

Summary	Assignee	Labels	Environment	Key ↑	Description	Resolved	Status
Resource Definition and Location	William Cox	RES-PROD-INSTR	Trevor Hardy, PNNL https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00000.html	ENERGYINTEROP-671	page 15 line 228 Resource definition should include the value of the commodity also depending on the location of delivery, right?		OPEN
Support for Consensus Markets	William Cox	MARKET	Trevor Hardy, PNNL https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00000.html	ENERGYINTEROP-672	page 15 Table 2-1 What about distributed or consensus mechanisms that do not necessarily communicate instruments among market participants? It seems like these mechanisms would not be supported by CTS, true?		OPEN
Hiding from Actors	William Cox	MARKET	Trevor Hardy, PNNL https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00000.html	ENERGYINTEROP-674	page 16 line 273 Doesn't the nature of the matching engine define the nature of the messages needing to be exchanged? Submitting tenders to an order book can require the communication of different information than that of a double-auction (point price-quantity pairs vs full supply or demand curves). Doesn't this require that the Actors are aware of this when submitting messages? I don't understand how "this complexity is hidden from the Actors".		OPEN
Inappropriate Issues	Toby Considine	editorial	Trevor Hardy, PNNL https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00000.html	ENERGYINTEROP-675	page 18 line 304 These questions seem out of character to include in a standard.		OPEN
Order and Undefined Terms	Toby Considine	editorial	Trevor Hardy, PNNL https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00000.html	ENERGYINTEROP-676	page 18 line 307 "Delegation" is an undefined term up to this point in the document. "PartyID" is an undefined term up to this point in the document.		OPEN
Location missing	Toby Considine	RES-PROD-INSTR	Edward G. Cazalet, TEMIX https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00001/Cazalet_Comments_on_CTS.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-678	2. There is no formal role in the Proposal for Location as in TEMIX.		OPEN
Expiration of Tender rule too restrictive	Toby Considine	FACET	Edward G. Cazalet, TEMIX https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00001/Cazalet_Comments_on_CTS.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-682	6. In conflict with the Proposal, there are valid use cases for a tender that expires after the start time of the associated interval.	08/Feb/22	OPEN
Eliminate Cancel Tender	William Cox	FACET	Edward G. Cazalet, TEMIX https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00001/Cazalet_Comments_on_CTS.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-684	8. The Cancel Tender operation cannot be required in any TEMIX implementation because a Party executing more than one transaction cannot rely on both transactions being executed. Moreover, tender cancellation can be an invitation to market manipulation.		OPEN
Are EQuote and EIDelivery needed?	Toby Considine	FACET	Edward G. Cazalet, TEMIX https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00001/Cazalet_Comments_on_CTS.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-685	9. The omission in the Proposal of EQuote is not an improvement as this service should never have been in TEMIX. Likewise, the Proposal's omission of the EIDelivery service makes no sense, especially as the Proposal has a significant discussion of Delivery.		OPEN
End-Party Participation unhelpful	William Cox	MARKET	Edward G. Cazalet, TEMIX https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00001/Cazalet_Comments_on_CTS.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-688	12. End Party participation in local clearing markets offered in the Proposal will typically see low participation and low liquidity, so such markets will be inefficient and unworkable except perhaps in exceptional circumstances.		OPEN
Offset Time unworkable	William Cox	MARKET	Edward G. Cazalet, TEMIX https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00001/Cazalet_Comments_on_CTS.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-689	13. The Proposal's option to have markets with offset Start Times is unworkable and unnecessary.		OPEN
CTS incompatible with CTS 2016	William Cox	ARCH-CONF	Edward G. Cazalet, TEMIX https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00001/Cazalet_Comments_on_CTS.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-690	14. The Proposal for Common Transactive Services (CTS) offers no more interoperability (likely less because of flaws) than TEMIX. As a result, CTS is oversold in this Proposal. In addition, the Proposal does not fully implement and is incompatible with the CTS in CTS2016 for reasons described above.		OPEN
More complex than TEMIX	William Cox	ARCH-CONF	Edward G. Cazalet, TEMIX https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00001/Cazalet_Comments_on_CTS.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-691	15. The Proposal does not simplify TEMIX as claimed. Most, if not all, of the claimed benefits of the Proposal, are provided by TEMIX. The Proposal's messages are not simpler than TEMIX messages and are likely incompatible (the messages are not yet published). TEMIX, as it stands, is fully capable of providing transactive services in any market, although its documentation in EMIX and EI could be "cleaned up" in a new standalone TEMIX profile of these standards. Hence the Proposal only adds confusion to the detriment of Transactive Energy progress		OPEN
