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If I understand the issue - âThe right peopleâ appears to me to be vendors who create software and how they identify, report and publish vulnerabilities in their software.
Threat Intelligence vendors (either creating intelligence or using intelligence), for the most part are downstream from where those âright peopleâ are.
So if you want to fix the root cause then I think you need to find a forum or interest group where vendors building software sit *and* have a motivation to incorporate changes so that they can address the problem consistently across all of them.
Iâm not sure anyone in this forum will fix the problem you state.
That said, if you disagree with my assessment and think this forum is appropriate please reach out to the TC leadership team to schedule some time to propose what changes should be considered for CTI.
Specifically around STIX and/or TAXII.
Thank you, Jane. The issues/obstacles pointed out in the referenced paper (ACM best paper CPSIoTSec 2020) are genuinely inhibiting parties from properly identifying vulnerabilities during software supply chain risk assessments. SBOM alignment with CVE databases will be key to addressing many of the issues cited in the paper, e.g. inconsistent supplier names is a big issue at present. My hope is that by raising this issue now, the right people will be able to influence a solution to the cited problems, or at least begin a conversation to deal with these issues. Thanks, Dick Brooks <image001.jpg> Tel: +1 978-696-1788 Dick: Thanks for the heads up on this. For those that are not familiar with SBOM I've attached a 2-page overview of the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) inventory from the US Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration. Jane Ginn On 11/15/2020 12:30 PM, Dick Brooks wrote: Rich, Iâm not very engaged in the development of STIX/TAXII, however I am an interested party and have a vested interest in seeing greater alignment of SBOM standards with Vulnerability reporting standards and entities. I want to raise your attention to an award winning paper from the ACM CPSIoTSec 2020 workshop held on 11/9/2020 that identifies some of the difficult challenges facing companies with regard to risk management and vulnerability reporting services. My software, SAG-PM, provides the energy industry with a software supply chain risk assessment control, and this paper highlights several of the issues that Iâve encountered with vulnerability reporting for software objects during risk assessments. I believe the âimpedance mismatchesâ, identified in the paper, between software objects and CVE databases/standards can be resolved, if the right people work together, especially software vendors, to address these issues as part of an SBOM standard, i.e. NTIA SBOM. I believe the complete paper is accessible from the ACM Digital Library. My apologies, if coordination is already underway between SBOM and CVE initiatives, but Iâm not aware of any such efforts. This paper identifies just how important coordination between CVE/SBOM initiatives is to helping parties manage software risk. I would be happy to participate in any coordination efforts in this regard. Thanks, Dick Brooks <image001.jpg> Tel: +1 978-696-1788 MITRE is considering setting up a repository for common objects for DHS. We are just at the planning stages, but that might be a good place for the execution-definition objects to âliveâ. We could have more information there about the extension, or individuals could just follow the URL in the schema property. I like that idea.
PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050 "Without cryptography vihv vivc ce xhrnrw, however, the only thing that can not be unscrambled is an egg." Rich, This latest exchange between Jeff Mates and myself about an Incident object made me reflect back on this email you sent me. If you recall, there was a similar type of exchange with Chris Ricard about Vulnerabilities. It got me thinking, what if we used the GitHub SEP Repository to be that place where people can go to see what extensions have been proposed, whoâs also working with them on, perhaps whoâs adopting. This way people can find others with a similar interest that are committed enough to work on a definition together. Rather than trying to convince everyone to agree, we use this as a sandbox. Then may when we see enough collaboration and interest, an extension could be brought to the TC for formal adoption into the specification. The hope being awareness of other parties interested in the same concept will help minimize the number of one-off extensions that are trying to define the same concept. Just a thought â Paul Patrick Hi Paul, I really like your examples for Vulnerability and Data Marking Definition extensions. One of the things that stands out is that there are pre-existing json schemas for a lot of these ideas. It would seem to me that having a repository of STIX Extension Definitions makes a lot of sense â a community known place to look for extension definitions. DHS has asked us to look into creating a common STIX object repository for the community. It would seem like Extension Definitions would be a natural fit for such a repository. BTW â I noticed on your IEP example â the property âend_dateâ has a value of null. The STIX spec generally would make a property optional if it could be null or emptyâ Rich -- Rich Piazza Lead Cyber Security Engineer The MITRE Corporation 781-271-3760 <image002.png> I wanted to share with the community some of the various examples of using the proposed STIX Extensions. Attached is a sample that illustrates: Â extend the STIX Vulnerability object with both CVSS scoring using the JSONscheme directly from FIRST Â extend the STIX Marking Definition object to create new data marking for IEP Â convert a couple of MITRE ATT&CK as STIX Attack Patterns representing the current MITRE custom extension using STIX Extensions Paul Patrick
-- ********************************** R. Jane Ginn, MSIA, MRP OASIS, CTI TC Secretary OASIS, TAC TC Secretary jg@ctin.us **********************************
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