Re: T2 Retry with Delivery Receipt

[christopher ferris <chris.ferris@Sun.COM>]

Marty,

I mostly agree. I certainly agree from the receiving end's
perspective.

TCP transmission errors are only detectable at the receiving
end, not the sending end unless the socket is closed before 
the sending end has completed streaming a message to the socket
in which case it can know that the message will not be
received.

TCP also provides for assurance that the message bits are
not corrupted in transmission through the use of checksums.
Any corruption at the content level has to happen somewhere
above the TCP layer of the stack.

The errors cited below are either MSH level or application
(as in the case of NRR) level errors which result in an
error being sent back to the sender of the message. These
should (MUST?) indicate that the receiver will not ever
process the message.

I think that the argument that while an error might be sent
to the sender, that the message might still be processed
is spurious. We shouldn't have to consider this. An error
should (MUST?) represent a failure to process a message.
Only then can you hope to build upon a solid foundation.
If an error is nothing more than informative, (I couldn't
validate the signature but I'm going to process the message
anyway) then it should be reported as such. If the case
is that the message will be processed anyway, in light of some
manner of fault, then no retry is necessary in the first
place.

Cheers,

Chris



Martin W Sachs wrote:
> 
> Maybe I am missing something here. I thought that (1) TCP transmission
> error detection is sufficient and (2) the result of a transmission error is
> that TCP discards the message.  If so, then a transmission error will
> result in the message not being delivered to the receiving MSH.  Therefore,
> no acknowledgement will be returned.  Therefore, normal RM retries take
> place.  If we trust TCP's transmission error detection, then the conditions
> mentioned below (Signature validation, NRR, Encryption validation, XML
> corruption)are content problems, not transmission errors, and have to be
> recovered at a content level, not at the MSH level.
> 
> Regards,
> Marty
> 
> *************************************************************************************
> 
> Martin W. Sachs
> IBM T. J. Watson Research Center
> P. O. B. 704
> Yorktown Hts, NY 10598
> 914-784-7287;  IBM tie line 863-7287
> Notes address:  Martin W Sachs/Watson/IBM
> Internet address:  mwsachs @ us.ibm.com
> *************************************************************************************
> 
> David Fischer <david@drummondgroup.com> on 09/18/2001 02:43:34 PM
> 
> To:   ebXML Msg <ebxml-msg@lists.oasis-open.org>
> cc:
> Subject:  RE: T2 Retry with Delivery Receipt
> 
> Chris,
> 
> You dismiss retry as a valid option in transmission error (Signature
> validation,
> NRR, Encryption validation, XML corruption) as if there is something which
> can
> be done to prevent such a thing.  Waving your hand at a problem does not
> make it
> go away.  The truth is that transmission errors happen constantly on the
> Internet at a much higher rate than anyone likes to admit and there is
> nothing
> which can be done to prevent it -- except try again.  Retry is the normal
> first
> step for ANY delivery failure situation.  The question should not be "why
> should
> we support retry" but rather "why wouldn't we support retry".
> 
> Why would retry ever be OK at the IM level but not OK from the Sender?
> Objectively, they are no different.  The ONLY issue is whether an IM should
> pass
> a resend from the Sender.  In this case, the IM is the provider and the
> Sender
> is the customer (the IM services the Sender).  Under what extraordinary
> circumstances should the service provider tell the customer "you can't do
> that"?
> You NEVER tell a customer no.  If you do, the customer will go find a
> different
> service provider.
> 
> Maybe I should ask why wouldn't you allow me to retry a message if that is
> my
> desire?  You don't sell products by telling someone what they can't do --
> someone else will do it.  You sell products by being flexible, not
> intolerant or
> autocratic.  I cannot conceive of a situation where someone would not, as
> the
> first fix, send a retry on a delivery failure.  Chris, maybe that would not
> be
> your first action but it is most everyone else's.  I had a delivery failure
> on
> an eMail this morning and the first thing I tried was to send it again --
> guess
> what, it worked.
