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Subject: [OASIS Issue Tracker] Updated: (OFFICE-3703) Proposal: ODF 1.3 Protection-Key Enhancements


     [ http://tools.oasis-open.org/issues/browse/OFFICE-3703?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel ]

Dennis Hamilton updated OFFICE-3703:
------------------------------------

       Proposal: 
[Updated 2013-05-02]

Version 1.06 of the full proposal with explanatory support is provided at https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=49071 , with specification of explicit changes to the text of these sections of ODF 1.2 for incorporation in ODF 1.3. 

There is related analysis considering the safe use of protection keys in ODF documents in draft advisory #00009 of the OIC TC, located at https://tools.oasis-open.org/version-control/svn/oic/Advisories/00009-ProtectionKeySafety/trunk/description.html 

v1.06 is an editorial improvement of v1.05, with important modifications to
SHA1DK. The two new protection-key methods are still proposed to replace
the current default and alternatives, with the explicitly-named ODF 1.2
alternatives identified as deprecated and not to be produced in ODF 1.3
documents.

AUTHZ160 does not depend on a hashing algorithm to match is value in order
to authenticate removal of a protection. 

SHA1DK is password based but it uses salt values and iterated hashing to
make it far more costly to attempt to discover the password used by
repeated trials. Passwords that are used should still be considered
compromised simply because the protection key, even though 320 bits, is
still available in plain sight and subject to off-line attacks.

1. Rationale
1.1 Vulnerability of Password Hash Values
1.2 SHA1DK for Password-Based Protection-Key Values
1.3 AUTHZ160 for Password-Less Protection-Key Values

2. Proposed Changes

3. Deployment Considerations
3.1 Down-Level Considerations
3.2 Immediate Usability of AUTHZ160 for Default Protection
Keys
3.3 Confirmation of Resilient Down-Level Treatment
3.4 Future-Proofing of Extended ODF 1.2 Consumers and
Producers

[Note: In section 2, the separation of the iteration count from the
cryptographically-random salt portion is made explicit. It is now possible
to produce the count as the result of iterative hashing under a time
constraint.] 


  was:
[Updated 2012-06-12]

Version 1.05 of the full proposal with explanatory support is provided at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=46218 , with specification of explicit changes to the text of these sections of ODF 1.2 for incorporation in ODF 1.3:

There is related analysis considering the safe use of protection keys in ODF documents in draft advisory #00009 of the OIC TC, located at https://tools.oasis-open.org/version-control/svn/oic/Advisories/00009-ProtectionKeySafety/trunk/description.html


1. RATIONALE
    1.1 Vulnerability of Password Hash Values
    1.2 SHA1DK for Password-Based Protection-Key Values
    1.3 AUTHZ160 for Password-Less Protection-Key Values

2. PROPOSED CHANGES
   [Errata-style instructions for modifying the text of ODF 1.2 for transposition into ODF 1.3]

3. DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS
   3.1 Down-Level Considerations
   3.2 Immediate Usabilty of AUTHZ160 for Default Protection Keys
   3.3 Confirmation of Resilient Down-Level Treatment
   3.4 Future-Proofing of Extended ODF 1.2 Consumers and
Producers

Two new protection-key-digest-algorithm URIs are proposed.  One for SHA1DK using a 20-byte salt iteratively in deriving a protection key, the other for AUTHZ160 with an 20-byte binary protection-key that is not dependent on a password and cannot be subjected to brute-force attack to obtain a password.

    Description: 
   The use of password hashes in easily-discovered XML element and attribute values is subject to compromise of the hashed password.  Although the use of increasingly-stronger digest algorithms may lengthen the time required for carrying out a brute-force attack on the hash, memorable passwords remain subject to compromise and the attack becomes easier as processor technology advances.  Currently (May 2013) there is an explosive growth in hacks involving the discovery of passwords that are authenticated by use of unsalted digest algorithms.
   
 In addition, the presence of hashes in plain sight in XML documents allows the digest value to be easily compared with the same digest value elsewhere, revealing worthy targets to an adversary.  In addition, the digest value is easily removed/replaced.  An extracted digest value can be repurposed for malicious purposes.
   
