

Any changes from the TeMix profile [TEMIX]² of Energy Interop (EI) and Energy Market Information Exchange (EMIX) must require clear justification because the changes may be incompatible with TEMIX, published a decade ago, that existing implementations have, may have, or will rely on otherwise the claimed interoperability of the **Proposal** will fail.

1. The **Proposal** introduces Actor as a synonym with Party. There is no apparent advantage to the change.
2. There is no formal role in the **Proposal** for Location as in TEMIX.
3. There is no formal role in the **Proposal** for Transport Products as in TEMIX.
4. The definition of a Transaction in the **Proposal** is different from TEMIX for no apparent reason.
5. The addition of Instrument as a Product for a Duration in the **Proposal** is unnecessary, and any market engine that requires Instruments can apply the instrument concept in its interface with TEMIX.
6. In conflict with the **Proposal**, there are valid use cases for a tender that expires after the start time of the associated interval.
7. The **Proposal's** definition of a Resource is inconsistent with the definition of a Resource in EMIX and is not used in TEMIX.
8. The Cancel Tender operation cannot be required in any TEMIX implementation because a Party executing more than one transaction cannot rely on both transactions being executed. Moreover, tender cancellation can be an invitation to market manipulation.
9. The omission in the **Proposal** of EiQuote is not an improvement as this service should never have been in TEMIX. Likewise, the **Proposal's** omission of the EiDelivery service makes no sense, especially as the **Proposal** has a significant discussion of Delivery.
10. The **Proposal's** discussion of a Position Service is incomplete and likely unworkable because of design flaws in the **Proposal**.
11. While the **Proposal** includes bilateral transactions, the **Proposal's** favored alternative of independent, local clearing markets (market engines) is unworkable in a grid where fine locational and time granularity is essential, and liquidity of tenders is minimal.
12. End Party participation in local clearing markets offered in the **Proposal** will typically see low participation and low liquidity, so such markets will be inefficient and unworkable except perhaps in exceptional circumstances.
13. The **Proposal's** option to have markets with offset Start Times is unworkable and unnecessary.
14. The **Proposal** for Common Transactive Services (CTS) offers no more interoperability (likely less because of flaws) than TEMIX. As a result, CTS is oversold in this **Proposal**. In addition, the **Proposal** does not fully implement and is incompatible with the CTS in CTS2016 for reasons described above.
15. The **Proposal** does not simplify TEMIX as claimed. Most, if not all, of the claimed benefits of the **Proposal**, are provided by TEMIX. The **Proposal's** messages are not simpler than TEMIX messages and are likely incompatible (the messages are not yet published). TEMIX, as it stands, is fully capable of providing transactive services in any market, although its documentation in EMIX and EI could be "cleaned up" in a new standalone TEMIX profile of these standards. Hence the **Proposal** only adds confusion to the detriment of **Transactive Energy** progress.

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² The term TEMIX, as defined in EI and EMIX, means Transactive EMIX to indicate that it is a transactive profile of EMIX. TEMIX was coined and used by EMIX well before the company TeMix Inc. was named and incorporated.