OASIS Mailing List ArchivesView the OASIS mailing list archive below
or browse/search using MarkMail.

 


Help: OASIS Mailing Lists Help | MarkMail Help

xacml message

[Date Prev] | [Thread Prev] | [Thread Next] | [Date Next] -- [Date Index] | [Thread Index] | [List Home]


Subject: RE: [xacml] Break the Glass policies


David -- Agree with your considerations. FWIW, I was visualizing this
from the ujser interaction POV (w/o worrying about implementation or
efficiency.) What I imagined was a person issuing a query, and then
getting a pop-up saying: "You are not authorized access to the requested
information EXCEPT in the following circumstance(s): [drop-down list of
circumstances].  If any of these applies to your request, select it and
then press the CERTIFY botton to certify that the circumstance applies
to this access request.  Otherwise press CANCEL.  Note: this transaction
and your certification will be recorded."  

Well, I hope it would be a bit less wordy that that. <g>

Martin


-----Original Message-----
From: David Chadwick [mailto:d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk] 
Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2009 4:38 PM
To: Smith, Martin
Cc: Ludwig Seitz; xacml; Waterman, K. Krasnow <CTR>; Hammar, Patricia
<CTR>; John, Anil; Tom Karygiannis
Subject: Re: [xacml] Break the Glass policies

Hi Martin

at the NIST PMI conference in September the DoD had a similar concept of
overriding access control for operational reasons, but the main
difference to BTG is that in the DOD model a system component evaluates
the operational need and either overrides or does not on behalf of the
user. With BTG we are giving power back to the user to make the informed
choice. One thing that our hospital trials uncovered is that you do need
the audit and checks afterwards, otherwise it is hypothesised that once
users learn that there are no consequences for always BTGing, they
always will do it.

The purpose for us defining the BTG model and third response it to build
the complexity into the application independent PDP layer with
consequent simplicity in the PEP layer, and simplicity in specifying the
BTG policies. We therefore hope it will make this type of access control
  much easier to implement in all sorts of application scenarios.

regards

David


Smith, Martin wrote:
> David, all --
> 
> In looking at access policies based on formal policy authorities (like

> laws and frederal regulation) we've seen a number of cases where the 
> only practical source of a person or environmental "attribute" is 
> assertion by the requestor. The "BTG" attribute is an assertion that 
> an emergency situation exists. We also have come to the same 
> conclusion that you have (apparently), namely that ex-post enforcement

> (via audit of access logs) is a sufficient basis for enforcement for 
> many kinds of policies.
> 
> Another general class of self-assertion situations is where a law or 
> policy says "you can share information 'for the purpose of'
something."
> Example: passpost clerks can view personal passport records 'for the 
> purpose of' varifying information in the course of processing a 
> passport renewal application, (but not for other purposes, like 
> browsing the information of celebrities.)  In many of these scenarios 
> one might imagine a data source for the attribute that did not depend 
> on self-assertion, but those data may not be available at least in the

> short run.
> 
> I have not considered implementation of this enforcement strategy 
> (self-assertion plus log audit) to be a standards issue, so much as a 
> tooling issue (does a PDP product support pop-up requests for 
> self-asserted information?)  But if making a BTG profile stimulates 
> vendors to add capability for collecting self-assertion data, I'm for 
> it!
> 
> Martin Smith
> US Department of Homeland Security
> 
>    
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xacml-return-1875-martin.smith=dhs.gov@lists.oasis-open.org
> [mailto:xacml-return-1875-martin.smith=dhs.gov@lists.oasis-open.org] 
> On Behalf Of Ludwig Seitz
> Sent: Monday, December 14, 2009 2:52 AM
> To: David Chadwick
> Cc: xacml
> Subject: Re: [xacml] Break the Glass policies
> 
> Hi David,
> 
> you might want to look at this:
> http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1263871
> 
> I think it is very similar to what you want to achieve.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Ludwig
> 

--
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Israeli group Breaking the Silence has just released a collection of
testimonies by Israeli soldiers that took part in the Gaza attack last
December and January. The testimonies expose significant gaps between
the official stances of the Israeli military and events on the ground.

See  http://www.shovrimshtika.org/news_item_e.asp?id=30

The Israeli government defies Obama, and continues its settlement
expansion

Israel plans to allocate $250 million over the next two years for
settlements

http://www.palestinecampaign.org/index7b.asp?m_id=1&l1_id=4&l2_id=24&Con
tent_ID=698

whilst simultaneously continuing to bulldoze Palestinian homes

http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/301/t/9462/campaign.jsp?campaign_KE
Y=27357

*****************************************************************
David W. Chadwick, BSc PhD
Professor of Information Systems Security The Computing Laboratory,
University of Kent, Canterbury, CT2 7NF Skype Name: davidwchadwick
Tel: +44 1227 82 3221
Fax +44 1227 762 811
Mobile: +44 77 96 44 7184
Email: D.W.Chadwick@kent.ac.uk
Home Page: http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/people/staff/dwc8/index.html
Research Web site:
http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk/research/groups/iss/index.html
Entrust key validation string: MLJ9-DU5T-HV8J PGP Key ID is 0xBC238DE5

*****************************************************************


[Date Prev] | [Thread Prev] | [Thread Next] | [Date Next] -- [Date Index] | [Thread Index] | [List Home]