Editorial Minor	Toby Considine	editorial	H Walter Johnson https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00007.html	ENERGYINTEROP-698	Some miscellaneous typos: Line 356: "that to shallow" should probably read "that are too shallow". Line 668, "report and power" should probably read "report any power". Line 712: "match buy and" should probably read "match buyer and". Line 912: "seller increase" should probably read "seller to increase" Line 914-15: "the sender" should probably read something like "the identities of the sender". Line 916: "able detect" should probably read "able to detect".		OPEN
White Paper	William Cox	OTHER	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-699	Detailed white paper with schematics and many comments attached. (See URI for environment, or attachment) Will attempt to transfer all as issues, but including overall white-paper as guidance.		OPEN
Missing Functionality	William Cox	MARKET	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-700	. CTS therefore may lack functionality needed for some emerging transactive energy systems. Specifically, the standard lacks abilities to represent • Inflexible supply or demand • Price-sensitive supply or demand • Aggregation of supply offers and demand bids There are potentially elegant ways to extend CTS to facilitate these capabilities that are currently missing from the draft standard.		OPEN
Binary Flexibility	William Cox	MARKET	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-701	CTS is suited for representing the binary flexibility of individual supply or demand objects. CTS is perfectly able to represent an offer from a conventional fueled generator, for example. The generator offers a quantity of supply at a strike price. The generator may become dispatched if the quantity is paired to willing demand via bilateral trading. Alternatively, the generator may become dispatched by a market if the market clears at a price greater than or equal to the strike price. It is irrelevant how the transactions proceed, but the CTS is suitable for either bilateral trades or real-time bilateral markets. CTS can represent simple binary flexibility from an object. CTS could represent a bid from a residential water heater to consume a quantity of electricity, for example. The control action is binary. If the bid is accepted, the water heater heats water; if the bid is not accepted, it waits idle. CTS could have been used for PNNL's Olympic Peninsula field study, for example, which created a real-time double auction and managed devices as described in this paragraph. However, the applicability of such binary flexibility works only for relatively short time intervals. Many end-use devices must eventually operate and provide a utility to their owners, which is why applicability of		OPEN

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					<p>CTS may be limited to short-term, real-time market intervals. Over long time intervals such devices cannot remain off. An unstated requirement of CTS is apparently that it requires a pre-existing market position or baseline, and a CTS-based offer or bid represents a diversion from that baseline. It does not seem that CTS can represent the baseline itself, however, although its parent EMIX is said to have this capability. It is argued that CTS can represent aggregated supplies and demands. For example, a bid or offer could be made via CTS for an entire building or for the entities within an energy microgrid. But this works only if the aggregate flexibility remains binary and can be represented at a single strike price. This limits the communication of priorities, as would be possible using supply and demand curves, where quantity may be a rich function of price alternatives.</p> <p>CTS can apparently flag a bid or offer to indicate that its quantity may be partially accepted, but all subquantities then possess the same strike price. CTS also may communicate multiple "Tender" offers to buy or sell, but it does not address the association of such alternatives into a cohesive supply or demand curve and the resulting mutual exclusivity of such alternatives.</p> <p>The commonality between all binary flexibility is that it can be represented by the pairing of a single quantity and single strike price. Figure 1 shows three alternative graphical representations of a CTS bid (or, more generally, of a single object's binary bid or offer). Panel (a) is a conventional way of showing supply and demand, as adopted from wholesale electricity practices. Both supply and demand are shown as positive quantities in the same quadrant. The top, right corner of the supply block is the offered quantity and strike price. Panel (a) shows a single offer. Demand is typically shown as a line. Here an inflection occurs at the demand quantity and strike price. Panels (b) and (c) are alternative representations that use signed quantities and prices. The only differences between the two panels is that (b) shows price as a function of signed quantity, and (c) shows signed quantity as a function of price. While these functional relationships could be mathematically represented in many ways, this white paper will use a piecewise linear approach, which provides a pathway for extension of CTS quite naturally to a broader set of TE applications. A CTS bid or offer requires a single pairing of price and quantity (i.e., a single "vertex"), but a second point is implied for the alternative binary action—the quantity zero at the strike price. This distinction is subtle, but it is important to the extensibility of CTS. Namely, CTS will be extensible if it explicitly includes what is now an implicit price/quantity pairing.</p> <p>Incidentally, all bid and offer prices should be understood to, in effect, extend to positive and negative infinity as shown in panels (b) and (c). See attachment (URI in environment) for graphics</p>		