> 
> David Fischer
> Drummond Group.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Chris.Ferris@Sun.COM [mailto:Chris.Ferris@Sun.COM]
> Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2001 12:32 PM
> To: ebXML Msg
> Subject: Re: T2 Retry with Delivery Receipt
> 
> David,
> 
> Please see below.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Chris
> 
> David Fischer wrote:
> >
> > Chris, your discussion is about RM and DR/NRR for RM.  We agreed to take
> DR
> out
> > of the RM discussion.  In your discussion you asked if this satisfied the
> > end-to-end retry need but you didn't discussion multi-hop at all?  All
> your
> > examples were single hop (SMTP does not count as an IM and let's stay
> away
> from
> > translating gateways for now).
> 
> Not at all. I gave 3 use cases, the third had a formal ebXML MSH
> intermediary
> node. I should point out that it was you who raised the EDI/INT gateway
> use case as a reason why you felt that end-to-end retries were a
> requirement.
> I was only building on that.
> 
> >
> > My question about allowing the Sending Party to retry (manually or
> > automatically) has nothing to do with RM.  The problem impacts RM
> > (deliverySemantics=OnceAndOnlyOnce) only in that the Receiving Party MUST
> > perform Idempotency.  My contention is that the ability to retry is
> required
> any
> > time there is a delivery failure.  I am not breaching the issue of
> automatic
> vs.
> > manual nor do I think we need to put that in the spec (in this we agree).
> 
> Okay, this is clearer.
> 
> If a DFN is returned, there are two possible meanings implied:
>      - the message could not possibly have made it to the To Party
>      - the message may have made it to the To Party, there is simply no
> proof (Ack)
> 
> I think that the speification already covers the DFN adequately with the
> exception
> of Marty's suggested change (SHOULD to SHALL to ensure that a DFN is ALWAYS
> genereted).
> The DFN has an Error severity if it is known that the message could not
> possibly
> have reached its destination. The DFN has a severity of Warning if it MAY
> have
> reached its destination but was simply unacknowledged after exhausting all
> retries.
> 
> A retry/resend of the identical message (same MessageId) above and beyond
> the
> RM-related retries can be accomodated when the DFN was generated locally
> (by the original sending MSH node) with a severity of either Error or
> Warning.
> It isn't clear to me that we have defined clearly enough the means by which
> the source of a DFN can be determined. It is also unclear as to whether
> an origin MSH that cannot communicate with the endpoint actually constructs
> an ebXML SOAP message, or whether it can simply throw an exception or
> notify
> the "application" layer in some manner other than the creation of an ebXML
> SOAP message that has an ErrorList with an Error element of DFN. This needs
> some clarification in any event.
> 
> A resend of a new message (different MessageId) with the same payload can
> always
> be safely accomodated if the severity of the DFN (generated anywhere
> along the message path) was Error. We can, and possibly should state this
> clearly in the specification, without going to the extreme of actually
> specifying any required MSH behaviour w/r/t a resend/retry, thus leaving
> it to the layer of software "above" the level of the MSH.
> 
> A DFN with a severity of Warning needs further investigation IMO. Clearly,
> we should not encourage that a new message (same payload) be sent if
> the DFN severity is Warning. We could, possibly in a non-normative section,
> describe how the Status inquiry service can be used to determine the
> status of the message w/r/t the To Party. If the message has indeed
> not been received, then it would seem to me to be a relatively safe course
> of
> action
> to send a new message with the same payload, assuming that this course
> of action is suitable for the "application"/message (e.g. it's business ttl
> is still viable). It should also be noted that the likelihood of this is
> fairly
> remote.
> 
> >
> > I am not concerned with end-to-end RM here, except where duplicates are
> > concerned.  This issue does not revolve around IMs being reliable or not
> or
> even
> > if they are true MSHs or not.  This is end-to-end with a black box in the
> > middle.
> >
> > I define TRP failure as:
> >
> >      1.  a DFN sent to the From Party MSH (error or warning)
> >      2. an Error Message sent to the From Party MSH
> >      3. the lack of a properly constructed Acknowledgement
> >         Message (Ack/DR/NRR) upon request.
> >
> > There's probably something else but I can't think what right now.  Let's
> take
> a
> > few example use cases.
