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Subject: RE: [emergency] CAP and Signatures/Encryption
I agree. I am talking about simulation to ensure that the systems being procured today and tomorrow will talk as designed and under stress. The NIMS doctrine of local control matches the reality of the majority of emergency management situations under normal circumstances. The NRP is not designed for these. It is designed for extraordinary circumstances when Federal systems must come online quickly to engage these local systems. That is why it emphasizes Incidents of National Significance. Worst Case Scenarios for chemical spills are far less complex than a coordinated attack on multiple facilities designed to drive responders and resources into a particular path of most destruction. That is war, Art. It is the careful allocation of limited resources to events designed to make the enemy do as much damage to himself as possible. The President doesn't become a principal whem a tanker truck turns over. His Assistants are notified when one is stolen, yes. Think the unthinkable. Analyze 911. It was a failure of performance based on inadequate planning AND communication, not a failure of available assets or local analysis of events. All I am saying is pare it down to a set of requirements ALL systems that play a part MUST meet to ensure interoperability. To do less is bad engineering and won't meet the hard requirements coming out of the Beltway. KISS. We have to put this stuff online in a short time. len -----Original Message----- From: Art Botterell [mailto:acb@incident.com] Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 7:12 PM To: emergency@lists.oasis-open.org Subject: RE: [emergency] CAP and Signatures/Encryption At 5:04 PM -0600 1/27/05, Bullard, Claude L (Len) wrote: >I don't think they will entertain chaos theory during an Incident of >National Significance. Certainly anyone who's ever managed a major disaster has had to come to terms with chaos theory.;-) Anyway, we're talking about planning and design, not response. And experienced emergency planners know to guard against being mesmerized by Worst Case Scenarios, which, paradoxically, are often much simpler than the much more common less dramatic ones. For just one example, in a WCS there's no ambiguity about whether the situation falls under emergency procedures or routine ones. In the vast majority of real-world emergencies, the transition from routine to emergency procedure ripples out only a limited distance through the involved organizations and jurisdictions, and over a period of time, which means that a significant number of transactions always occur between folks who are operating in emergency mode and counterparts who have different priorities. In thirty years in and around emergency management I can't think of any major operation I've seen where that mismatch of modalities didn't spawn difficulties. Don't get me wrong, I'm an original and enthusiastic supporter of NIMS, based largely on my experience in deploying essentially the same thing in California during the 1990's (it was called SEMS there.) The reason ICS works... and has been extended from the field level upward over three decades to its national expression in NIMS... is that it can be used continually in the world as it is, not only for an INS/WCS/RBD (Really Bad Day). Again, it would be convenient for us if we could make the simplifying assumption that we're only devising capabilities for a full-blown NRP-activating event... and I'm all for standardization where possible... but our day-to-day context is much broader.
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