

## 1.1 FUNCTIONS

Key management functions	C_GenerateKey	generates a secret key
	C_GenerateKeyPair	generates a public-key/private-key pair
	C_WrapKey	wraps (encrypts) a key
	C_UnwrapKey	unwraps (decrypts) a key
	C_WrapKeyAuthenticated	Authenticated key Wrapping (encrypt) a key
	C_UnWrapKeyAuthenticated	Authenticated key unwrapping (decrypt) a key
	C_DeriveKey	derives a key from a base key

## 1.2 (5.18) Key management functions

### 1.2.1 C WrapKeyAuthenticated

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_WrapKeyAuthenticated) (  
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  
    CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,  
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey,  
    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,  
  
    CK_VOID_PTR pParameter,  
    CK_ULONG ulParameterLen,  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pAssociatedData,  
    CK_ULONG ulAssociatedDataLen,  
    CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,  
    CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen  
);
```

**C\_WrapMessageKey** wraps (i.e., encrypts) a private or secret key. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the wrapping mechanism; *hWrappingKey* is the handle of the wrapping key; *hKey* is the handle of the key to be wrapped; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message wrap operation; *pAssociatedData* and *ulAssociatedDataLen* specify the associated data for an AEAD mechanism; *pWrappedKey* points to the location that receives the wrapped key; and *pulWrappedKeyLen* points to the location that receives the length of the wrapped key.

**C\_WrapKeyAuthenticated** uses the convention described in Section on producing output.

The **CKA\_WRAP** attribute of the wrapping key, which indicates whether the key supports wrapping, MUST be CK\_TRUE. The **CKA\_EXTRACTABLE** attribute of the key to be wrapped MUST also be CK\_TRUE.

If the key to be wrapped cannot be wrapped for some token-specific reason, despite its having its **CKA\_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK\_TRUE, then **C\_WrapKeyAuthenticated** fails with error code CKR\_KEY\_NOT\_WRAPPABLE. If it cannot be wrapped with the specified wrapping key and mechanism solely because of its length, then **C\_WrapKeyAuthenticated** fails with error code CKR\_KEY\_SIZE\_RANGE.

**C\_WrapKeyAuthenticated** can be used in the following situations:

- To wrap any secret key with a public key that supports encryption and decryption.
- To wrap any secret key with any other secret key. Consideration MUST be given to key size and mechanism strength or the token may not allow the operation.
- To wrap a private key with any secret key.

Of course, tokens vary in which types of keys can actually be wrapped with which mechanisms.

To partition the wrapping keys so they can only wrap a subset of extractable keys the attribute **CKA\_WRAP\_TEMPLATE** can be used on the wrapping key to specify an attribute set that will be compared against the attributes of the key to be wrapped. If all attributes match according to the **C\_FindObject** rules of attribute matching then the wrap will proceed. The value of this attribute is an attribute template, and the size is the number of items in the template times the size of CK\_ATTRIBUTE. If this attribute is not supplied, then any template is acceptable. If an attribute is not present, it will not be checked. If any attribute mismatch occurs on an attempt to wrap a key, then the function SHALL return CKR\_KEY\_HANDLE\_INVALID.

Return Values: CKR\_ARGUMENTS\_BAD, CKR\_BUFFER\_TOO\_SMALL, CKR\_CRYPTOKI\_NOT\_INITIALIZED, CKR\_DEVICE\_ERROR, CKR\_DEVICE\_MEMORY, CKR\_DEVICE\_REMOVED, CKR\_FUNCTION\_CANCELED, CKR\_FUNCTION\_FAILED, CKR\_GENERAL\_ERROR, CKR\_HOST\_MEMORY, CKR\_KEY\_HANDLE\_INVALID, CKR\_KEY\_NOT\_WRAPPABLE, CKR\_KEY\_SIZE\_RANGE, CKR\_KEY\_UNEXTRACTABLE, CKR\_MECHANISM\_INVALID, CKR\_MECHANISM\_PARAM\_INVALID, CKR\_OK,

CKR\_OPERATION\_ACTIVE, CKR\_PIN\_EXPIRED, CKR\_SESSION\_CLOSED,  
CKR\_SESSION\_HANDLE\_INVALID, CKR\_USER\_NOT\_LOGGED\_IN,  
CKR\_WRAPPING\_KEY\_HANDLE\_INVALID, CKR\_WRAPPING\_KEY\_SIZE\_RANGE,  
CKR\_WRAPPING\_KEY\_TYPE\_INCONSISTENT.

Example:

```
#define AUTH BUF SZ 100
CK_BYTE auth[2][AUTH BUF SZ];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, hKey;
CK_BYTE iv[12];
CK_BYTE tag[16];
CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS gcmParams = {
    iv,
    sizeof(iv) * 8,
    96,
    CKG_GENERATE,
    tag,
    sizeof(tag) * 8
};

CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_AES_GCM, &gcmParams, sizeof(gcmParams)
};

CK_BYTE wrappedKey[32]; /* only the wrapped key returned*/
CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen;
CK_RV rv;
.
.
.
ulWrappedKeyLen = sizeof(wrappedKey);
rv = C_WrapMessageKey(
    hSession, &mechanism,
    hWrappingKey, hKey,
    gcmParams, sizeof(gcmParams),
    &auth[0][0], sizeof(auth[0]),
    wrappedKey, &ulWrappedKeyLen);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}
```

## **1.2.2 C UnwrapKeyAuthenticated**

```
CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_UnwrapMessageKey)(
    CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
```

```

    CK MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
    CK OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey,
    CK BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
    CK ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen,
    CK ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,
    CK ULONG ulAttributeCount,
    CK VOID_PTR pParameter,
    CK ULONG ulParameterLen,
    CK BYTE_PTR pAssociatedData,
    CK ULONG ulAssociatedDataLen,
    CK OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey
);

```

**C\_UnwrapKeyAuthenticated** unwraps (i.e. decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new private key or secret key object. *hSession* is the session's handle; *pMechanism* points to the unwrapping mechanism; *hUnwrappingKey* is the handle of the unwrapping key; *pWrappedKey* points to the wrapped key; *ulWrappedKeyLen* is the length of the wrapped key; *pTemplate* points to the template for the new key; *ulAttributeCount* is the number of attributes in the template; *pParameter* and *ulParameterLen* specify any mechanism-specific parameters for the message\_unwrap operation; *pAssociatedData* and *ulAssociatedDataLen* specify the associated data for an Aead mechanism; *phKey* points to the location that receives the handle of the recovered\_key.

The **CKA\_UNWRAP** attribute of the unwrapping key, which indicates whether the key supports unwrapping, **MUST** be CK\_TRUE.

The new key will have the **CKA\_ALWAYS\_SENSITIVE** attribute set to CK\_FALSE, and the **CKA\_NEVER\_EXTRACTABLE** attribute set to CK\_FALSE. The **CKA\_EXTRACTABLE** attribute is by default set to CK\_TRUE.

Some mechanisms may modify, or attempt to modify, the contents of the *pMechanism* structure at the same time that the key is unwrapped.

If a call to **C\_UnwrapKeyAuthenticated** cannot support the precise template supplied to it, it will fail and return without creating any key object.

The key object created by a successful call to **C\_UnwrapKeyAuthenticated** will have its **CKA\_LOCAL** attribute set to CK\_FALSE. In addition, the object created will have a value for **CKA\_UNIQUE\_ID** generated and assigned (See Section **Error! Reference source not found.**).

To partition the unwrapping keys so they can only unwrap a subset of keys the attribute **CKA\_UNWRAP\_TEMPLATE** can be used on the unwrapping key to specify an attribute set that will be added to attributes of the key to be unwrapped. If the attributes do not conflict with the user supplied attribute template, in 'pTemplate', then the unwrap will proceed. The value of this attribute is an attribute template and the size is the number of items in the template times the size of CK\_ATTRIBUTE. If this attribute is not present on the unwrapping key then no additional attributes will be added. If any attribute conflict occurs on an attempt to unwrap a key then the function SHALL return **CKR\_TEMPLATE\_INCONSISTENT**.

Return values: **CKR\_ARGUMENTS\_BAD**, **CKR\_ATTRIBUTE\_READ\_ONLY**, **CKR\_ATTRIBUTE\_TYPE\_INVALID**, **CKR\_ATTRIBUTE\_VALUE\_INVALID**, **CKR\_BUFFER\_TOO\_SMALL**, **CKR\_CRYPTOKI\_NOT\_INITIALIZED**, **CKR\_CURVE\_NOT\_SUPPORTED**, **CKR\_DEVICE\_ERROR**, **CKR\_DEVICE\_MEMORY**, **CKR\_DEVICE\_REMOVED**, **CKR\_DOMAIN\_PARAMS\_INVALID**, **CKR\_FUNCTION\_CANCELED**, **CKR\_FUNCTION\_FAILED**, **CKR\_GENERAL\_ERROR**, **CKR\_HOST\_MEMORY**, **CKR\_MECHANISM\_INVALID**, **CKR\_MECHANISM\_PARAM\_INVALID**, **CKR\_OK**, **CKR\_OPERATION\_ACTIVE**, **CKR\_PIN\_EXPIRED**, **CKR\_SESSION\_CLOSED**, **CKR\_SESSION\_HANDLE\_INVALID**, **CKR\_SESSION\_READ\_ONLY**, **CKR\_TEMPLATE\_INCOMPLETE**, **CKR\_TEMPLATE\_INCONSISTENT**, **CKR\_TOKEN\_WRITE\_PROTECTED**, **CKR\_UNWRAPPING\_KEY\_HANDLE\_INVALID**, **CKR\_UNWRAPPING\_KEY\_SIZE\_RANGE**, **CKR\_UNWRAPPING\_KEY\_TYPE\_INCONSISTENT**, **CKR\_USER\_NOT\_LOGGED\_IN**, **CKR\_WRAPPED\_KEY\_INVALID**, **CKR\_WRAPPED\_KEY\_LEN\_RANGE**.

Example:

```
#define AUTH BUF SZ 100

CK_BYTE auth[2][AUTH BUF SZ];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, hKey;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
    CKM_AES_GCM, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE wrappedKey[32] = {...};
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_AES;
CK_BBOOL true = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
    {CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass)},
    {CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)},
    {CKA_ENCRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)},
    {CKA_DECRYPT, &true, sizeof(true)}
};
CK_RV rv;
CK_BYTE iv[] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 }; /*value from wrap
CKG_GENERATE */
CK_BYTE tag[16];
CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS gcmParams = {
    iv,
    sizeof(iv) * 8,
    0, /* ignored */
    CKG_NO_GENERATE, /* ignored */
    tag, /* Tag returned from Wrap */
    sizeof(tag) * 8
};
rv = C_UnwrapKeyAuthenticated(
    hSession, &mechanism, hUnwrappingKey,
    gcmParams, sizeof(gcmParams),
    &auth[0][0], sizeof(auth[0]),
    wrappedKey, sizeof(wrappedKey),
    template, 4, &hKey);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
    .
    .
}
}
```

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## 1.3 (6.13) Additional AES Mechanisms

Table 1, Additional AES Mechanisms vs. Functions

Mechanism	Functions						
	Encrypt & Decrypt	Sign & Verify	SR & VR <sup>1</sup>	Digest	Gen. Key/ Key Pair	Wrap & Unwrap	Derive
CKM_AES_GCM	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_CCM	✓					✓	
CKM_AES_GMAC		✓					

### 1.3.1 Definitions

Mechanisms:

CKM\_AES\_GCM  
 CKM\_AES\_CCM  
 CKM\_AES\_GMAC

Generator Functions:

CKG\_NO\_GENERATE  
 CKG\_GENERATE  
 CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER  
 CKG\_GENERATE\_RANDOM  
 CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER\_XOR

### 1.3.2 AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption / Decryption

Generic GCM mode is described in [GCM]. To set up for AES-GCM use the following process, where *K* (key) and *AAD* (additional authenticated data) are as described in [GCM]. AES-GCM uses CK\_GCM\_PARAMS for Encrypt, Decrypt and CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS for MessageEncrypt and MessageDecrypt.

Encrypt:

- Set the IV length *uIvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIv* in the parameter block.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *uAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *uAADLen* is 0.
- Set the tag length *uTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Call C\_EncryptInit() for **CKM\_AES\_GCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C\_Encrypt(), or C\_EncryptUpdate()\*1 C\_EncryptFinal(), for the plaintext obtaining ciphertext and authentication tag output.

Decrypt:

1 "\*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

- Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIv* in the parameter block.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Call `C_DecryptInit()` for **CKM\_AES\_GCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call `C_Decrypt()`, or `C_DecryptUpdate()`\*1 `C_DecryptFinal()`, for the ciphertext, including the appended tag, obtaining plaintext output. Note: since **CKM\_AES\_GCM** is an AEAD cipher, no data should be returned until `C_Decrypt()` or `C_DecryptFinal()`.

#### MessageEncrypt:

- Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set *pIv* to hold the IV data returned from `C_EncryptMessage()` and `C_EncryptMessageBegin()`. If *ullvFixedBits* is not zero, then the most significant bits of *pIv* contain the fixed IV. If *ivGenerator* is set to `CKG_NO_GENERATE`, *pIv* is an input parameter with the full IV.
- Set the *ullvFixedBits* and *ivGenerator* fields in the parameter block.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Set *pTag* to hold the tag data returned from `C_EncryptMessage()` or the final `C_EncryptMessageNext()`.
- Call `C_MessageEncryptInit()` for **CKM\_AES\_GCM** mechanism key *K*.
- Call `C_EncryptMessage()`, or `C_EncryptMessageBegin()` followed by `C_EncryptMessageNext()`\*2. The mechanism parameter is passed to all three of these functions.
- Call `C_MessageEncryptFinal()` to close the message decryption.

#### MessageDecrypt:

- Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIv* in the parameter block.
- The *ullvFixedBits* and *ivGenerator* fields are ignored.
- ~~Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.~~
- Set the tag data *pTag* in the parameter block before `C_DecryptMessage()` or the final `C_DecryptMessageNext()`.
- Call `C_MessageDecryptInit()` for **CKM\_AES\_GCM** mechanism key *K*.
- Call `C_DecryptMessage()`, or `C_DecryptMessageBegin` followed by `C_DecryptMessageNext()`\*3. The mechanism parameter is passed to all three of these functions.
- Call `C_MessageDecryptFinal()` to close the message decryption.

In *pIv* the least significant bit of the initialization vector is the rightmost bit. *ullvLen* is the length of the initialization vector in bytes.

On `MessageEncrypt`, the meaning of *ivGenerator* is as follows: `CKG_NO_GENERATE` means the IV is passed in on `MessageEncrypt` and no internal IV generation is done. `CKG_GENERATE` means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is generated by the module internally. The generation method is not defined.

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2 \*\* indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

3 \*\*\* indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required



CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is generated by the module internally by use of an incrementing counter, the initial IV counter is zero.

CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER\_XOR means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is xored with a counter. The value of the non-fixed portion passed must not vary from call to call. Like CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER, the counter starts at zero.

CKG\_GENERATE\_RANDOM means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is generated by the module internally using a PRNG. In any case the entire IV, including the fixed portion, is returned in *pIV*.

Modules must implement CKG\_GENERATE. Modules may also reject *ullvFixedBits* values which are too large. Zero is always an acceptable value for *ullvFixedBits*.

In Encrypt and Decrypt the tag is appended to the cipher text and the least significant bit of the tag is the rightmost bit and the tag bits are the rightmost *ulTagBits* bits. In MessageEncrypt the tag is returned in the *pTag* field of CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS. In MessageDecrypt the tag is provided by the *pTag* field of CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS.

The key type for *K* must be compatible with **CKM\_AES\_ECB** and the C\_EncryptInit()/C\_DecryptInit()/C\_MessageEncryptInit()/C\_MessageDecryptInit() calls shall behave, with respect to *K*, as if they were called directly with **CKM\_AES\_ECB**, *K* and NULL parameters.

### **1.3.3 AES-GCM Authenticated Wrap / Unwrap**

Generic GCM mode is described in [GCM]. To set up for AES-GCM use the following process, where *wK* (wrapping key) and *AAD* (additional authenticated data) are as described in [GCM]. AES-GCM uses CK\_GCM\_WRAP\_PARAMS for WrapKey, UnWrapKey and CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS for WrapMessageKey and UnWrapMessageKey.

#### Wrap:

- Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set *pIV* to hold the IV data returned from C\_WrapKey() . If *ullvFixedBits* is not zero, then the most significant bits of *pIV* contain the fixed IV. If *ivGenerator* is set to CKG\_NO\_GENERATE, *pIV* is an input parameter with the full IV.
- Set the *ullvFixedBits* and *ivGenerator* fields in the parameter block.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Call C\_WrapKey() for **CKM\_AES\_GCM** mechanism with parameters and wrapping key *wK* and key to be wrapped *K*, obtaining a wrapped key and authentication tag output.

#### UnWrap:

- Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIV* in the parameter block.
- The *ullvFixedBits* and *ivGenerator* fields are ignored.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Call C\_UnWrapKey() for **CKM\_AES\_GCM** mechanism with parameters and wrapping key *K* and wrapped key+ authenticated tag output from wrap, template for the new key, obtaining a key handle.

#### WrapKeyAuthenticated:

- Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set *pIv* to hold the IV data returned from `C_Wrapkey()`. If *ullvFixedBits* is not zero, then the most significant bits of *pIv* contain the fixed IV. If *ivGenerator* is set to CKG\_NO\_GENERATE, *pIv* is an input parameter with the full IV.
- Set the *ullvFixedBits* and *ivGenerator* fields in the parameter block.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Set *pTag* to hold the tag data returned from `C_WrapKeyAuthenticated()`.
- Call `C_WrapMessageKey()` for **CKM\_AES\_GCM** mechanism wrapping key *wK*, wrapped key mechanism, parameters and obtaining a wrapped key and authentication tag output in the parameter block.
- 

#### UnWrapKeyAuthenticated:

- Set the IV length *ullvLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the IV data *pIv* in the parameter block.
- The *ullvFixedBits* and *ivGenerator* fields are ignored.
- Set the tag length *ulTagBits* in the parameter block.
- Set the tag data *pTag* in the parameter block
- Call `C_UnWrapKeyAuthenticated()` for **CKM\_AES\_GCM** mechanism, -wrapping key *wK*, Wrapped key, parameter, template for the new key, obtaining a key handle.

In *pIv* the least significant bit of the initialization vector is the rightmost bit. *ullvLen* is the length of the initialization vector in bytes.

On `WrapKeyAuthenticated`, the meaning of *ivGenerator* is as follows: CKG\_NO\_GENERATE means the IV is passed in on `MessageEncrypt` and no internal IV generation is done. CKG\_GENERATE means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is generated by the module internally. The generation method is not defined.

CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is generated by the module internally by use of an incrementing counter, the initial IV counter is zero.

CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER\_XOR means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is xored with a counter. The value of the non-fixed portion passed must not vary from call to call. Like CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER, the counter starts at zero.

CKG\_GENERATE\_RANDOM means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is generated by the module internally using a PRNG. In any case the entire IV, including the fixed portion, is returned in *pIv*.

Modules must implement CKG\_GENERATE. Modules may also reject *ullvFixedBits* values which are too large. Zero is always an acceptable value for *ullvFixedBits*.