Representing Inflexibility	William Cox	MARKET	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-702	<p>Transactive energy systems should be able to represent both their flexibility and inflexibility. Failure to do so will create exceptions and will rely on assumptions—like the existence of a predetermined market position or baseline. Consider, for example, a transactive system design that must communicate not only its available flexibility, but also its existing baseline apart from such flexibility. Regrettably, the number of objects having no flexibility is typically much greater than the number offering flexibility. Also consider the growth of renewable energy resources, which contribute virtually no flexibility to be controlled by prices but are becoming an important component of global electricity supply.</p> <p>Figure 2 demonstrates alternative representations of inflexible supply and demand. Unlike the binary flexibility discussed in Section 1, inflexible supply or demand possess no meaningful strike price. Inflexibility implies that the quantity would be the same regardless of price. One way to extend CTS to represent inflexibility would be to populate the strike price with a value (e.g., ∞ or NULL) that would clearly indicate inflexibility. If this number or symbol is used consistently, it would be easy to identify and aggregate inflexible supply and demand See attachment (URI in environment) for graphics</p>		OPEN
Linear Price Sensitivity	William Cox	MARKET	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-703	<p>Transactive energy systems should also be able to represent non-binary opportunities like price-sensitive quantities. See Figure 3. The use of price sensitivity in bids and offers can improve the accuracy and effectiveness of energy balance achieved via auctions, especially as the system diverges from its normal, expected trajectory. Complete bid and supply curves can also reduce the numbers of iterations needed to discover prices using iterative consensus and game price-discovery mechanisms.</p> <p>Price sensitivity appears quite naturally in conventional generator supply curves that are typically derived from their quadratic cost curves. If a cost curve is truly quadratic (not linear), offer prices are a linear function of generated quantity.</p> <p>Price sensitivity also appears in transactive energy systems that discover price via centralized or distributed locational marginal pricing algorithms. Most notable is the effect of transport losses that make price become a function of system losses, which are in turn a function of transported quantity.</p> <p>Price sensitivity comes into play for most controllable DER when time intervals become longer than what can be accommodated using binary on/off binary flexibility. Simple heuristic methods (e.g., thermostat bids based on zone temperatures) begin to fail when applied to relatively long future prediction horizons and long market intervals. Under these cases, bids and offers must more accurately predict the actual energy quantity and the impacts of any flexibility. One strategy is to optimize the likely outcome while monetizing the state of the utility (e.g., comfort or discomfort level) that is provided. The result of such an optimization is an indifference curve that expresses the willingness of a prosumer to exchange energy and money.</p> <p>As suggested by Figure 3, CTS might be extended to support simple price sensitivity from an individual object if it were to support a second price/quantity pair. However, the next section will argue that CTS should preferably support communication of many price/quantity pairs if it is to represent effects of aggregation. Even individual objects might require multiple price/quantity pairs when their price sensitivity cannot be adequately represented by only two price/quantity pairs. See attachment (URI in environment) for graphics</p>		OPEN
Aggregated Flexibility and Inflexibility	William Cox	ARCH-COPE	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-704	<p>Binary supply or demand flexibility might be acceptable for aggregation of household or building demand and supply. But it is unlikely that dissimilar objects' flexibility can be controlled in a binary fashion using the same strike price. Shouldn't DERs supplying utility of different value be prioritized by strike price? In principle, a transactive energy system should be able to represent aggregations of bids and offers from sets of objects having binary flexibility, price-sensitive flexibility, and even inflexibility. The aggregation of an object without flexibility with another have binary flexibility is exemplified by Figure 4. In this example, there is no price at which the aggregate supply or demand quantity magnitude can be reduced to zero. A step appears at the strike price of the object offering binary flexibility.