> >
> >    - Lack of DR (when requested) (3)
> 
> If the DR is sent reliably, then its absense is significant cause for
> concern.
> 
> >    - If there is a network outage (1 or 3)
> 
> I assume that you mean 3 (DR) if the DR is sent unreliably. If sent
> reliably,
> then
> a network partition would result in a DFN (1) with a severity of Error
> which,
> as I stated before, can be safely accomodated by resending the original,
> identical
> message.
> 
> >    - DFN from IM to From Party MSH (1 or 3)
> 
> See above, if severity is Error, message can be safely sent as a new
> message with the same payload. We can say this, but it must be clearly
> stated that this functionality is outside the scope of the MSH proper,
> but of course can be implemented as an add-on.
> 
> >    - NRR validation failure (3)
> 
> Seems to me that this use case needs further decomposition. Do you
> mean that the receiving MSH failed to validate the signature of
> the original received message, and is therefore reporting that
> it will not process the message? This seems to be a case of a (2)
> above. In that case, sending a new message with the same payload
> is safe because the To Party has indicated that it will not
> process the message. Of course, this case also requires further
> investigation/intervention. If the signature is based on a certificate
> that has expired, or which the To party doesn't recognize as valid,
> then more than a simple retry is in order.
> 
> If the NRR validation failure is at the sending node, then
> it isn't clear to me that resending the message is in order at all.
> 
> If the message was mangled in transit, then clearly, something
> needs to be done to ensure that it never happens again! A retry
> gets you nowhere when there is some manner of security violation.
> 
> >    - Lack of initial Ack (3)
> 
> Already accomodated in the spec with the RM retry protocol.
> 
> >    - Security Failure (error on Signature or Encryption) (2)
> 
> Send a new message with the same payload. See above regarding
> the fact that there are more than likely bigger problems involved.
> 
> >    - XML text corruption in transit (2)
> 
> Unless you can verify that the message wasn't mangled to begin with,
> a retry does little to resolve the problem. In any event, sending
> a new message with the same payload is always safe in this circumstance
> because it is known that the To Party cannot and will not process the
> original message.
> 
> >
> > Some of these might be automatic and some will require a fix prior to
> retry.
> > Lack of a DR is only one possible cause for a retry.  In any of these
> cases,
> > there will be a retry of the same message (same MessageId) to prevent
> duplicates
> > which means Idempotency must be performed by the Receiving Party.  If
> even one
> > of these is valid, then end-to-end retries needs to be allowed.
> 
> See above, I don't think that there is need to do anything to support
> resending a message beyond what is already accomodated by the spec.
> 
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > David Fischer
> > Drummond Group.
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Chris.Ferris@Sun.COM [mailto:Chris.Ferris@Sun.COM]
> > Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2001 9:44 AM
> > To: ebXML Msg
> > Subject: Re: T2 Retry with Delivery Receipt
> >
> > David,
> >
> > Please see below.
> >
> > Cheers,
> >
> > Chris
> >
> > David Fischer wrote:
> > >
> > > I haven't seen any discussion on the list from this question.  Does
> this
> mean
> > > everyone agrees there are valid use cases supporting end-to-end
> retries?
> >
> > I don't agree that there has been a valid use case presented.
> >
> > Specifically, what we are concerned with are intermediary nodes
> > that are ebXML MSH nodes, not transport intermediary nodes such as SMTP
> > nodes along an SMTP message path between a From: and a To: email address.
> >
> > e.g.
> >
> >         MSHA->SMTP(local)->SMTP(x)->SMTP(y)->SMTP(To:<host>)->MSHB
> >
> > The above is a *single hop* from the ebXML RM perspective. If the message
> > is either delayed, or "lost" somewhere between MSHA and MSHB, then the
> > ebXML RM protocol would kick in and there would be an automated retry
> > based on retryInterval/retries as detailed in the spec because MSHA
> > would not receive an Acknowledgment from MSHB. The same holds true for
> > the case where the Acknowledgment is lost on the return message path.