This proposal introduces two protection-key digest algorithms, AUTHZ160 and SHA1DK that are intended to mitigate risks associated with use of digest algorithms and provision of the digests in plain view in XML documents.  AUTHZ160, the recommended new default, uses protection-keys that are not derived from a password at all.  They are 100% protection against discovery of an actual password known to the user by analysis of the protection key.  SHA1DK uses a cryptographically-random salt and an iterative key derivation procedure that makes discovery of a password by repeated trials very costly. 

  was:
   The use of password hashes in easily-discovered XML element and attribute values is subject to compromise of the hashed password.  Although the use    of increasingly-stronger digest algorithms may lengthen the time required    for carrying out a brute-force attack on the hash, memorable passwords    remain subject to compromise and the attack becomes easier as processor    technology advances.  Recent (June 2012) reveal that there is an explosive growth in hacks involving the discovery of passwords that are authenticated by use of unsalted digest algorithms.
   
 In addition, the presence of hashes in plain sight in XML documents allows the digest value to be easily compared with the same digest value elsewhere, revealing worthy targets to an adversary.  In addition, the digest value is easily removed/replaced.  And an extracted digest value can be repurposed for malicious purposes.
   
This proposal introduces two protection-key digest algorithms, AUTHZ160 and SHA1DK that are intended to mitigate risks associated with use of digest algorithms and provision of the digests in plain view in XML documents.  AUTHZ160, the recommended new default, uses protection-keys that are not derived from a password at all.  They are 100% protection against discovery of an actual password known to the user by analysis of the protection-key alone.  SHA1DK uses an AUTHZ160-sized cryptographically-random salt and an iterative key derivation procedure that makes discovery of a password by repeated trials very costly.  (SHA1DK and an extension, SHA1DKX, can be used to create tear-off secret authenticators for AUTHZ160 protection keys, even though a protection-key that includes all of the SHA1DK result is password based.)


The v1.06 update includes all of the modifications proposed in comments on this JIRA issue prior to 2013-05-01.

> Proposal: ODF 1.3 Protection-Key Enhancements
> ---------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: OFFICE-3703
>                 URL: http://tools.oasis-open.org/issues/browse/OFFICE-3703
>             Project: OASIS Open Document Format for Office Applications (OpenDocument) TC
>          Issue Type: Improvement
>          Components: Security, Table, Text
>    Affects Versions: ODF 1.0, ODF 1.0 (second edition), ODF 1.1, ODF 1.2, ODF 1.2 COS 1
>         Environment: This is an enhancement, described in terms of changes to OpenDocument-v1.2-os.
>            Reporter: Dennis Hamilton
>            Assignee: Dennis Hamilton
>             Fix For: ODF 1.3, ODF 1.3 CSD 01
>
>
>    The use of password hashes in easily-discovered XML element and attribute values is subject to compromise of the hashed password.  Although the use of increasingly-stronger digest algorithms may lengthen the time required for carrying out a brute-force attack on the hash, memorable passwords remain subject to compromise and the attack becomes easier as processor technology advances.  Currently (May 2013) there is an explosive growth in hacks involving the discovery of passwords that are authenticated by use of unsalted digest algorithms.
>    
>  In addition, the presence of hashes in plain sight in XML documents allows the digest value to be easily compared with the same digest value elsewhere, revealing worthy targets to an adversary.  In addition, the digest value is easily removed/replaced.  An extracted digest value can be repurposed for malicious purposes.
>    
> This proposal introduces two protection-key digest algorithms, AUTHZ160 and SHA1DK that are intended to mitigate risks associated with use of digest algorithms and provision of the digests in plain view in XML documents.  AUTHZ160, the recommended new default, uses protection-keys that are not derived from a password at all.  They are 100% protection against discovery of an actual password known to the user by analysis of the protection key.  SHA1DK uses a cryptographically-random salt and an iterative key derivation procedure that makes discovery of a password by repeated trials very costly. 

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