</p> <p>If CTS were to support the supply and demand aggregations of example of Figure 4, it would need to communicate at least two price/quantity pairs. However, it would be better for CTS to support a greater or indefinite number of such pairs if rich aggregations of supply and demand are to be represented. Incidentally, an aggregate curve could very well include both supply (positive quantity) and demand (negative quantity) price/quantity pairs, as would be needed for the indifference supply/bid curve from a battery system performing arbitrage. I recommend the consistent use of signed quantities, like those of panels (b) and (c), because the use of signed quantity avoids separation of an object's supply and demand components, as must be done when using unsigned quantities (i.e., panels (a)). Furthermore, the practice of using signed quantities greatly facilitates aggregation, requiring simply that objects' quantities be added at all defined strike prices, including inflexible quantities at strike price ∞. See attachment (URI in environment) for graphics</p>		OPEN

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General Recommendations	William Cox	ARCH-CONF	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-705	<p>Here is a summary of how CTS might be modified to extend its applicability to the future cases discussed in this white paper:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Select and use a sign convention that will allow electricity quantity to be consistently expressed as a signed quantity. 2. Consider the practice of supporting sets of price/quantity pairs (i.e., vertices) to approximate the functional relationships between price and quantity in a single time interval. This would be a natural extension to CTS, which currently supports a single price/quantity pair. 3. Specify a price (e.g. ⇒) to indicate inflexibility. The pairing of this indication with a quantity would thereby represent a constant, inflexible supply or demand quantity. Upon completing this extension, the use of existing baseline quantities can become a design option rather than implied necessity. Regardless, documentation should not be silent concerning this current limitation of CTS to only flexible supply and demand components, which implies the need for a baseline apart from CTS. 4. CTS appears to be silent concerning the effects of location. While it is claimed that locational impacts are in scope, it is not clear that an Actor's circuit location must be communicated. See attachment (URI in environment) for graphics 		OPEN
Adequacy of CTS model	William Cox	ARCH-CONF	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-706	<p>There are 30 specific recommendations in the "Specific Recommendations" section of the submitted Hammerstrom paper. I have numbered them all for traceability as I recombine them into specific issues. The original white paper/submission can be read in the URI under "environment"</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lines 19 – 22: It is problematic that the broader TE community does not universally accept this narrow definition of TE. CTS may work within this narrow definition of TE, but the application of market structs in electric distribution systems and end uses is an immature, evolving technology, and CTS is not yet adequate for communication in these newer visions. 2. Lines 30 – 32: My content above explains why CTS may not be future proof for future TE systems and for mechanisms that already differ from that envisioned by the CTS authors. 3. Line 49: Please see the content above concerning CTS limitations in respect to aggregations of collections of devices. The biggest limitation is that a CTS message possesses only one strike price, which is inadequate to represent aggregations of dissimilar, prioritized devices, that may have differing associated prices and quantities. 		OPEN
Slides or Signs	William Cox	ARCH-CONF	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-707	<p>There are 30 specific recommendations in the "Specific Recommendations" section of the submitted Hammerstrom paper. I have numbered them all for traceability as I recombine them into specific issues. The original white paper/submission can be read in the URI under "environment"</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Line 64: The "Side attribute" in an energy market is unneeded if signed quantities are used. How would a battery system offer to transition from being a buyer to being a seller at a given price, for example? It is potentially problematic that a baseline is being assumed but not defined for all TE implementations. 11. Section 2.2.2: The attribute Side (i.e., Buy or Sell) is unneeded if signed quantities are employed. 		OPEN
