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Subject: RE: [soa-rm-ra] collected concept definitions per action
Frank, Most of what I’ve put together is just a cut and paste of
what is in the document. I did revise the definitions of intent and
commitment because your changes in response to my comments missed the mark;
more on that below. If some of the model labels I used don’t catch
the proper essence, we can change the labels or possibly that indicates some
needed changes in the words. Now to Intent and Commitment. Intent is not internal planning and orienting. The online
definition is “Something that is intended; an aim or purpose.”
Synonyms are intention, intent, purpose, goal, end, aim, object,
objective. There is no planning or orienting. The online definition of commitment is “A pledge to
do.”
The participant doesn’t ensure the commitment is satisfied but they state
what they intend. Additionally, you note “rights are part of a social
structure. Permissions are part of policies.” Yes, we may
currently discuss rights as connected to words about social structure and we
may discuss permissions as connected to words about policy, but either the
definitions should make clear how the two are different or we should use the
same term/concept in both places. This applies equally to the other
definitions I suggest are redundant. Again, my *intent* was a reasonably complete summary in
one eyeful of what is already there. Ken --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr. Kenneth Laskey MITRE Corporation, M/S
H305
phone: 703-983-7934 7515 Colshire
Drive
fax: 703-983-1379 McLean VA 22102-7508 From: Francis McCabe [mailto:fmccabe@gmail.com] Some immediate thoughts: 1. In general, we are only
interested in measurable things. So, there is no sense in talking about
unmeasurable state. We had a lot of discussions about
state in the RM days. We came to the conclusion that state is characterized by
facts but is probably not the same as facts. 2. We have generally avoided
cardinality unless needed. Cardinality is not needed for private state. 3. The real world effect should
refer to the world, not to what is known about the world. 4. Intent DOES NOT need to be
stated. Generally it is NOT stated. Indeed, most people rely on evaluations of
intent (much like trust) as opposed to stated intent. We should keep closer to
the original definition: Intent is the internal planning and
orienting of an actor to achieve an objective
5. Commitment is not directly
connected to intent. e.g., I promise that it will be sunny tomorrow. Should not
be unnecessarily connected to shared anything. Original definition: A commitment is a social
fact about the future that a participant
is responsible for ensuring is satisfied. 6. The concept of permission is a
standard part of the policy ontology. Not inherently connected to social
structure. A right is a permission that is connected to a social structure. 7. Achievement should not be part
of obligation - it implies that the actor is not currently in the desired
state. Similarly for permission. 8. I am not against prohibition,
except that it is a form of negative permission/obligation. 9. goals are internal, purposes are
external. I do not have a purpose but I do have goals. 10. rights are part of a social
structure. Permissions are part of policies. 11. Ditto for obligation and
responsibility On Sep 28, 2010, at 10:48 AM, Ken
Laskey wrote:
<section 3 collected
definitions.docx> |
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