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Subject: RE: [cti-stix] STIX: Messaging Standard vs. Document Standard


Jerome - Trying to put some context around what I'm seeing in the paper - What is being proposed is really a replacement for TAXII, no?  Is that what is being discussed in the TAXII group currently?

-----Original Message-----
From: cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org [mailto:cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org] On Behalf Of Jerome Athias
Sent: Monday, December 14, 2015 1:21 AM
To: Jordan, Bret
Cc: Patrick Maroney; Terry MacDonald; Jason Keirstead; Richard Struse; cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org; Wunder, John A.
Subject: Re: [cti-stix] STIX: Messaging Standard vs. Document Standard

A recommended read, interesting from multiple point of views for CTI, but in the context of this thread, mainly regarding these points:
Message-oriented Architecture
Resource-Oriented Architecture
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-mile-rolie-01

NB: You could also find interesting elements for TAXII




2015-12-12 9:51 GMT+03:00 Jerome Athias <athiasjerome@gmail.com>:
> Attached is an OLD draft (so not updated and with errors) diagram from 2012.
> (This is a good one in case it helps https://github.com/google/capirca 
> )
>
> NB: Mitigation is not Remediation
>
> (PS: and really far from me to say that it matters in any way!
> But, because we don't share our resumes. I would just say that I am a
> 36 years old Otaku/Hacker [1] who started manipulating computers 25+ 
> years ago, and who probably spent in average 8 plenty hours a day 
> (including week-ends and vacations) on these automatons during the 
> past 10/15 years)
>
>
> [1] 1. A person who enjoys exploring the details of programmable 
> systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to most 
> users, who prefer to learn only the minimum necessary. RFC1392, the 
> Internet Users' Glossary, usefully amplifies this as: A person who 
> delights in having an intimate understanding of the internal workings 
> of a system, computers and computer networks in particular.
> 2. One who programs enthusiastically (even obsessively) or who enjoys 
> programming rather than just theorizing about programming.
> 3. One who enjoys the intellectual challenge of creatively overcoming 
> or circumventing limitations.
>
>
> 2015-12-01 3:46 GMT+03:00 Jordan, Bret <bret.jordan@bluecoat.com>:
>> Nice diagram.  One thing I am working on internal to BC is to get it 
>> so you can send your STIX indicator / CybOX object to the Solera 
>> Security Analytics device and do automatic retrospective analysis.  
>> This will allow you to see if you have seen said object before.  This would fit in to this work flow
>> nicely, I believe.    Another area would be in automatic remediation, aka
>> sent a STIX indicator / CybOX object with a Coarse of Action to your 
>> Proxy and tell it to block that traffic.
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Bret
>>
>>
>>
>> Bret Jordan CISSP
>> Director of Security Architecture and Standards | Office of the CTO 
>> Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 
>> 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, 
>> however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>>
>> On Nov 30, 2015, at 17:41, Patrick Maroney <Pmaroney@Specere.org> wrote:
>>
>> re: " Now lets talk about work flow and how this information is going 
>> to flow around the network, how it is going to flow in to vendor tools,  "
>>
>> Here is one Reference Implementation for consideration/discussion:
>>
>> <6DB53CE0-AB02-4DDD-ABB7-4A2A7FCD92B2.png>
>>
>> Patrick Maroney
>> Office:  (856)983-0001
>> Cell:      (609)841-5104
>>
>> <C690F973-64C5-4C00-889B-C1A5BB4A2A0B[6].png>
>>
>> President
>> Integrated Networking Technologies, Inc.
>> PO Box 569
>> Marlton, NJ 08053
>>
>> From: <cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org> on behalf of Bret Jordan 
>> <bret.jordan@bluecoat.com>
>> Date: Monday, November 30, 2015 at 7:25 PM
>> To: Terry MacDonald <terry@soltra.com>
>> Cc: Jason Keirstead <Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com>, Richard Struse 
>> <Richard.Struse@HQ.DHS.GOV>, "cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org"
>> <cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org>, John Wunder <jwunder@mitre.org>
>> Subject: Re: [cti-stix] STIX: Messaging Standard vs. Document 
>> Standard
>>
>> You are correct, some organizations will do it in-house, some will 
>> outsource, and I will add that some will just not care. We have an 
>> amazing group that does APT research and has a massive amount of 
>> internal data mining tools to find this sort of stuff.  We help a lot 
>> of the biggest companies and governments solve these problem, every day.