Editorial - Consistent Abbreviations and Casing	Toby Considine	editorial	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-708	<p>There are 30 specific recommendations in the "Specific Recommendations" section of the submitted Hammerstrom paper. I have numbered them all for traceability as I recombine them into specific issues. The original white paper/submission can be read in the URI under "environment"</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Section 1.6: Do not jump between use of "EI," "Energy Interoperation," and "Energy Interoperation 1.0." I presume these are all covered by acronym and reference "EI". 17. Throughout: Consistent capitalization of "Products", "Instruments", "Transactions", etc. is needed. Section 4.1 and throughout: I'm finding usage of "facet" to be misleading and confusing. These must be properties of some object or class or references to objects' behaviors. Part of the problem perhaps evolves from the double meaning of "transaction" that is being allowed. At times it refers generally to an interaction between Parties; at other times, it refers to a specific state of that interaction after a Tender has been accepted and contracted. If this confusion were resolved, you could make clearer reference to the various properties and states that surround interactions between parties. 18. Throughout: Once defined, use "EI" consistently. 		OPEN
Minimal and Fractal	William Cox	ARCH-CONF	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-710	<p>There are 30 specific recommendations in the "Specific Recommendations" section of the submitted Hammerstrom paper. I have numbered them all for traceability as I recombine them into specific issues. The original white paper/submission can be read in the URI under "environment"</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Section 1.6: I'm awaiting the novel value of this "minimal transactive profile." If valuable, why are the referenced standards not being extended instead of creating a separate CTS standard? 7. Section 2.1.1: This claim of hierarchical or "fractal" application of CTS is questionable. It seems that CTS provides means of procuring needed and selling surplus energies in time, but it does not aggregate the opportunities that could be embedded in an aggregate supply or demand curve. It is unlikely that dissimilar aggregated devices or prioritizable actor preferences can be combined at the same identical strike price. 10. Section 2.2.1: This treatment of "facets" seems to be a step backward and is not architecturally sound. The "facets" are first introduced as properties of interactions and later as Actor roles. These are certainly not actor roles and do not inherently even belong to Actors. What an odd mix! (Maybe these are "interaction profiles"?) 		OPEN
Resources / Products / Instruments	Toby Considine	RES-PROD-INSTR	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-712	<p>There are 30 specific recommendations in the "Specific Recommendations" section of the submitted Hammerstrom paper. I have numbered them all for traceability as I recombine them into specific issues. The original white paper/submission can be read in the URI under "environment"</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 12. Table 3-2, Resource row: Consider offering an extensible enumeration for Resource. If this is not done, duplicate Designators and Names will evolve for the same Resource. 16. Line 378: "Products" → "instruments"? 20. Table 5-1, "Resource Designator" row: Shouldn't this be a reference to a specific Product, not Resource? 27. Line 689: Editing needed. 		OPEN
Party and Party Registration	Toby Considine	PREREG	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-713	<p>There are 30 specific recommendations in the "Specific Recommendations" section of the submitted Hammerstrom paper. I have numbered them all for traceability as I recombine them into specific issues. The original white paper/submission can be read in the URI under "environment"</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 22. Section 7: As for the prior comment, use an informative name like "Party Registration" for this interaction. I would vote to entirely eliminate word "facet" from this document as it is not defined and useful within a standardization context. 23. Section 7: The properties of a Party are not addressed, but the Party of an electricity market should specify location, I hope, if it is to support future location-specific transactions and outcomes. 		OPEN
Transaction States	Toby Considine	ARCH-CONF	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-715	<p>There are 30 specific recommendations in the "Specific Recommendations" section of the submitted Hammerstrom paper. I have numbered them all for traceability as I recombine them into specific issues. The original white paper/submission can be read in the URI under "environment"</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 24. Section 8: This section points out the weakness of using transaction and Transaction differently. I liked the use of Transaction in TEMIX as a state of a transaction. All this subtle distinction is lost if capitalization is not used consistently, as is the case in this section. 26. Table 9-2: I think the fact that an ETransaction always has Transactive State=transaction is a vestige 		OPEN

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					<p>of an earlier, preferable approach. Wouldn't it be much more elegant to define a single transaction behavior, in which the transaction migrates through its available states? Each of the Tender Facet, Transaction Facet (and possibly Quote Facet) should be defined as state transition behaviors, but I question why the structure of the interaction payloads should differ at all.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tender, Transaction, Delivery, (Quote) address states of an interaction and were more clearly addressed by a TEMIX enumeration. This may be an unwise simplification, as it limits future extension of interaction attributes. 		