In `Encrypt` and `Decrypt` the tag is appended to the cipher text and the least significant bit of the tag is the rightmost bit and the tag bits are the rightmost *ulTagBits* bits. In `MessageEncrypt` the tag is returned in the *pTag* field of CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS. In `MessageDecrypt` the tag is provided by the *pTag* field of CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS.

The key type for *K* must be compatible with CKM\_AES\_ECB and the `C_WrapKey()/C_UnWrapKey()/C_WrapMessageKey()/C_UnWrapMessageKey()` calls shall behave, with respect to *K*, as if they were called directly with CKM\_AES\_ECB, *K* and NULL parameters.

### **1.3.31.3.4 AES-CCM authenticated Encryption / Decryption**

For IPsec (RFC 4309) and also for use in ZFS encryption. Generic CCM mode is described in [RFC 3610].

To set up for AES-CCM use the following process, where *K* (key), nonce and additional authenticated data are as described in [RFC 3610]. AES-CCM uses CK\_CCM\_PARAMS for Encrypt and Decrypt, and CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS for MessageEncrypt and MessageDecrypt.

Encrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Call C\_EncryptInit() for **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C\_Encrypt(), C\_EncryptUpdate(), or C\_EncryptFinal(), for the plaintext obtaining the final ciphertext output and the MAC. The total length of data processed must be *ulDataLen*. The output length will be *ulDataLen* + *ulMACLen*.

Decrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block. This length must not include the length of the MAC that is appended to the cipher text.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Call C\_DecryptInit() for **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism with parameters and key *K*.
- Call C\_Decrypt(), C\_DecryptUpdate(), or C\_DecryptFinal(), for the ciphertext, including the appended MAC, obtaining plaintext output. The total length of data processed must be *ulDataLen* + *ulMACLen*. Note: since **CKM\_AES\_CCM** is an AEAD cipher, no data should be returned until C\_Decrypt() or C\_DecryptFinal().

MessageEncrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen*.
- Set *pNonce* to hold the nonce data returned from C\_EncryptMessage() and C\_EncryptMessageBegin(). If *ulNonceFixedBits* is not zero, then the most significant bits of *pNonce* contain the fixed nonce. If *nonceGenerator* is set to CKG\_NO\_GENERATE, *pNonce* is an input parameter with the full nonce.
- Set the *ulNonceFixedBits* and *nonceGenerator* fields in the parameter block.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Set *pMAC* to hold the MAC data returned from C\_EncryptMessage() or the final C\_EncryptMessageNext().
- Call C\_MessageEncryptInit() for **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism key *K*.
- Call C\_EncryptMessage(), or C\_EncryptMessageBegin() followed by C\_EncryptMessageNext()<sup>\*4</sup>. The mechanism parameter is passed to all three functions.
- Call C\_MessageEncryptFinal() to close the message encryption.

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<sup>4</sup> "\*" indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

- The MAC is returned in *pMac* of the CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS structure.

MessageDecrypt:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block
- The *ulNonceFixedBits* and *nonceGenerator* fields in the parameter block are ignored.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the MAC data *pMAC* in the parameter block before C\_DecryptMessage() or the final C\_DecryptMessageNext().
- Call C\_MessageDecryptInit() for **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism key *K*.
- Call C\_DecryptMessage(), or C\_DecryptMessageBegin() followed by C\_DecryptMessageNext()<sup>5</sup>. The mechanism parameter is passed to all three functions.
- Call C\_MessageDecryptFinal() to close the message decryption.

In *pNonce* the least significant bit of the nonce is the rightmost bit. *ulNonceLen* is the length of the nonce in bytes.

On MessageEncrypt, the meaning of *nonceGenerator* is as follows: CKG\_NO\_GENERATE means the nonce is passed in on MessageEncrypt and no internal MAC generation is done. CKG\_GENERATE means that the non-fixed portion of the nonce is generated by the module internally. The generation method is not defined.

CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER means that the non-fixed portion of the nonce is generated by the module internally by use of an incrementing counter, the initial IV counter is zero.

CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER\_XOR means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is xored with a counter. The value of the non-fixed portion passed must not vary from call to call. Like CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER, the counter starts at zero.

CKG\_GENERATE\_RANDOM means that the non-fixed portion of the nonce is generated by the module internally using a PRNG. In any case the entire nonce, including the fixed portion, is returned in *pNonce*.

Modules must implement CKG\_GENERATE. Modules may also reject *ulNonceFixedBits* values which are too large. Zero is always an acceptable value for *ulNonceFixedBits*.

In Encrypt and Decrypt the MAC is appended to the cipher text and the least significant byte of the MAC is the rightmost byte and the MAC bytes are the rightmost *ulMACLen* bytes. In MessageEncrypt the MAC is returned in the *pMAC* field of CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS. In MessageDecrypt the MAC is provided by the *pMAC* field of CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS.

