RE: [courtfiling-process] Security of court orders

["John Messing" <jmessing@law-on-line.com>]

I have sent a request for comment to some lists I belong to as well. The responses are very interesting. I have gotten a few back that request further information about the nature of the connection between the database and the judge's chamber; i.e., if it is IP or other. Can this information be provided? Thanks.

-----Original Message-----
From: jkeane [mailto:jik@jkeane.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 16, 2003 7:35 AM
To: 'Gilliam, Charles'; 'John Greacen'; 'Efiling Process Models Subcommittee'
Cc: Michael Greenwood (E-mail); Robert Borochoff (E-mail)
Subject: RE: [courtfiling-process] Security of court orders

I recall the Commitee on Automation and Technology considered this issue.  I'm copying some of the AOUSC folks to see if there is any background material that might help.

 

Jim Keane

 

James I. Keane

JKeane.Law.Pro

20 Esworthy Terrace

North Potomac MD 20878

301-948-4062 F: 301-947-1176 (N.B.: NEW FAX NUMBER)

www.jkeane.com 

 

Co-Author and Annual Update Editor of Treatise: Litigation Support Systems, An Attorney Guide 2nd  Ed. (WestGroup, 1992, updated through 2002)

-----Original Message-----
From: Gilliam, Charles [mailto:Charles.Gilliam@CONTENTGUARD.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, April 16, 2003 10:06 AM
To: John Greacen; Efiling Process Models Subcommittee
Subject: RE: [courtfiling-process] Security of court orders

"The only way in which to circumvent this system is by bribing a member of the judge's staff to submit a forged order to the system."

 

That statement may be a bit bullish. I have heard of persons entering systems and placing unauthorized material there.

 

Still, the statement "I believe that the issue John is so concerned about is adequately addressed by this process" could be true. It is a matter of the level of risk you want to accept. It seems a fair question to probe the means employed by the system to prevent unauthorized deposit of information. Maybe those means are adequate or maybe there is room for improvement. What is adequate could depend on the type of the order and what was adequate yesterday may not be adequate tomorrow.

 

--Charles

 

-----Original Message-----
From: John Greacen [mailto:john@greacen.net]
Sent: Wednesday, April 16, 2003 00:04 AM
To: Efiling Process Models Subcommittee
Subject: [courtfiling-process] Security of court orders

On the last conference call, John Messing insisted that the work of this subcommittee could not proceed further until the issue of the security of judges' orders was adequately addressed.  John is concerned that electronic judicial orders will be forged and criminals will be released from jail or prison as a result.

 

The federal court efiling system, and most state and local systems, have solved this problem by treating the electronic record contained in the court's data base to be the official judge's order.  The system can guarantee the authenticity of these electronic orders because it will not accept orders coming from any address except the judge's chambers.  Persons wishing to verify the legitimacy of a purported order can go online, access the court's electronic data base and view the official order there.  The court advises law enforcement and correctional personnel to check orders in that fashion; they should not rely on a transmitted or printed copy of such an order.  This process provides security far exceeding anything available in the paper world today.  The only way in which to circumvent this system is by bribing a member of the judge's staff to submit a forged order to the system.  That risk is minimal.

 

I believe that the issue John is so concerned about is adequately addressed by this process.

 

John M. Greacen

Greacen Associates, LLC

HCR 78, Box 23

Regina, New Mexico 87046

505-289-2164

505-780-1450 (cell)

 

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