> > MSHA would automatically resend the message. MSHB would detect any
> > duplicates, based on MessageId and respond with the *same* Acknowledgment
> > that it sent in response to the original message it received.
> >
> > If MSHA wants a DR for NRR from MSHB, it asks for this and would receive
> > it. I believe that this makes a strong case for the DR to be delivered
> > reliably, so that MSHA can be certain that it will be received.
> >
> > In the use case where there is not an MSH at the To Party, as might be
> > the case where some manner of gateway is employed, then the MSH which
> > acts as that gateway has a responsibility to ensure that the message is
> > reliably delivered. I don't believe that it is our responsibility to
> > provide specification language for how that is to be achieved.
> >
> > e.g.
> >
> >         MSHA->HTTP->MSHB||EDI/INT->EDI/INT(To Party)
> >
> > In the above case, MSHB is the endpoint from the perspective of the
> > sending MSHA. MSHB would acknowledge the message from MSHA after it
> > had persisted the message, thus having assumed full responsibility for
> > delivering the message. How this is effected is outside the scope of
> > our specification. MSHB (or more correctly, the gateway "application"
> > at MSHB) can do whatever is necessary to ensure that the message is
> > delivered. It can resend the message all it likes as far as I'm
> concerned.
> > MSHA should not have to concern itself with these details since it
> > successfully transitioned the responsibility to reliably deliver the
> > message to the node at MSHB.
> >
> > In the case where there is a reverse gateway at the To Party, then
> > again, the ebXML RM protocol could be used to ensure that the To Party
> > receives one and only one message just as was the case for the transfer
> > between MSHA and MSHB. How you get a DR for NRR from the To Party
> > in the above case is also beyond our scope. It must be assumed that
> > somehow, the To Party generates some manner of EDI/INT equivalent to
> > the DR which the MSHB||EDI/INT gateway translates into an ebXML DR.
> > Again, we don't need to go there for the spec because it is outside
> > our scope.
> >
> > e.g.
> >
> >         MSHA->HTTP->MSHB||EDI/INT->EDI/INT||MSHC
> >
> > In the above case, if the message were lost between MSHB and MSHC,
> > then the retries kick in, etc. thus ensuring that the message
> > is safely delivered. In this use case, EDI/INT is equivalent
> > to a transport such as HTTP (even if EDI/INT uses HTTP for its
> > transport).
> >
> > We do not assume that MSHB||EDI/INT is unreliable. We assume that
> > it is reliable. I see no reason why we need to pursue the case where
> > it is irresponsible and may lose messages or not bother to make
> > any effort at ensuring that the message is reliably delivered
> > safely to the next MSH node.
> >
> > In the case where there IS no subsequent MSH node, then all bets
> > are off as far as I'm concerned. We need not concern ourselves
> > with this because it is outside our scope. We are and should be
> > solely concerned with ensuring that we have a reliable messaging
> > protocol that works effectively between MSH nodes that exchange
> > messages over an unreliable transport protocol such as HTTP, SMTP
> > or orange-juice cans and strings.
> >
> > If you want to covver the case where some disaster at MSHB||EDI/INT
> > GW node results in loss of data, then MSHB needs to rollback to some
> > earlier state (one in which it has not seen the messages that it may have
> lost).
> > MSHA can resend messages which MSHB will treat as new, forwarding
> > them onto MSHC which would discard any duplicates as per the current
> > spec. Any messages which are resent in this manner, which MSHC has not
> > previously received would be processed accordingly.
> >
> > Does this satisfy you your end-to-end retry requirement? Note that
> > it doesn't involve any changes to the spec (IMO). If you or anyone
> > else wants to build in an automated retry on non-receipt of a DR,
> > you are free to do so. I disagree that it is something that the
> > specification needs to comment on. The retries could be manual
> > with equal effect (and that would also provide that MSHB had
> > restored itself to some stable state if one assumes that a phone
> > call or some other OOB communication is made to ensure that everything
> > is ready to roll). For that matter, MSHA may have a similar rollback
> > capability that it could invoke after consulting the To Party
> > (possibly using the Status inquiry MSH service) to determine
> > at which point the two parties need to resynchronize, etc.