The key type for *K* must be compatible with **CKM\_AES\_ECB** and the C\_EncryptInit()/C\_DecryptInit()/C\_MessageEncryptInit()/C\_MessageDecryptInit() calls shall behave, with respect to *K*, as if they were called directly with **CKM\_AES\_ECB**, *K* and NULL parameters.

### **1.3.5 AES-CCM Authenticated Wrap / Unwrap**

To set up for AES-CCM use the following process, where *K* (key), nonce and additional authenticated data are as described in [RFC 3610]. AES-CCM uses CK\_CCM\_WAP\_PARAMS for WrapKey and UnWrapKey, and CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS for WrapKeyAuthenticated and UnWrapKeyAuthenticated.

Wrap:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block.

<sup>5</sup> indicates 0 or more calls may be made as required

- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block.
- Set *pNonce* to hold the nonce data returned from C\_WrapKey(). If *ulNonceFixedBits* is not zero, then the most significant bits of *pNonce* contain the fixed nonce. If *nonceGenerator* is set to CKG\_NO\_GENERATE, *pNonce* is an input parameter with the full nonce.
- Set the *ulNonceFixedBits* and *nonceGenerator* fields in the parameter block.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Call C\_WrapKey() for **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism with parameters wrapping key *wK*, key to be wrapped *mK*, obtaining the final Wrappedkey output and the MAC. The total length of data processed must be *ulDataLen*. The output length will be *ulDataLen + ulMACLen*.

#### UnWrap:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* to Zero in the parameter block. This returns a key handle.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block.
- The *ulNonceFixedBits* and *nonceGenerator* fields in the parameter block are ignored.
- Set the AAD data *pAAD* and size *ulAADLen* in the parameter block. *pAAD* may be NULL if *ulAADLen* is 0.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Call C\_UnwrapKey() for **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism with parameters, unwrapping key *wK*, template, and wrapped key. Including the appended MAC, obtaining a ~~obtaining a~~ new key handle

#### WrapKeyAuthenticated:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen*.
- Set *pNonce* to hold the nonce data returned from C\_WrapKeyAuthenticated(). If *ulNonceFixedBits* is not zero, then the most significant bits of *pNonce* contain the fixed nonce. If *nonceGenerator* is set to CKG\_NO\_GENERATE, *pNonce* is an input parameter with the full nonce.
- Set the *ulNonceFixedBits* and *nonceGenerator* fields in the parameter block.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Set *pMAC* to hold the MAC data returned from C\_WrapkeyAuthenticated()
- Call C\_WrapKeyAuthenticated() for **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism wrapping key *wK* the key to be wrapped *mK*, parameter block
- The MAC is returned in *pMac* of the CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS structure.

#### UnWrapKeyAuthenticated:

- Set the message/data length *ulDataLen* to Zero as a key handle will be returned.
- Set the nonce length *ulNonceLen* and the nonce data *pNonce* in the parameter block
- The *ulNonceFixedBits* and *nonceGenerator* fields in the parameter block are ignored.
- Set the MAC length *ulMACLen* in the parameter block.
- Set the MAC data *pMAC* in the parameter block before C\_UnWrapKeyAuthenticated().
- Call C\_UnWrapMessageKey() for **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism key *wK*, wrapped key *mK*, parameter block and template, obtaining a new key handle.

In *pNonce* the least significant bit of the nonce is the rightmost bit. *ulNonceLen* is the length of the nonce in bytes.

On MessageEncrypt, the meaning of nonceGenerator is as follows: CKG\_NO\_GENERATE means the nonce is passed in on MessageEncrypt and no internal MAC generation is done. CKG\_GENERATE means that the non-fixed portion of the nonce is generated by the module internally. The generation method is not defined.

CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER means that the non-fixed portion of the nonce is generated by the module internally by use of an incrementing counter, the initial IV counter is zero.

CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER\_XOR means that the non-fixed portion of the IV is xored with a counter. The value of the non-fixed portion passed must not vary from call to call. Like CKG\_GENERATE\_COUNTER, the counter starts at zero.

CKG\_GENERATE\_RANDOM means that the non-fixed portion of the nonce is generated by the module internally using a PRNG. In any case the entire nonce, including the fixed portion, is returned in pNonce.

Modules must implement CKG\_GENERATE. Modules may also reject ulNonceFixedBits values which are too large. Zero is always an acceptable value for ulNonceFixedBits.

In Encrypt and Decrypt the MAC is appended to the cipher text and the least significant byte of the MAC is the rightmost byte and the MAC bytes are the rightmost ulMACLen bytes. In MessageEncrypt the MAC is returned in the pMAC field of CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS. In MessageDecrypt the MAC is provided by the pMAC field of CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS.

The key type for K must be compatible with CKM\_AES\_ECB and the C WrapKey()/C UnWrapKey()/C WrapMessageKey()/C UnWrapMessageKey() calls shall behave, with respect to K, as if they were called directly with CKM\_AES\_ECB, K and NULL parameters

### 1.3.41.3.6 AES GCM and CCM Mechanism parameters

#### ◆ CK\_GENERATOR\_FUNCTION

Functions to generate unique IVs and nonces.