>>
>> Some organizations that outsource or do things internally MAY share 
>> sightings or things back within their eco-systems, or they may even 
>> share with certain government groups.  But their own legal 
>> departments and general councils will dictate what they can share and with whom they can share it.
>>
>> Remember getting a huge repo of STIX data, in your Soltra Edge device 
>> is NOT going to magically make you any more secure. You need vendor 
>> products that sit inline in your network that can actually DO something with that data.
>> Those products typically only understands what we call CybOX objects. 
>> They do NOT understand nor care about higher level things.  We humans 
>> and analysts and big data intelligence platforms do care about higher 
>> level things.  It helps us figure out what is going on, and REALLY 
>> helps in retrospective analysis of an attack.
>>
>> Lets put this in real world terms...   Government or vendor XYZ discovers
>> that threat actor Ivan is launching an attack against executives of 
>> high tech companies in Silicon Valley.  They believe Ivan is going to 
>> use Whale Phishing based on the latest Audi and BMW cars.
>>
>> This is great information.  Now lets talk about work flow and how 
>> this information is going to flow around the network, how it is going 
>> to flow in to vendor tools, how it is going to flow in to user 
>> awareness programs and training programs.
>>
>> And maybe, just maybe, some organizations might send some data back 
>> or share pieces of information that they learn.  We do this today.  
>> We have interconnections with lots of groups where we share data back and forth.
>> This is not new.  We have been doing this for 14 years.
>>
>> Lets focus on workflow and how we can make an analysts life easier 
>> and make vendor product use and understand the data they can.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Bret
>>
>>
>>
>> Bret Jordan CISSP
>> Director of Security Architecture and Standards | Office of the CTO 
>> Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 
>> 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, 
>> however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>>
>> On Nov 30, 2015, at 17:09, Terry MacDonald <terry@soltra.com> wrote:
>>
>> Bret,
>>
>> I foresee that Organizations will share data between their own 
>> internal tools (to understand threats and look for indicators of that 
>> threats) most often. It’s not all about sharing that information with 
>> external parties. An Organization needs to do both in order to make 
>> best use of Threat Intelligence. They need to join those two 
>> processes together. Threat Intelligence and Incident Response.
>>
>> Now a lot of Organizations will not have the ability or the 
>> inclination to do the Threat Intelligence gathering/sifting/etc 
>> required to build up a picture of the threats relevant to their 
>> Organization profile, but that’s not a problem. They’ll just outsource it.
>>
>> Organizations will outsource their threat intelligence function to 
>> third parties who will look for threat intelligence that matches the 
>> Organizations risk profile  on their behalf. The organizations will 
>> then just get feeds of Indicators customized to their Organization, 
>> and will then feedback sightings they see. They will also push up any 
>> interesting observations they notice, and the Threat Intelligence 
>> providers will use that data to discern any new Threat Actors/Campaigns/malware families as needed.
>>
>> It doesn’t matter if the threat analysis is done in house, or is 
>> outsourced – the deep research still needs to be done in order to 
>> discover new Indicators, and to track the changes that take place 
>> over time. Without the deep analysis, the Indicators will soon lose 
>> their accuracy. And without the real-world feedback, the Threat 
>> Intelligence modelling will become less accurate.
>>
>> Each process makes the other one stronger.
>>
>> One thing I would like to point out is the need to move away from ‘dumb’
>> Indicator feeds, where the recipient gets a hug wall of Indicators 
>> that contain every bad things that the world has seen over the last 3 months.
>> This won’t scale, and all it does is increase the cost to 
>> Organizations as they have to increase infrastructure and personnel 
>> resources to cope with the increased workload. Higher chances of 
>> false positives and less understanding of what the really important indicators are.
