wsrp message
[Date Prev]
| [Thread Prev]
| [Thread Next]
| [Date Next]
--
[Date Index]
| [Thread Index]
| [List Home]
Subject: RE: [wsrp] Issue #28: Replace EventDescription.requiresSecureDistribution?
- From: Rich Thompson <richt2@us.ibm.com>
- To: wsrp@lists.oasis-open.org
- Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 09:31:23 -0500
One area that is not reflected in the
current draft, nor considered in Andre's alternate proposal, is that the
resulting security level needed for distributing an event applies not only
to directly distributing the event as the portlet has generated it, but
also becomes the minimum for the distribution of any information contained
within the event which the Consumer might distribute in some other event
it composes. I'll add language to this effect to draft 04 and would also
plan to include it if the mechanism is changed to Andre's proposal.
Rich
Rich Thompson/Watson/IBM@IBMUS
12/16/2004 08:29 AM
|
To
| wsrp@lists.oasis-open.org
|
cc
|
|
Subject
| RE: [wsrp] Issue #28: Replace
EventDescription.requiresSecureDistribution? |
|
I have opened issue #28 for this topic. Basically we have two proposals
in front of us:
1. Have requiresSecureDistribution fields on both the EventDescription
and Event structures. This presumes that non-secure distribution is allowed
unless the portlet has said otherwise using these flags.
2. Have authorizedNonSecureDistribution field on just the Event structure.
This requires that the Consumer distribute events in as secure manner as
it received them unless this field has been set to true (default = false).
What do people think of these two choices?
Rich
Andre Kramer <andre.kramer@eu.citrix.com>
12/16/2004 04:47 AM
|
To
| wsrp@lists.oasis-open.org
|
cc
|
|
Subject
| RE: [wsrp] EventDescription.requiresSecureDistribution |
|
The markup related fields you mention speak more about user agent to consumer
communications than WSRP protocol security to me. My concern still is that
we are adding security protocol (which we usually tend to avoid) and that
this could lead to problems for 2.0 implementation and continuing down
the road (when we have message based security and policy negotiation).
If we really need the functionality you describe below would the following
not be simpler?
AuthorizeInsecureRedistribution : Boolean flag on Event objects (default
false). If a consumer receives an event with this flag set to true and
the consumer can verify that the flag is as the producer set it (i.e. was
not tampered with, for example because the event was signed by the producer
and the consumer verified the signature or was received over a secure end-to-end
transport) then the event MAY be re-distributed to other portlets over
an insecure communications channel. Such explicit downgrading of security
by a producer/portlet should be used with care. Note, consumers may redistribute
an event received on an insecure channel regardless of the value of this
flag. [The event description flag would go.]
Sorry keep laboring the point but security is extremely important to get
right.
Regards,
Andre
From: Rich Thompson [mailto:richt2@us.ibm.com]
Sent: 15 December 2004 18:08
To: wsrp@lists.oasis-open.org
Subject: RE: [wsrp] EventDescription.requiresSecureDistribution
It was commented at the F2F that much as we have these fields relative
to markup, we would need them for events. Without much discussion, everyone
agreed and my notes say to add the fields. I think the following may provide
a base use case for them:
A Consumer incorporates a pair of remote portlets (P1 & P2) on a page
where:
P1: The Producer only offers unsecure ports (e.g. http)
P2: The Producer only offers secure ports (e.g. https)
1. If P2 generates an event that does not require secure communication
during distribution, how to tell the Consumer?
2. If P1 generates an event that it determines does need secure communications
and determines it can securely send it to the Consumer (either by network
topology or message security), can it insist that it only be distributed
in a secure manner?
Obviously a Producer offering both types of ports just complicates the
logic (but not the fundamental questions) by throwing in the question of
whether of not the transport layer will make the current communications
with the Consumer secure. Message level security just adds another equivalent
wrinkle to the logic side of things.
I think both of the above situations will happen and that the protocol
should make it easy to signal to the Consumer the security concerns related
to distributing an event. I suppose we could remove the field from the
event description and require on the event, but this would move valuable
information from design time to runtime.
Rich
Andre Kramer <andre.kramer@eu.citrix.com>
12/15/2004 11:52 AM
|
To
| wsrp@lists.oasis-open.org
|
cc
|
|
Subject
| RE: [wsrp] EventDescription.requiresSecureDistribution |
|
A producer that wishes to return an event securely can not publish a http
binding (i.e. only an https binding so that SOAP responses are secured)
if transport level security is to be used, or use message level security
for responses. Given we start from this position, is it not more a question
of the producer possibly granting the consumer the right to forward an
event on a less secure channel? How useful is such a feature as opposed
to just mandating that a securely returned event be always forwarded securely?
I think the end goal should be for end to end security to be used to secure
the event payload so do we really need these flags?
Regards,
Andre
From: Rich Thompson [mailto:richt2@us.ibm.com]
Sent: 15 December 2004 15:07
To: wsrp@lists.oasis-open.org
Subject: Re: [wsrp] EventDescription.requiresSecureDistribution
Rereading this on the OASIS distribution reminded why the event field did
not have a default specified in the schema ... its default is whatever
was specified in the EventDescription.
Rich
Rich Thompson/Watson/IBM@IBMUS
12/15/2004 09:20 AM
|
To
| wsrp@lists.oasis-open.org
|
cc
|
|
Subject
| Re: [wsrp] EventDescription.requiresSecureDistribution |
|
Good point on the possibility of tampering ... I'll add a sentence in section
9 of draft 04 to point this out.
The reason the field exists in both places is that some events will always
require secure distribution and some will only require it when sensitive
information is being carried in the payload (i.e. dynamic payload contents).
We deliberately named the equivalent fields in v1 as simply requiring security.
This allows evolving security standards to be used as they become supported.
Thanks for catching the .xsd overlook of the default value. Has been updated
relative to the next version.
Rich
Andre Kramer <andre.kramer@eu.citrix.com>
12/10/2004 05:15 AM
|
To
| wsrp@lists.oasis-open.org
|
cc
|
|
Subject
| [wsrp] EventDescription.requiresSecureDistribution |
|
We should note that basing
security decisions
on
EventDescription.requiresSecureDistribution
only makes sense if the EventDescription
was itself was
retrieved securely.
The
threat
here
being
Tampering.
I do not
see why we would want to
duplicate
the flag in the Event
type itself, even if we include it in
the event
metadata.
IMHO
A consumer should either use (securely
determined) metadata to
determine
the security level
for event transmission
or use the same security level
at which an event was received to re-distribute
the event (Event.RequiresSecureRedistribution?).
Would it be simpler to use the same rule as
for getMarkup to distribute all events? i.e.
If a producer
publishes a secure binding (i.e.
SSL) then the consumer should make use
of it? Or, better, provide
and encourage
means for the event data to be signed/encrypted
by sending portlets?
Regards,
Andre
PS.
In any case,
the
Event.requiresSecure(Re)Distribution declaration
XML
schema
could do with a default="false"
to match the
EventDescription convention.
[Date Prev]
| [Thread Prev]
| [Thread Next]
| [Date Next]
--
[Date Index]
| [Thread Index]
| [List Home]