|
I
don't know which one was used but FIPS 180-1 was referenced in the court
managment published specifications. And 198 was only recently
released.
I
would hope that it is possible to go forward with both. 180-1 for the
signature and 198 for the instance (message) or just 198 if it can accomplish
both.
JA
| 180-1 |
|
Secure Hash Standard (SHS) -- 95 Apr 17
- To
specify a Secure Hash Algorithm to be used by both the transmitter and
intended receiver of a message in computing and verifying a digital
signature.
|
| 198 |
|
The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), 2002 March.
-This standard describes a keyed-hash message
authentication code (HMAC), a mechanism for message authentication using
cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative Approved
cryptographic hash function, in combination with a shared secret key. The
cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying
hash function. The HMAC specification in this standard is a generalization
of Internet RFC 2104, HMAC, Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, and
ANSI X9.71, Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code.
|
The
"hash total" to which Jim refers is an electronic signature. It allows others
to validate that document/file content is as produced (i.e. not modified in
any way) without unnecessarily encrypting the document/file content. It's
like a big checksum that requires a key for generation. A key is required to
calculate the electronic signature. This works when:
1) Those who must validate the document content as being
authentic have access to a key
2) Those who must validate the document content as being
authentic have access to the author's generated electronic signature for
each document for comparison to the key attached to the file. For very large
documents this can be much more efficient than securing a key or key pair or
constantly downloading copies of the original document.
gary
CAT,
cited below is a Committe of the US Judicial Conference. The approved the
Federal CMS/ECF system and judges' use of it in chambers for electronically
file orders. Two factor came up in my review of the Federal system for
the USDOJ 1) the Judges accepted the use of ID and password as
a "signature" 2) the Officially filed document is a PDF with some
sort of hash total to determine if anyone has tampered with the document, 3)
the National Security Agency approved the AOUSC system for interface
with the highly secure DOJ system.
Hope this
helps...
JimK
I
have sent a request for comment to some lists I belong to as well. The
responses are very interesting. I have gotten a few back that request
further information about the nature of the connection between the database
and the judge's chamber; i.e., if it is IP or other. Can this information be
provided? Thanks.
I
recall the Commitee on Automation and Technology considered this
issue. I'm copying some of the AOUSC folks to see if there is
any background material that might help.
Jim
Keane
"The only way in which to
circumvent this system is by bribing a member of the judge's staff to
submit a forged order to the system."
That statement may be a bit bullish. I have heard
of persons entering systems and placing unauthorized material
there.
Still, the statement "I believe that the issue John
is so concerned about is adequately addressed by this process" could be
true. It is a matter of the level of risk you want to accept. It seems a
fair question to probe the means employed by the system to prevent
unauthorized deposit of information. Maybe those means are adequate or
maybe there is room for improvement. What is adequate could depend on the
type of the order and what was adequate yesterday may not be adequate
tomorrow.
--Charles
On the last conference call,
John Messing insisted that the work of this subcommittee could not proceed
further until the issue of the security of judges' orders was adequately
addressed. John is concerned that electronic judicial orders will be
forged and criminals will be released from jail or prison as a
result.
The federal court efiling
system, and most state and local systems, have solved this problem by
treating the electronic record contained in the court's data base to be
the official judge's order. The system can guarantee the
authenticity of these electronic orders because it will not accept orders
coming from any address except the judge's chambers. Persons wishing
to verify the legitimacy of a purported order can go online, access the
court's electronic data base and view the official order there. The
court advises law enforcement and correctional personnel to check orders
in that fashion; they should not rely on a transmitted or printed copy of
such an order. This process provides security far exceeding anything
available in the paper world today. The only way in which to
circumvent this system is by bribing a member of the judge's staff to
submit a forged order to the system. That risk is
minimal.
I believe that the issue John
is so concerned about is adequately addressed by this
process.
John M.
Greacen
Greacen
Associates, LLC
HCR 78,
Box
23
Regina,
New Mexico
87046
505-289-2164
505-780-1450
(cell)
******************************************************************************
The
information in this email is confidential and may be legally
privileged.
Access to this email by anyone other than the
intended addressee is
unauthorized. If you are not the intended
recipient of this message, any
review, disclosure, copying,
distribution, retention, or any action taken
or omitted to be taken
in reliance on it is prohibited and may be
unlawful. If you are not
the intended recipient, please reply to or
forward a copy of this
message to the sender and delete the message, any
attachments,
and any copies thereof from your
system.
******************************************************************************
|