> >
> > Again, I have also repeatedly stated that a DR is not a requirement
> > for all messages in all cases. It may be that it is frequently used,
> > but in fact it may be mere window dressing to some. Some parties
> > might consider the expected "response" or follow-on message as
> > the proof they require to "know" that the message they sent
> > was received. They may be satisfied with "if I get no business
> > response, then the business transaction is null and void". This
> > is likely to be something that the Business Server layer of software
> > would concern itself with, not the MSH.
> >
> > >
> > > The way the spec is written now, single-hop, end-to-end retries work.
> > Multi-hop
> > > end-to-end retries do not work when RM is turned on (idempotence).  Can
> we
> now
> > > discuss what that will entail?
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > >
> > > David Fischer
> > > Drummond Group.
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: David Fischer [mailto:david@drummondgroup.com]
> > > Sent: Friday, September 14, 2001 8:46 AM
> > > To: Martin W Sachs; Christopher Ferris
> > > Cc: Dan Weinreb; ebxml-msg@lists.oasis-open.org
> > > Subject: RE: T2 Retry with Delivery Receipt
> > >
> > > This all comes down to "Are end-to-end Retries REQUIRED"?  All the
> other
> > things
> > > like automated retries, end-to-end RM, retry on DR, are secondary
> issues.
> > >
> > > Under any delivery failure scenario, the ability to retry the original
> send
> is
> > > REQUIRED.  This might be automated or it might be manual.  It might
> come
> from
> > > the MSH or from the Application.  It might be now or after a fix.  No
> matter
> > > where or how, we MUST allow end-to-end Retries.
> > >
> > > Can anyone disagree with this?
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > >
> > > David Fischer
> > > Drummond Group.
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Martin W Sachs [mailto:mwsachs@us.ibm.com]
> > > Sent: Friday, September 14, 2001 8:25 AM
> > > To: Christopher Ferris
> > > Cc: Dan Weinreb; david@drummondgroup.com;
> ebxml-msg@lists.oasis-open.org
> > > Subject: Re: T2 Retry with Delivery Receipt
> > >
> > > Sure but it is an example of how ebxml end to end RM can work through
> > > unreliable IMs.
> > >
> > >
> >
> ********************************************************************************
> 
> > > *****
> > >
> > > Martin W. Sachs
> > > IBM T. J. Watson Research Center
> > > P. O. B. 704
> > > Yorktown Hts, NY 10598
> > > 914-784-7287;  IBM tie line 863-7287
> > > Notes address:  Martin W Sachs/Watson/IBM
> > > Internet address:  mwsachs @ us.ibm.com
> > >
> >
> ********************************************************************************
> 
> > > *****
> > >
> > > Christopher Ferris <chris.ferris@sun.com> on 09/13/2001 01:40:58 PM
> > >
> > > To:   Martin W Sachs/Watson/IBM@IBMUS
> > > cc:   Dan Weinreb <dlw@exceloncorp.com>, david@drummondgroup.com,
> > >       ebxml-msg@lists.oasis-open.org
> > > Subject:  Re: T2 Retry with Delivery Receipt
> > >
> > > Marty,
> > >
> > > AN SMTP node is NOT an MSH node. It is not part of the equation.
> > > The MSH nodes that are communication via SMTP are the ones that
> > > adopt the RM protocol of retries in the absence of an Acknowledgment.
> > > The SMTP nodes are incidental.
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > >
> > > Chris
> > >
> > > Martin W Sachs wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Re:  "I think David's position is that we can't do that, because
> there
> > > are
> > > > hosts/entities out there that (a) must participate as ebXML MS IM's,
> > > > and (b) that are unreliable.  The question is whether there's a use
> > > > case demonstrating this."
> > > >
> > > > There is one major use case, which is SMTP.  SMTP intermediate nodes
> are
> > > > notoriously unreliable and only acknowledge to the previous node so a
> > > > sender has no idea whether the message got to its destination.  ebXML
> on
> > > > top of SMTP is one of the major reasons for having ebXML reliable
> > > messaging
> > > > and only end to end reliable messaging helps with SMTP.  I don't know
> if
> > > > there is a use case for ebXML unreliable intermediaries but if there
> is,
> > > > end to end RM is the answer.
