RE: [dss] Timestamping

["Nick Pope" <pope@secstan.com>]

Trevor, Robert,

I agree with what Trevor has stated in his earlier messages.

If we have to define a different protocol for all the different potential
semantics of a DSS service then we are going have to define a multitude of
protocols.  Depending on the different inputs and output options being
considered the DSS will have different semantics.  We have already defined
in the use cases which have different semantics: e.g. for individal
signatures, corporate seals, delegated signatures, protecting SOAP
exchanges, notarisation .....  If we define a separate protocol for each
then we will never finish our job.  Also, if we do have a separate protocol
for time-stamping I am concerned also about the need for a separate protocol
for verification of time-stamps.

In addition, having taken part in & watched years of discussion on the
"non-repudiation bit", the exact semantics, and by implication legal
liabilities, associated with signed data is much more than a technical
question.

I suggest that a more efficient approach would be as mentioned at the last
DSS meeting:  that is to define a generic protocol with profiles for
specific uses.  One of these profiles can be for time-stamping.

Nick





> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert Zuccherato [mailto:robert.zuccherato@entrust.com]
> Sent: 21 March 2003 15:17
> To: dss@lists.oasis-open.org
> Subject: RE: [dss] Timestamping
>
>
> Trevor;
>
> My feeling is that the semantics of a TSA's signature is substantially
> different enough from the semantics of other signatures that it warrants a
> separate syntax, or <TSTInfo>, for the signed data.  Thus, I
> support option
> B below.
>
> Let's compare the timestamping scenario with the Corporate Seal use case
> where only the hash of the data is sent to the server and the server
> includes a time-mark (as some sort of authenticated attribute).  This use
> case is probably the closest in practice to the timestamping scenario.  In
> both situations the server sees only the hash of the data and in both
> situations the server is appending the current time in some fashion.  The
> semantics of the two situations are very different though.  The TSA is not
> purporting to have originated the data and is not agreeing to the data in
> any way.  It is simply purporting to have seen the hash at that time.
> However, in the Corporate Seal use case I argue that even though
> the server
> itself has not seen the actual data, the entity that has
> submitted the data
> to the server has and thus the server can claim to have
> originated the data
> or can agree to the data on behalf of that submitter.  This is why
> authentication to the server in this use case is so important.  The server
> is actually delegating some of it's responsibilities as a signer to the
> submitter and must authenticate that the submission is from a trusted
> entity.  Thus, the corporate seal provides origin authentication or agrees
> to the data on an organizational level.
>
> Now, we could still load all of these semantics into some sort of signed
> attribute and if we could be sure that the attribute would always be
> honoured, this would likely be fine.  However, we don't have any
> criticality
> defined for authenticated attributes in most of the signature
> formats that I
> can think of.  Thus, I believe that it is likely that these TSA signatures
> will be mis-interpreted.  The safe way of doing things, I believe, is to
> have a separate syntax for timestamped data.
>
> 	Robert.
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Trevor Perrin [mailto:trevp@trevp.net]
> > Sent: Tuesday, March 18, 2003 4:38 PM
> > To: dss@lists.oasis-open.org
> > Subject: [dss] Timestamping
> >
> >
> >
> > The requirements subcommittee is considering what the
> > requirements should
> > be for a timestamp format and protocol.  We'd like some input
> > from the
> > group, since this hasn't had much discussion yet.
> >
> > Currently, the notions of time-marked signatures and time-stamped
> > signatures have been defined:
> >
> > A time-marked signature is just a signature on some content
> > with a signed
> > attribute (created by the signer) containing the signing time.
> >
> > A time-stamped signature contains, as an unsigned attribute,
> > a timestamp
> > "token", which somehow binds the time and a hash of the time-stamped
> > signature's signatureValue, and is created and signed by a
> > 3rd party TSA
> > (Time Stamp Authority).
> >
> > More generally, a timestamp token may be used to timestamp
> > other things
> > than a signatureValue.
> >
> > Now, whatever format the timestamp token takes, a timestamp
> > protocol just
> > requires the client send a hash and receive back a token.
> > This shouldn't
> > be any different from the DSS protocol used in the
> > "client-side hashing"
> > and "receiving a detached signature" case.  Thus,
> > time-stamping should just
> > be a use-case of the DSS protocol, not a separate protocol.
> >
> > As for an XML timestamp token format, there's two approaches:
> > A) Define a time-stamp token as just a time-marked signature
> > produced by a
> > 3rd-party that's trusted as a TSA.
> > B) Define a time-stamp token as a signature on some new
> > <TSTInfo> structure
> > containing a hash of the to-be-timestamped data and the time.
> >
> > In (A), the TSA produces a normal signature using the hash of the
> > to-be-timestamped data, with time as a signed attribute.  In
> > (B), the TSA
> > combines the hash of the to-be-timestamped data with the time
> > into a new
> > structure, and produces a normal signature on that.  (B) is
> > the approach
> > used in RFC 3161, which is PKIX's timestamping protocol, and
> > is used to
> > timestamp CMS signatures.
> >
> > The benefit of (A) is that timestamps aren't handled
> > differently from any
> > other signature type, they're just a particular "semantics"
> > instead of
> > "syntax".  The argument against this, is that timestamps
> > *are* different
> > from other signatures:  Normally signatures testify that the
> > contents are
> > associated with the signer as an originating entity, not that
> > the contents
> > are associated with a time.  So timestamps should have a
> > different syntax
> > to ensure that they're processed correctly, and that a Relying Party
> > understands that the time is the important thing, and doesn't
> > mistakenly
> > ignore a signing-time signed attribute and think the TSA
> > originated the
> > to-be-signed data.
> >
> > One way of framing the question: what are the semantics of a
> > raw, DSIG
> > signature?  If a DSIG signature is just a statement of the
> > form "someone
> > says something about some data", where
> >   - the speaker ("someone") is identified with a <KeyInfo>
> >   - the object ("some data") is identified with a <SignedInfo>
> >   - the predicate (what is being said about the object) is
> > identified by
> > the <KeyInfo>'s properties/policy identifiers and signed attributes
> >
> > Then asserting that the data existed at a certain time is
> > just another
> > predicate that can be asserted about <SignedInfo>, along with
> > asserting
> > that you originated it, or asserting that you agree to its
> > contents, or
> > asserting that it really came from some Identified Requestor.
> >
> > But if a DSIG signature also carries the semantics that the signer
> > originated the data, then it would be misleading for a TSA to
> > produce a
> > signature on the to-be-timestamped hash while relegating the
> > signing time
> > to a signed attribute (but then wouldn't any use case where
> > the server
> > didn't originate the data, but just signed a hash, be misleading?).
> >
> > But that may be unfair (I'm biased towards A).  What do other
> > people prefer?
> >
> > Trevor
> >
>
>