Re: [xri] RE: Delegation (was: trusted discovery workflow)

[Breno de Medeiros <breno@google.com>]

And the endpoint would be signed because it is a legitimate endpoint
for a different purpose?

Sounds to me like a defacement type of attack (mapping some services
in the domain to others). Probably less interesting to do than
straight defacement or DoS.

On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 10:53 AM, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 6:24 PM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> wrote:
>> This makes sense to me, but I think the challenge is how to codify this behavior in a way that is easy to understand and implement... It is way too easy to screw this up.
>
> It seems quite simple to me. At any point I have a current authority,
> and until I hit an XRD signed by that authority, it doesn't change.
> When I do, it becomes whatever the new XRD specifies. When I reach the
> end, the current authority must be authoritative for whatever resource
> I end up with.
>
> I do worry, though, that there could be some kind of attack where
> (forged) unsigned delegations are used to point some service at the
> wrong endpoint in the same domain, with the result that Bad Things
> happen.
>
>>
>> EHL
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Brian Eaton [mailto:beaton@google.com]
>>> Sent: Friday, December 05, 2008 9:58 AM
>>> To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
>>> Cc: xri@lists.oasis-open.org
>>> Subject: Re: [xri] RE: Delegation (was: trusted discovery workflow)
>>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 5, 2008 at 9:46 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> > A domain delegating the management of their services to a third
>>> party. Hosting and managing XRDs can and should become a product. Of
>>> course, if you <ref> the entire XRD, you can as easily just point the
>>> Link in that direction in the first place but it only works well with
>>> Link header and element where you have a resource level control. If you
>>> use a /site-meta map, it is impossible to point some XRD locations to
>>> server A and some to server B (at least this is a use case I refuse to
>>> support due to complexity). I much rather allow this to happen using a
>>> simple <Ref> in the local XRD itself.
>>>
>>> This sounds like a reasonable use case, and I think it'll fit into the
>>> trust workflow.
>>>
>>> - If the initial XRD is not signed or does not delegate to a new key
>>> in the trust chain, the next XRD must be signed with a key
>>> authoritative for the initial XRD.  More concretely: if I don't
>>> specify that somebody else can sign an XRD for me, that next XRD needs
>>> to be signed by me.
>>>
>>> - If the intial XRD is signed, it can point to a new key that will be
>>> used to sign the next XRD.
>>
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--Breno

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