[humanmarkup-comment] RE: Regarding the Ground Rules for Ground Rules

[paul <beadmaster@ontologystream.com>]

I think that this would do well (see Len's remarks copied below).  It is not
exactly like I would have figured it out, but then I do not have the
tri-level architecture figured out completely.  I am open to the intuitions
that you have.

The tri-level would have a middle level where situatedness might occur
naturally if a human is involved in using the system to play a game or to
interact with a knowledge base.  I would hold that an opportunity for
becoming situated is produced in a rather nice way, but that unless the
computer system state is viewed and an experience is produced "within the
human (or natural system)" then there is no situatedness.

Situatedness can not be gotten away from if one is a natural system, we
"live" in the eternal now.  But something can be said about the variable
quality of the experience of the present moment.

In the tri-level computational architecture, the substrate is related to the
nature of the elements that human memories (or habits) of the past are
encoded.  This would be to make a correspondence between a view of the
neuropsychology of memory systems and the re-membering of elements into
something (a mental experience).

But there has to be a top down expectancy and the laws that govern the
assemble of atoms.

So the bottom up aggregation of invariance that occur (as parts of things)
and the top down of expectancies are brought together into the awareness of
the moment.  Can a computer program do something similar, well yes and no.

The computer program can not assemble from substructure in the way that
emergence in natural system does.  The birth process is a emergence process,
for example; as is the forming of an individual thought or emotion.  These
types of things are clearly involving more than one level of organization -
and in fact all natural process involves and relies on natural
stratification.

But the Quasi Axiomatic Theory of Finn, Pospelov and a community of Russian
logicians seemed to have advanced computer theory that is synthetically
stratified.

The programs are not stratified in the way that natural systems are, so we
might call these new types of computer programs "synthetic intelligence", as
I do in my recent work.

***

You see, your definition of compound is not completely satisfactory in that
the compound sign is not at the same level of organization as the contained
signs.  This is a form of the Russell Paradox regarding the set of all sets,
being a set or not.

There has to be an "real" emergence otherwise there is not a full and
natural stratification, and this can only occur outside of the computer
(using the interaction with any natural system - not necessarily a living
system).

****

I do not know how to resolve the problems that I am introducing.  I think
that a tri-level system could be developed by using any good descriptive
enumeration of gestures, and then use some devise to produce machine
gesturing as a means to allow a human to navigate quickly and correctly
through informational spaces.  In this context, I think that sign systems
can be said to have emerging viewpoints (formative ontology that is
interpreted by the humans (or other natural system)).  I am very
appreciative of the fact that you seem to see truly the nature of the
problem with scope and viewpoint.  Many do not see the issue at all.

Channels might be a proper language to talk about the propagation of sign,
meta data about signs and sensors themselves....  the beginning and end of
any channel may be a place where an external action occurs due to the
imposition of values from the natural world.

It would be nice to get the Topic Map notion of addressable and
non-addressable subjects back into place.

I like how this sits, what about others?  Does this seem reasonable.



-----Original Message-----
From: Bullard, Claude L (Len) [mailto:clbullar@ingr.com]
Sent: Monday, June 10, 2002 5:34 PM
To: 'paul'; Rex Brooks; drdodds42@hotmail.com
Cc: rkthunga@humanmarkup.org; categoricalAbstraction; Jeremy Lieberman
Subject: RE: Regarding the Ground Rules for Ground Rules


I believe I do.

If we propose a markup system into which gestural systems
can be organized by their sign properties (that is, identify
by markup signs which are

o  compound (signs that contain signs)

o  typed (eg, iconic, indexical, symbolic)

and so on

and these can then be organized into views, (eg, a world
view (organization of the perceived environment as learned
by episodes), a value view (eg, the learned or acquired
reactions to stimuli of given types, aka, the emotions)

then enable our processors for whatever representations
we use (say, the VR avatar) to work with these in various
interconnected ways (say routing values through the intermediate
functions we design), are we closer to what you are
describing?

Crudely, something like
                                                View Systems
                                                |-----------|
signs -> sensors - channels(perceptionTypes) -> |  values   | -> Acts ->
Actions
                                                |-----------_
                                                |  world    |
                                                |-----------|
with this inside an environment which
is itself capable of hosting or producing
signs, are we close to your concepts?

len