>>
>> By using Threat intelligence and an understanding of our adversaries 
>> , we will know who is likely to target us, and we can look for the 
>> things they do. We have less noise to contend with, and we spend our 
>> precious infrastructure and personnel resources looking for things that matter to us.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Terry MacDonald
>> Senior STIX Subject Matter Expert
>> SOLTRA | An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company
>> +61 (407) 203 206 | terry@soltra.com
>>
>>
>> From: Jordan, Bret [mailto:bret.jordan@bluecoat.com]
>> Sent: Tuesday, 1 December 2015 9:45 AM
>> To: Terry MacDonald <terry@soltra.com>
>> Cc: Jason Keirstead <Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com>; Richard Struse 
>> <Richard.Struse@HQ.DHS.GOV>; cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org; Wunder, John A.
>> <jwunder@mitre.org>
>> Subject: Re: [cti-stix] STIX: Messaging Standard vs. Document 
>> Standard
>>
>> Re: It’s a symbiotic relationship!
>>
>> It is only a symbiotic relationship, if the two organizations are 
>> communicating.  We make a LOT of assumptions that people and 
>> organizations are going to do anything more than just process 
>> indicators (meaning block them on their firewall or proxy).  Most, 
>> honestly, do not care.  They may share sighting information back to their own internal tools.  But I doubt
>> many will share sightings back to the larger community.   The general
>> council's of most organizations will prohibit that for many years to come.
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Bret
>>
>>
>>
>> Bret Jordan CISSP
>> Director of Security Architecture and Standards | Office of the CTO 
>> Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 
>> 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, 
>> however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>>
>>
>> On Nov 30, 2015, at 14:02, Terry MacDonald <terry@soltra.com> wrote:
>>
>> “There is no actual reason that indicator or sighting messages need 
>> to be a layer on top of the ontology. They are for totally different 
>> use cases and can be developed completely independently.”
>>
>> There needs to be a relationship between the Indicators and sightings 
>> that are exchanged and the higher-order threat intelligence that is 
>> exchanged, or there is no way to relate the two levels together. The 
>> key important part in all of this is to be able to maintain relationships from one to the other.
>> Without that ability then there is no way to do the analysis.
>>
>> Frode Hommedal put it best in his presentation to FIRST:
>> http://frodehommedal.no/presentations/first-tc-oslo-2015. I implore 
>> you to read it if you haven’t already. Especially this slide.
>>
>> As I see it the two camps fall into these broad groups:
>> ·         All of STIX: Threat Intelligence group
>> o   “We need to track everything otherwise we won’t be able to understand
>> the bad guys”
>> o   “Everything is related to everything”
>> ·         Indicators and Sightings: Incident Response group
>> o   “We don’t need to understand them, we just need to detect them damn it”
>> o   “I only care about Indicators and Sightings”
>>
>> The thing that not many people realize is that you need both, and you 
>> need a way of crossing from one to the other. I think this diagram I 
>> created
>> (©Threatloop.com) demonstrates why:
>>
>> <image001.png>
>>
>> The Incident Response process needs to know what Indicators are the 
>> ones that your Organization needs to look for. At present monitoring 
>> and detection systems are struggling to operate with the number of 
>> indicators they need to be looking for. The Threat intelligence 
>> process knows what threats are most likely…. So wouldn’t it be 
>> sensible to use the Threat Intelligence process to generate/filter 
>> the Indicators so that the Incident Response process has a far 
>> smaller number of things and more important things to look for?
>>
>> And the Threat Intelligence process need to know what the Incident 
>> Response process is seeing. Maybe there is a new Threat Actor in 
>> town? Maybe an existing Threat Actor is starting a new campaign? 
>> Threat Intelligence processes need to be able to record what is 
>> happening to be able to generate Indicators that make sense and 
>> follow what the real risks to the Organization are.
>>
>> It’s a symbiotic relationship! Both are equally important, and in 
>> fact are critical to improving Organization’s abilities to protect themselves.
