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Subject: [OASIS Issue Tracker] Updated: (OFFICE-3703) Proposal: ODF 1.3 Protection-Key Enhancements


     [ http://tools.oasis-open.org/issues/browse/OFFICE-3703?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]

Dennis Hamilton updated OFFICE-3703:
------------------------------------

             Proposal: 
[Updated 2012-06-12]

Version 1.05 of the full proposal with explanatory support is provided at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=46218 , with specification of explicit changes to the text of these sections of ODF 1.2 for incorporation in ODF 1.3:

There is related analysis considering the safe use of protection keys in ODF documents in draft advisory #00009 of the OIC TC, located at https://tools.oasis-open.org/version-control/svn/oic/Advisories/00009-ProtectionKeySafety/trunk/description.html


1. RATIONALE
    1.1 Vulnerability of Password Hash Values
    1.2 SHA1DK for Password-Based Protection-Key Values
    1.3 AUTHZ160 for Password-Less Protection-Key Values

2. PROPOSED CHANGES
   [Errata-style instructions for modifying the text of ODF 1.2 for transposition into ODF 1.3]

3. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
   3.1 Down-Level Considerations
   3.2 Immediate Usabilty of AUTHZ160 for Default Protection Keys
   3.3 Confirmation of Resilient Down-Level Treatment
   3.4 Future-Proofing of Extended ODF 1.2 Consumers and
Producers

Two new protection-key-digest-algorithm URIs are proposed.  One for sha1-salt with a minimum 20 byte salt, one for authz160 with a minimum 20-byte binary protection-key that is not dependent on a password and cannot be subjected to brute-force attack to obtain a password.

  was:
[Updated 2011-09-24]

Version 1.04 body of the proposal is maintained at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=43652 , with specification of explicit changes to the text of these sections of ODF 1.2 for incorporation in ODF 1.3 CSD01:


      A.    RATIONALE

      B.    PROPOSED CHANGES
               1. Front Page
               2. Section 19.697 table:protection-key
               3. Section 19.698 table:protection-key-digest-algorithm
               4. Section 19.850 text:protection-key
               5. Section 19.851 text:protection-key-digest-algorithm

   C. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Two new protection-key-digest-algorithm URIs are proposed.  One for sha1-salt with a minimum 20 byte salt, one for authz160 with a minimum 20-byte binary protection-key that is not dependent on a password and cannot be subjected to brute-force attack to obtain a password.

          Environment: This is an enhancement, described in terms of changes to OpenDocument-v1.2-os.  (was: This is an enhancement, described in terms of changes to OpenDocument-v1.2-cs01.)
          Component/s: Security
        Fix Version/s: ODF 1.3
    Affects Version/s: ODF 1.2
                       ODF 1.1
                       ODF 1.0 (second edition)
                       ODF 1.0
          Description: 
   The use of password hashes in easily-discovered XML element and attribute values is subject to compromise of the hashed password.  Although the use    of increasingly-stronger digest algorithms may lengthen the time required    for carrying out a brute-force attack on the hash, memorable passwords    remain subject to compromise and the attack becomes easier as processor    technology advances.  Recent (June 2012) reveal that there is an explosive growth in hacks involving the discovery of passwords that are authenticated by use of unsalted digest algorithms.
   
 In addition, the presence of hashes in plain sight in XML documents allows the digest value to be easily compared with the same digest value elsewhere, revealing worthy targets to an adversary.  In addition, the digest value is easily removed/replaced.  And an extracted digest value can be repurposed for malicious purposes.
   
This proposal introduces two protection-key digest algorithms, AUTHZ160 and SHA1DK that are intended to mitigate risks associated with use of digest algorithms and provision of the digests in plain view in XML documents.  AUTHZ160, the recommended new default, uses protection-keys that are not derived from a password at all.  They are 100% protection against discovery of an actual password known to the user by analysis of the protection-key alone.  SHA1DK uses an AUTHZ160-sized cryptographically-random salt and an iterative key derivation procedure that makes discovery of a password by repeated trials very costly.  (SHA1DK and an extension, SHA1DKX, can be used to create tear-off secret authenticators for AUTHZ160 protection keys, even though a protection-key that includes all of the SHA1DK result is password based.)

  was:
   The use of password hashes in easily-discovered XML element and attribute    values is subject to compromise of the hashed password.  Although the use    of increasingly-stronger digest algorithms may lengthen the time required    for carrying out a brute-force attack on the hash, memorable passwords    remain subject to compromise and the attack becomes easier as processor    technology advances.
   
   In addition, the presence of hashes in plain sight in XML documents allows the digest value to be easily compared with the same digest value elsewhere, revealing worthy targets to an adversary.  In addition, the digest value is easily removed/replaced.  And an extracted digest value can be repurposed for malicious purposes.
   
   This proposal introduces two protection-key digest algorithms that are intended to mitigate (but not eliminate) risks associated with use of digest algorithms and provision of the digests in plain view in XML documents.


This is a major update to the Protection-Key Enhancements proposal.  The AUTHZ160 and SHA1DK are the only proposed new protection-key algorithms and all simple-hash algorithms are deprecated (although still required to be supported by consumers).

In order to make the proposal more manageable (and easily understood), it is now provided in an ODF Text document.  There is also a PDF and an HTML version at the same document location.



> Proposal: ODF 1.3 Protection-Key Enhancements
> ---------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: OFFICE-3703
>                 URL: http://tools.oasis-open.org/issues/browse/OFFICE-3703
>             Project: OASIS Open Document Format for Office Applications (OpenDocument) TC
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>          Components: Security, Table, Text
>    Affects Versions: ODF 1.0, ODF 1.0 (second edition), ODF 1.1, ODF 1.2, ODF 1.2 COS 1
>         Environment: This is an enhancement, described in terms of changes to OpenDocument-v1.2-os.
>            Reporter: Dennis Hamilton
>            Assignee: Dennis Hamilton
>             Fix For: ODF 1.3, ODF 1.3 CSD 01
>
>
>    The use of password hashes in easily-discovered XML element and attribute values is subject to compromise of the hashed password.  Although the use    of increasingly-stronger digest algorithms may lengthen the time required    for carrying out a brute-force attack on the hash, memorable passwords    remain subject to compromise and the attack becomes easier as processor    technology advances.  Recent (June 2012) reveal that there is an explosive growth in hacks involving the discovery of passwords that are authenticated by use of unsalted digest algorithms.
>    
>  In addition, the presence of hashes in plain sight in XML documents allows the digest value to be easily compared with the same digest value elsewhere, revealing worthy targets to an adversary.  In addition, the digest value is easily removed/replaced.  And an extracted digest value can be repurposed for malicious purposes.
>    
> This proposal introduces two protection-key digest algorithms, AUTHZ160 and SHA1DK that are intended to mitigate risks associated with use of digest algorithms and provision of the digests in plain view in XML documents.  AUTHZ160, the recommended new default, uses protection-keys that are not derived from a password at all.  They are 100% protection against discovery of an actual password known to the user by analysis of the protection-key alone.  SHA1DK uses an AUTHZ160-sized cryptographically-random salt and an iterative key derivation procedure that makes discovery of a password by repeated trials very costly.  (SHA1DK and an extension, SHA1DKX, can be used to create tear-off secret authenticators for AUTHZ160 protection keys, even though a protection-key that includes all of the SHA1DK result is password based.)

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