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Subject: Re: [P1619-3] OASIS EKMI Article in InformationWeek
[Note: The protocol used within a Symmetric Key Management System (SKMS) - one of two major components of an EKMI (the other being a PKI) - is the Symmetric Key Services Markup Language (SKSML).] To date, there is only one implementation of the DRAFT 1 version of the SKSML protocol (an open-source implementation called StrongKey, produced by our company and available at www.strongkey.org). The protocol, after much discussion within the OASIS TC over the last 18 months, is at DRAFT 6 and is scheduled to be released to the general internet for review and comments within the next 10-14 days (it is under ballot within the committee as we speak). While confidentiality agreements with our customers preclude us from mentioning where it is being used, I will point you to some publicly available statistics on the number of downloads of StrongKey at SourceForge.net: http://sourceforge.net/search/?type_of_search=soft&type_of_search=soft&words=strongkey If we assume that a mere 2-3% of the downloads are in use, that makes 30-45 EKMI's using the DRAFT 1 protocol. Not much, I agree, when you compare it to the millions of downloads of software like the JDK, Apache, JBoss, etc.; but we're talking about a paradigm-shift in cryptographic key management here - a highly specialized niche - so it will take time to register. I will also point you to the OASIS EKMI TC home-page, where you can see the publicly-visible supporters of the protocol, which includes: - CA - FundServ (a Canadian company) - MISMO (the Mortgage Industry Association in the US) - PrimeKey (a Swedish company) - Red Hat - the US Department of Defense - Wave Systems and - Wells Fargo. What is not visible - unless you are an OASIS member - is that two of the three largest software companies in the world, two of the three largest security software companies in the world, and two very large consulting firms, are all Observers on the Technical Committee. While the number of EKMI TC members certainly is smaller than the 1619.3 WG, there is a broader acceptance across business sectors for the vision of EKMI. Given this, I would like to make a suggestion to the storage vendors in the P1619.3 WG. (Please don't shoot the messenger because of the unpopularity of this message I'm about to give) :-). It is my personal belief that the market for storage-device based encryption will dry up within 3-5 years. Why? Because of the following: An application stack on a running server resembles something like the following diagram (I've simplified it for brevity - real applications typically have more layers in the stack): +-----------------------+ | Application Layer | <-- Focus of OASIS EKMI TC efforts +-----------------------+ | Network Layer | +-----------------------+ | Web-server Layer | +-----------------------+ | Application Server | +-----------------------+ | Database Layer | +-----------------------+ | Operating System | +-----------------------+ | Storage Device | <-- Focus of IEEE P1619.3 WG efforts +-----------------------+ While transparently encrypting/decrypting data as it goes in and out of the storage device makes it easy for enterprises in the short-term, it does not protect them from attacks on plaintext in any of the layers above the storage device. The only threat that encrypted storage devices protect against is, theft. For an always-on, operational system in a data-center, this is an insufficient counter-measure against data-breaches, since an attacker may be reading plaintext at ANY of the layers above the storage device and land the company on the front-pages of the Wall Street Journal and CNN in spite of the encrypted storage device. This is not to say that the OASIS effort eliminates the problem - it does not. However, it minimizes the attack-surface to the minimum possible target, and allows the enterprise to not have to duplicate protecting data in any of the layers below the application layer. Given that many application developers already have to protect their applications from X-site scripting, SQL Injection, and a host of new application-specific vulnerabilities, adding encryption to the list of things to do is going to become a formality. The OASIS effort is also planning on educating IT Auditors through ISACA about potential vulnerabilities in the stack (as shown above), so ignorance on the part of developers/managers will not be an excuse for too long if they want to comply with SOX, GLBA, PCI-DSS, HIPAA, FISMA, PIPEDA, EU Directive, etc. It is my belief that once ISVs and customers recognize this problem, they will start modifying their applications to encrypt data at the application layer. Once we're past the tipping-point on that, there will be little need for duplicating encryption on storage-devices. Notwithstanding this, I believe there is a place for the P1619.3 protocol in the short-medium term - it is to take the keys and polices supplied by an EKMI and push it down to the storage devices for storage-based encryption in the intervening years before applications encrypt data directly. Towards that end, what is needed is a compact binary protocol that can be used between the Management Console of the Storage environment and the storage device itself, while the MC itself becomes an EKMI client and uses the SKSML protocol to get the keys and policies. It is my belief that the WS-MAN based XML protocol being worked on by the P1619.3 WG will create confusion in the marketplace. While this will serve the key-management vendors in the WG (who are not members of the OASIS effort), it neither serves the industry nor the storage vendors. Since the market for encrypted storage-devices is not a long-lived one, how much effort do storage vendors want to put into building XML-based protocols, libraries, tools and MC applications, when another effort has reasonable acceptance and traction, and can be easily used to meet the goals of the storage industry? If storage-industry budgets allow for duplicating the OASIS work and dealing with the mixed-marketing messages that customers receive, that's a different issue. However, if you want to optimize your investments while making the most of the opportunity that presents itself over the next 3-5 years, then it makes sense to do the minimum necessary work on the binary protocol and use the OASIS XML-based protocol where it makes sense. Arshad Noor StrongAuth,Inc. Luther Martin wrote: > How many vendors have implemented EKMI? Are there any users of it? Knowing how it has succeeded or failed might provide some particularly useful insights for P1619.3. > > ________________________________ > From: Gary Palgon [gpalgon@NUBRIDGES.COM] > Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2008 7:22 AM > To: P1619-3@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG > Subject: [P1619-3] OASIS EKMI Article in InformationWeek > > Oasis' open Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure initiative promises less-complex encryption. But will vendors get on board? > > http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml?articleID=208800937 > > > Gary Palgon > VP Product Management > gpalgon@nubridges.com<UrlBlockedError.aspx> > nuBridges, Inc. | 1000 Abernathy Road | Suite 250 | Atlanta GA USA 30328 > Tel: +1 770 730 3592 | Fax: +1 770 730 3784 > > www.nubridges.com<http://www.nubridges.com> > The Secure eBusiness Authority
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