>>
>> You MUST be able to map from one process to another.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Terry MacDonald
>> Senior STIX Subject Matter Expert
>> SOLTRA | An FS-ISAC and DTCC Company
>> +61 (407) 203 206 | terry@soltra.com
>>
>>
>> From: cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org 
>> [mailto:cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org]
>> On Behalf Of Jordan, Bret
>> Sent: Tuesday, 1 December 2015 4:35 AM
>> To: Jason Keirstead <Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com>
>> Cc: Richard Struse <Richard.Struse@HQ.DHS.GOV>; 
>> cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org; Wunder, John A. <jwunder@mitre.org>
>> Subject: Re: [cti-stix] STIX: Messaging Standard vs. Document 
>> Standard
>>
>> I agree with Jason.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Bret
>>
>>
>>
>> Bret Jordan CISSP
>> Director of Security Architecture and Standards | Office of the CTO 
>> Blue Coat Systems PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 
>> 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, 
>> however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg."
>>
>>
>> On Nov 30, 2015, at 08:35, Jason Keirstead 
>> <Jason.Keirstead@ca.ibm.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Precisely.
>>
>> If we can agree on the below.. then work on the standardization of 
>> messages can be done independently of the underlying model.
>>
>> RE @Sean: However, I do not view these message specifications as an 
>> alternative or independent thing from the model/ontology. I would 
>> view them as a layer on top of the model/ontology that allows focused 
>> and explicit representation of a small subset of information from the 
>> model/ontology that is relevant for a given exchange use case.
>>
>> I disagree here - this is why we are having such a hard time with the 
>> current paradigm.
>>
>> There is no actual reason that indicator or sighting messages need to 
>> be a layer on top of the ontology. They are for totally different use 
>> cases and can be developed completely independently.
>>
>> -
>> Jason Keirstead
>> Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems 
>> www.ibm.com/security | www.securityintelligence.com
>>
>> Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - 
>> Unknown
>>
>>
>> <graycol.gif>"Struse, Richard" ---11/30/2015 11:04:55 AM---So, what I 
>> think I’m hearing is that we envision a world where we define a 
>> serialization for STIX &
>>
>> From: "Struse, Richard" <Richard.Struse@HQ.DHS.GOV>
>> To: Jason Keirstead/CanEast/IBM@IBMCA, "Wunder, John A." 
>> <jwunder@mitre.org>
>> Cc: "cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org" <cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org>
>> Date: 11/30/2015 11:04 AM
>> Subject: RE: [cti-stix] STIX: Messaging Standard vs. Document 
>> Standard ________________________________
>>
>>
>>
>> So, what I think I’m hearing is that we envision a world where we 
>> define a serialization for STIX & CybOX (let’s assume in JSON) and 
>> implementations can exchange “documents” using the serialization of 
>> the complete data model (e.g. for communicating a new TTP for an 
>> existing threat actor).  However, in addition to this, we might 
>> define/standardized specialized message exchanges for a set of common 
>> use-cases such as indicator or indicator-sighting exchange.  This 
>> would allow appliances, for example, to simply implement the 
>> use-case-specific message exchanges that make sense without having to implement the full STIX model.
>>
>> As a result, I foresee implementations asserting what exchanges they 
>> support, perhaps as follows:
>> CTI-O-MATIC Threat Analysis Platform
>>                 STIX Exchange: SUPPPORTED
>>                 Indicator Exchange: SUPPORTED
>>                 Indicator-Sighting Exchange: SUPPORTED
>>                 Etc.
>>
>> ACME IDS 9000 Appliance
>>                 STIX Exchange:  NOT SUPPORTED
>>                 Indicator Exchange: SUPPORTED
>>                 Indicator-Sighting Exchange: SUPPORTED
>>
>> Does this make sense?
>> From: cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org 
>> [mailto:cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org]
>> On Behalf Of Jason Keirstead
>> Sent: Monday, November 30, 2015 9:47 AM
>> To: Wunder, John A.
>> Cc: cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org
>> Subject: Re: [cti-stix] STIX: Messaging Standard vs. Document 
>> Standard "What about a new TTP for an existing threat actor? I would 
>> not want to have to do an RDF-based exchange to share that type of 
>> information (still holding out hope for a reasonable JSON-LD 
>> approach) but I’m also not sure we can build messages to cover those use cases."
>>
>> I believe you would indeed do a complex exchange for that. This is 
>> not a "messaging" use case, it is a "document share" use case. The 
>> difference in complexity between sharing TTP information to sighting 
>> information is similar to emailing a word document vs. engaging in an 
>> IM session. It's not the same.