> > > >
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Marty
> > > >
> > >
> >
> ********************************************************************************
> 
> > > *****
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Martin W. Sachs
> > > > IBM T. J. Watson Research Center
> > > > P. O. B. 704
> > > > Yorktown Hts, NY 10598
> > > > 914-784-7287;  IBM tie line 863-7287
> > > > Notes address:  Martin W Sachs/Watson/IBM
> > > > Internet address:  mwsachs @ us.ibm.com
> > > >
> > >
> >
> ********************************************************************************
> 
> > > *****
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Dan Weinreb <dlw@exceloncorp.com> on 09/13/2001 12:55:02 PM
> > > >
> > > > Please respond to Dan Weinreb <dlw@exceloncorp.com>
> > > >
> > > > To:   chris.ferris@sun.com
> > > > cc:   david@drummondgroup.com, ebxml-msg@lists.oasis-open.org
> > > > Subject:  Re: T2 Retry with  Delivery Receipt
> > > >
> > > >    Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2001 11:48:33 -0400
> > > >    From: Christopher Ferris <chris.ferris@sun.com>
> > > >
> > > >    > The only problem is that the addition of multi-hop interferes
> with
> > > > end-to-end
> > > >    > retries (duplicates) which, as we have seen, is a fundamental
> > > > functional
> > > >    > requirement under all circumstances when a Delivery Receipt is
> > > > requested but not
> > > >    > received.
> > > >
> > > >    You're asking for retries on top of retries. What happens when the
> > > > end-to-end
> > > >    retries are exhausted and there is still no delivery receipt? Do
> we
> > > add
> > > > retries
> > > >    of retries of retries? What happens when they fail? Do we add yet
> > > > another layer?
> > > >
> > > > What David is asking for is perfectly sensible *if* you your failure
> > > > model states that IM's are unreliable, e.g. that an IM might accept a
> > > > message, and then silently forget it.  In that case, the end-to-end
> > > > retries exist for a specific purpose: to harden the system against
> the
> > > > possibility of flaky IM's.  There would be no need to add another
> > > > layer unless there is some additional, distinct failure mode to be
> > > > taken care of.
> > > >
> > > >    Why not focus on what you perceive as an omission in the spec,
> that an
> > > > intermediary
> > > >    has certain obligations w/r/t reliable delivery. Let's address
> that by
> > > > adding
> > > >    text that fully sets out what the responsibilities of an
> intermediary
> > > > are
> > > >    not only w/r/t RM but w/r/t routing and any other oddities of an
> > > > intermediaries
> > > >    role that is clearly distinct from that of an endpoint.
> > > >
> > > > I think David's position is that we can't do that, because there are
> > > > hosts/entities out there that (a) must participate as ebXML MS IM's,
> > > > and (b) that are unreliable.  The question is whether there's a use
> > > > case demonstrating this.
> > > >
> > > >    I'd like to focus on the specific use case that you cited in the
> call,
> > > > where
> > > >    an MSH uses an EDI/INT gateway. Is there an ebXML MSH at the To
> Party
> > > or
> > > > do they
> > > >    simply have an EDI/INT server?
> > > >
> > > >         MSHA -> IMSHGW -> EDI/INTGW -> EDI/INTB
> > > >
> > > >    In this case, how does the ebXML delivery receipt get generated?
> IMO,
> > > > the
> > > >    EDI/INT Gateway has a responsibility to ensure that the message is
> > > > safely
> > > >    delivered. How it does this is not the perview of our
> specification.
> > > > However,
> > > >    that doesn't obviate the responsibility that the gateway
> intermediary
> > > > node
> > > >    assumes.
> > > >
> > > > I'd call this a protocol-translating gateway, not an ebXML MS IM at
> > > > all.  I agree that the gateway has to make sure that the message is
> > > > truly delivered, and then the gateway generates the DR.  It's the
> > > > job of the protcol-translating gateway to create the illusion that
> > > > the far end is really running ebXML MS.
> > > >
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