```
typedef CK_ULONG CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION;
```

#### ◆ CK\_GCM\_PARAMS; CK\_GCM\_PARAMS\_PTR

CK\_GCM\_PARAMS is a structure that provides the parameters to the CKM\_AES\_GCM mechanism when used for Encrypt or Decrypt. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_GCM_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE_PTR    pIv;
    CK_ULONG       ulIvLen;
    CK_ULONG       ulIvBits;
    CK_BYTE_PTR    pAAD;
    CK_ULONG       ulAADLen;
    CK_ULONG       ulTagBits;
} CK_GCM_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pIv	pointer to initialization vector
ulIvLen	length of initialization vector in bytes. The length of the initialization vector can be any number between 1 and $(2^{32}) - 1$ . 96-bit (12 byte) IV values can be processed more efficiently, so that length is recommended for situations in which efficiency is critical.
ulIvBits	length of initialization vector in bits. Do not use ulIvBits to specify the length of the initialization vector, but ulIvLen instead.

pAAD	pointer to additional authentication data. This data is authenticated but not encrypted.
ulAADLen	length of pAAD in bytes. The length of the AAD can be any number between 0 and $(2^{32}) - 1$ .
ulTagBits	length of authentication tag (output following cipher text) in bits. Can be any value between 0 and 128.

**CK\_GCM\_PARAMS\_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK\_GCM\_PARAMS**.

#### ◆ **CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS; CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS\_PTR**

**CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM\_AES\_GCM** mechanism when used for **MessageEncrypt** or **MessageDecrypt**. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE_PTR    pIv;
    CK_ULONG       ulIvLen;
    CK_ULONG       ulIvFixedBits;
    CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION  ivGenerator;
    CK_BYTE_PTR    pTag;
    CK_ULONG       ulTagBits;
} CK_GCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

pIv	pointer to initialization vector
ulIvLen	length of initialization vector in bytes. The length of the initialization vector can be any number between 1 and $(2^{32}) - 1$ . 96-bit (12 byte) IV values can be processed more efficiently, so that length is recommended for situations in which efficiency is critical.
ulIvFixedBits	number of bits of the original IV to preserve when generating an new IV. These bits are counted from the Most significant bits (to the right).
ivGenerator	Function used to generate a new IV. Each IV must be unique for a given session.
pTag	location of the authentication tag which is returned on <b>MessageEncrypt</b> , and provided on <b>MessageDecrypt</b> .
ulTagBits	length of authentication tag in bits. Can be any value between 0 and 128.

**CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS\_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS**.

#### ◆ **CK\_GCM\_WRAP\_PARAMS; CK\_GCM\_WRAP\_PARAMS\_PTR**

**CK\_GCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM\_AES\_GCM** mechanism when used for **C\_WrapKey** to provide, return a token generated IV for input into **C\_UnWrapKey**. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_GCM_WRAP_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE_PTR    pIv;
    CK_ULONG       ulIvLen;
    CK_ULONG       ulIvFixedBits;
}
```

```

    CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION    ivGenerator;
    CK_BYTE_PTR              pAAD;
    CK_ULONG                 ulAADLen;
    CK_ULONG                 ulTagBits;
} CK_GCM_WRAP_PARAMS;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings:

<code>plv</code>	pointer to initialization vector
<code>ullvLen</code>	length of initialization vector in bytes. The length of the initialization vector can be any number between 1 and $(2^{32}) - 1$ . 96-bit (12 byte) IV values can be processed more efficiently, so that length is recommended for situations in which efficiency is critical.
<code>ullvFixedBits</code>	number of bits of the original IV to preserve when generating an new IV. These bits are counted from the Most significant bits (to the right).
<code>ivGenerator</code>	Function used to generate a new IV. Each IV must be unique for a given session.
<code>pAAD</code>	pointer to additional authentication data. This data is authenticated but not encrypted.
<code>ulAADLen</code>	length of pAAD in bytes. The length of the AAD can be any number between 0 and $(2^{32}) - 1$ .
<code>ulTagBits</code>	length of authentication tag in bits. Can be any value between 0 and 128.

**CK\_GCM\_WRAP\_PARAMS\_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK\_GCM\_WRAP\_PARAMS**.

#### ◆ **CK\_CCM\_PARAMS; CK\_CCM\_PARAMS\_PTR**

**CK\_CCM\_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism when used for Encrypt or Decrypt. It is defined as follows:

```

typedef struct CK_CCM_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG    ulDataLen; /*plaintext or ciphertext*/
    CK_BYTE_PTR pNonce;
    CK_ULONG    ulNonceLen;
    CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD;
    CK_ULONG    ulAADLen;
    CK_ULONG    ulMACLen;
} CK_CCM_PARAMS;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings, where L is the size in bytes of the data length's length ( $2 \leq L \leq 8$ ):

<code>ulDataLen</code>	length of the data where $0 \leq \text{ulDataLen} < 2^{(8L)}$ .
<code>pNonce</code>	the nonce.
<code>ulNonceLen</code>	length of pNonce in bytes where $7 \leq \text{ulNonceLen} \leq 13$ .
<code>pAAD</code>	Additional authentication data. This data is authenticated but not encrypted.
<code>ulAADLen</code>	length of pAAD in bytes where $0 \leq \text{ulAADLen} \leq (2^{32}) - 1$ .



ulMACLen      length of the MAC (output following cipher text) in bytes. Valid values are 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16.

**CK\_CCM\_PARAMS\_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK\_CCM\_PARAMS**.

#### ◆ **CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS; CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS\_PTR**

**CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism when used for MessageEncrypt or MessageDecrypt. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG      ulDataLen; /*plaintext or ciphertext*/
    CK_BYTE_PTR   pNonce;
    CK_ULONG      ulNonceLen;
    CK_ULONG      ulNonceFixedBits;
    CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION  nonceGenerator;
    CK_BYTE_PTR   pMAC;
    CK_ULONG      ulMACLen;
} CK_CCM_MESSAGE_PARAMS;
```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings, where L is the size in bytes of the data length's length ( $2 \leq L \leq 8$ ):

ulDataLen	length of the data where $0 \leq \text{ulDataLen} < 2^{(8L)}$ .
pNonce	the nonce.
ulNonceLen	length of pNonce in bytes where $7 \leq \text{ulNonceLen} \leq 13$ .
ulNonceFixedBits	number of bits of the original nonce to preserve when generating a new nonce. These bits are counted from the Most significant bits (to the right).
nonceGenerator	Function used to generate a new nonce. Each nonce must be unique for a given session.
pMAC	location of the CCM MAC returned on MessageEncrypt, provided on MessageDecrypt
ulMACLen	length of the MAC (output following cipher text) in bytes. Valid values are 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16.

**CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS\_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK\_CCM\_MESSAGE\_PARAMS**.

#### ◆ **CK\_CCM\_WRAP\_PARAMS; CK\_CCM\_WAP\_PARAMS\_PTR**

**CK\_CCM\_PARAMS** is a structure that provides the parameters to the **CKM\_AES\_CCM** mechanism when used for C WrapKey only to provide a token generated nonce and the number of bits to preserve. It is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct CK_CCM_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG      ulDataLen; /*wrappedkey data*/
    CK_BYTE_PTR   pNonce;
    CK_ULONG      ulNonceLen;
    CK_ULONG      ulNonceFixedBits;
    CK_GENERATOR_FUNCTION  nonceGenerator;
    CK_BYTE_PTR   pAAD;
}
```

```

    CK_ULONG    ulAADLen;
    CK_ULONG    ulMACLen;
} CK_CCM_PARAMS;

```

The fields of the structure have the following meanings, where L is the size in bytes of the data length's length ( $2 \leq L \leq 8$ ):

ulDataLen	length of the data where $0 \leq \text{ulDataLen} < 2^{(8L)}$ .
pNonce	the nonce.
ulNonceLen	length of pNonce in bytes where $7 \leq \text{ulNonceLen} \leq 13$ .
ulNonceFixedBits	number of bits of the original nonce to preserve when generating a new nonce. These bits are counted from the Most significant bits (to the right).
nonceGenerator	Function used to generate a new nonce. Each nonce must be unique for a given session.
pAAD	Additional authentication data. This data is authenticated but not wrapped.
ulAADLen	length of pAAD in bytes where $0 \leq \text{ulAADLen} \leq (2^{32}) - 1$ .
ulMACLen	length of the MAC (output following cipher text) in bytes. Valid values are 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16.

**CK\_CCM\_WRAP\_PARAMS\_PTR** is a pointer to a **CK\_CCM\_WRAP\_PARAMS**