>>
>> My point is that the huge amount of third party vendors who want to 
>> "speak STIX" to communicate and/or absorb indicators, observables, 
>> and sightings, are not interested in use cases like "TTP for an existing threat actor".
>> They don't have that information, and they can't act on that information.
>> You aren't going to get TTP information out of an IPS, and you aren't 
>> going to send TTP information to an IDS or Firewall. But you will get 
>> Indicators and sightings from an IPS, and you will want to send 
>> observables to an IDS or Firewall.
>>
>> These are the two different use cases - one that lends itself to a 
>> semantic model, and one that lends itself to a compact and coherent messaging format.
>>
>> -
>> Jason Keirstead
>> Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems 
>> www.ibm.com/security | www.securityintelligence.com
>>
>> Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - 
>> Unknown
>>
>>
>> <graycol.gif>"Wunder, John A." ---11/30/2015 10:04:36 AM---So to be 
>> honest I’m not yet as convinced on this approach as all of you 
>> (sorry). I can definitely se
>>
>> From: "Wunder, John A." <jwunder@mitre.org>
>> To: "cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org" <cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org>
>> Date: 11/30/2015 10:04 AM
>> Subject: Re: [cti-stix] STIX: Messaging Standard vs. Document 
>> Standard Sent by: <cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org> 
>> ________________________________
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> So to be honest I’m not yet as convinced on this approach as all of 
>> you (sorry). I can definitely see the value of messages at the level 
>> of sightings and indicators but it seems to me like there’s a giant 
>> middle ground of use cases where we don’t want to define 
>> tightly-scoped messages but the document-based approach would still 
>> be a burden. For these cases I was hoping the JSON serialization of the full model would be used.
>>
>> For example, would we have a message to represent a new incident? 
>> What would the message semantics be? What about a new TTP for an existing threat actor?
>> I would not want to have to do an RDF-based exchange to share that 
>> type of information (still holding out hope for a reasonable JSON-LD 
>> approach) but I’m also not sure we can build messages to cover those use cases.
>>
>> Jason, Jon, Mark…what do you all think about that? Would we define 
>> messages for that? Would we have third-party messages (i.e. my app 
>> can define a non-standard CTI message based on the data model)? Would we just use RDF?
>>
>> John
>> On Nov 30, 2015, at 8:42 AM, Jason Keirstead 
>> <Jason.Keirstead@CA.IBM.COM>
>> wrote:
>> +1 to all below recommendations... exactly my line of thinking.
>>
>> It may or may not be more work to undertake these two parallel 
>> efforts - but I believe that it would allow both efforts to more 
>> forward in a faster and more coherent way than the current methodology.
>>
>> -
>> Jason Keirstead
>> Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems 
>> www.ibm.com/security | www.securityintelligence.com
>>
>> Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - 
>> Unknown
>>
>>
>> <graycol.gif>"Baker, Jon" ---11/30/2015 09:36:44 AM---+1 Thanks for 
>> thinking through the underlying issues that might be making it so 
>> hard to achieve cons
>>
>> From: "Baker, Jon" <bakerj@mitre.org>
>> To: Jason Keirstead/CanEast/IBM@IBMCA, "cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org"
>> <cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org>
>> Date: 11/30/2015 09:36 AM
>> Subject: RE: [cti-stix] STIX: Messaging Standard vs. Document 
>> Standard Sent by: <cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org> 
>> ________________________________
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> +1
>>
>> Thanks for thinking through the underlying issues that might be 
>> making it so hard to achieve consensus. I completely agree that by 
>> trying to develop a messaging standard and a document standard in one 
>> effort is a significant source of frustration for this group. This is 
>> how I have thought about this
>> issue:
>>
>>
>> STIX has two primary use cases
>> • UC1: Holistic cyber threat analysis • UC2: Exchange cyber threat 
>> information Requirements for UC1 are not always conducive to 
>> effective information exchange
>>
>> My basic recommendation would be as follows:
>>
>> Differentiate analysis and sharing requirements • avoid overloading 
>> analysis model with exchange requirements • avoid overloading 
>> exchange with analysis requirements Develop a high level model of 
>> cyber threat intelligence for analysis • initially in UML, but a 
>> semantic representation can be developed Develop messages tailored to 
>> information exchange needs • each exchange has a formal specification 
>> • ensure messages are compatible with the analysis model • allow 
>> protocol and serialization to be dictated by information exchange 
>> needs • initially specify only a few well known and well defined 
>> messages • plan for many messages, but add messages over time as real 
>> needs are understood
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> ============================================
>> Jonathan O. Baker
>> J83D - Cyber Security Partnerships, Sharing, and Automation The MITRE 
>> Corporation
>> Email: bakerj@mitre.org
>>
>> From: cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org 
>> [mailto:cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org]
>> On Behalf Of Jason Keirstead
>> Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2015 8:47 AM
>> To: cti-stix@lists.oasis-open.org
>> Subject: [cti-stix] STIX: Messaging Standard vs. Document Standard 
>> When I originally started this message, I had started it with a "here 
>> is why I am against JSON-LD" stance, but then decided to take a step 
>> FAR BACK and try to figure out / tease apart the fundamental reasons 
>> why people are both for and against JSON-LD. As a result of my 
>> analysis, I think am starting to figure out why there are two diametrically opposed camps here.
>>
>> The root I believe is that there is a fundamental disconnect between 
>> an ideal messaging standard and a document standard, yet STIX is 
>> trying to serve both masters. I am not sure that it can, and keep 
>> everyone happy. At any rate, I hope if everyone can read through the 
>> below, it will at least help each camp start to see the other's point of view.
>>
>> Things desired in a document standard:
>> - Clarity of the source and meaning of the data
>> - Readability by humans can sometimes be a factor depending on use 
>> cases
>> - Byte-efficiency is a secondary or tertiary concern (disk is cheap)
>>
>> In a document standard, it is now the standard practice that the 
>> schema accompanies the document. This is the core tenant of JSON-LD 
>> and other related semantic technologies - that your data is annotated 
>> in a way such that it can be linked back to the schema that defined 
>> it, which then also allows you to infer the semantic meaning behind 
>> fields in the document. This lets people and systems cross-correlate 
>> and search documents of different types that contain fields that are 
>> related semantically, without having to have standard-specific code written for them.
>> Things desired in a messaging standard:
>>
>> - Maximum byte efficiency (bandwidth is not cheap)
>> - Absolutely zero ambiguity
>> - Readability by humans is a secondary (or tertiary) concern, 
>> sometimes not a concern at all In a messaging standard, the schema 
>> has no reason to accompany the message, because anyone who implements 
>> it would have zero ambiguity anyway, and doing so greatly inflates 
>> the size of the messages. You also don't have to infer meaning of a 
>> field in a messaging standard, because the meaning is fixed and is 
>> not open to any interpretation. As such, semantic technologies are 
>> not required in a messaging standard, because they aren't even 
>> applicable to the use case.
>> The root of our problem here and I believe why we can not come to 
>> consensus, is we are trying to come up with one standard that does 
>> both things, which are actually philosophically opposed to 
>> each-other. There is an extremely large community of people and 
>> systems who want to "speak STIX", but they have no plans to STORE 
>> STIX, and this could not care less about semantic representations. 
>> Similarly, there is a large community of people and systems who want 
>> to (and already have) systems with large STIX warehouses, and very 
>> much care about semantic representations, so that they can tie that data to other systems.
>>
>> Maybe we should take a step back and look at this more critically. If 
>> you look at what people care about from a "frequently messaged" 
>> perspective (namely of indicators and observable occurrences) maybe 
>> that should be moved under TAXII? Currently, TAXII is just a transit 
>> protocol and the standard of the messages is simply " a STIX 
>> document". I am starting to think that this is not enough and it's 
>> part of why we can't reach any consensus. There is no reason that 
>> there could not be a messaging format in TAXII to communicate 
>> indicators and observables that was an offshoot of STIX but not STIX 
>> itself... meanwhile there could continue to be a channel for full/complete "STIX documents" which are transmitted with much less frequency.
>> -
>> Jason Keirstead
>> Product Architect, Security Intelligence, IBM Security Systems 
>> www.ibm.com/security | www.securityintelligence.com
>>
>> Without data, all you are is just another person with an opinion - 
>> Unknown
>>
>>
>>

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