Tickers and Quotes	Toby Considine	FACET	Donald Hammerstrom https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202111/msg00008/2111DJH_CTS_Review.pdf	ENERGYINTEROP-716	<p>There are 30 specific recommendations in the "Specific Recommendations" section of the submitted Hammerstrom paper. I have numbered them all for traceability as I recombine them into specific issues. The original white paper/submission can be read in the URI under "environment" 30. Section 12.2: Recommend deleting this section unless a useful distinction between "Tickers" and "Quotes" can be stated.</p>		OPEN
Market Rules Enforcement	Toby Considine	FACET MARKET	Horia Pop; Lateral Inc https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202112/msg00001.html	ENERGYINTEROP-720	<p>Market Rules Enforcement Until the standard covers the facets, operation, and information models of an auditor and enforcer actor, the free interoperation of distinct conforming implementation is going to be hindered. It is hard to imagine a vendor accepting a standard-conforming actor with a distinct implementation to trade freely, knowing it can introduce malicious behavior and that there's no standard way to inhibit it that the actor would oblige by. <i>[Lines 195]</i></p>		OPEN
Market vs Marketplace	Toby Considine	MARKET	Horia Pop; Lateral Inc https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202112/msg00001.html	ENERGYINTEROP-721	<p>Market vs Marketplace Context When discussing [EMIX] and further down when discussing the Market facet market context/characteristics are used inconsistently introducing confusion. To exemplify contrast the definition in Table 2-1, with the definition in Table 3-4 and Table 3-5, and section 6.1. I suggest clarifying what definition is the one adopted by CTS and the distinctions with [EMIX] and [E]. The order of models in section 6 implies that an actor first requests the Market Context and then the Marketplace Context. In the real world, this would be in reverse. <i>[Lines 249, 282,367, 465, 492]</i></p>		OPEN
Matching Engine Privacy	Toby Considine	MARKET PRIV-SEC	Horia Pop; Lateral Inc https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202112/msg00001.html	ENERGYINTEROP-723	<p>Matching Engine Privacy I believe the matching algorithm (or at least the type) in a market should be public information to the participants not hidden. It provides trust in the market and allows participants to develop trading strategies accordingly. <i>[Lines 273]</i></p>		OPEN
Product Warrants	Toby Considine	ARCH-CONF	Horia Pop; Lateral Inc https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202112/msg00001.html	ENERGYINTEROP-725	<p>Product Warrants CTS provides a warning on segmentation and shallow markets risk with the excessive use of product warrants. I believe an actor can achieve the same behavior by extending the tender model within the same market with additional attributes that specify a preference. Therefore, the market matching engine can try to satisfy that preference without the risk of creating a shallow market. <i>[Lines 348,355]</i></p>		OPEN
Tender Privacy	Toby Considine	PRIV-SEC	Horia Pop; Lateral Inc https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202112/msg00001.html	ENERGYINTEROP-732	<p>Tender Privacy The individual tenders and parties are indeed private information. But as with financial markets, there is public information derived from the tenders for each instrument. This should include the top of the book that can be an aggregation of multiple tenders (market price/cheapest sell price and quantity, highest buy price and quantity), market spread, and market depth. Is there any scenario in which TE will want to behave differently? Even if the current market price for an instrument is public it offers no guarantees. For a buy tender to match in both price and quantity (and possibly other aspects) the price will be higher than the market price. <i>[Lines 592, 745]</i></p>		OPEN
Quote Facet	Toby Considine	FACET	Horia Pop; Lateral Inc https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202112/msg00001.html	ENERGYINTEROP-733	<p>Quote Facet The facet payloads do not seem to provide a way for participants to ask for public market information for an instrument. i.e. What is the market price for 10kW at 11 AM tomorrow? The same information may be publicly distributed on price change, but a new actor that just joined the market should have a way to ask for that quote. What is the intended purpose for Cancel Quote payload?</p>		OPEN
Ticker Facet	Toby Considine	FACET	Horia Pop; Lateral Inc https://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/energyinterop-comment/202112/msg00001.html	ENERGYINTEROP-734	<p>Ticker Facet The ticker should obfuscate the parties. The model should include for each instrument the last transaction quantity and price, direction of the price change since the previous transaction, price change value. Any request (or distribution for a ticker) should default to only the last transaction but historic (or time bounded) transactions could be returned for each instrument. The goal of the ticker is informative only. What is the purpose of the Cancel Ticker? <i>[Lines 744,756]</i></p>		OPEN
Alignment of Market Price Granularity and Stream Price Granularity	Toby Considine	CLARITY	Toby Considine - Editing Note	ENERGYINTEROP-738	<p>In Streams, we defined Price Granularity as follows Stream Price Granularity Price granularity expressed as an exponent. Applies to all Intervals in the Stream. Not required for all Facets. For example, if the price granularity is -3, and the value is 1500, the price is 1.500 currency units. And in Market (Product) definition we have: Price Granularity PRICE_GRAIN The allowed price unit, e.g. Price Granularity == 10 means that that any multiple of 10 CURRENCY units is acceptable, but any price not matching, say a price of 9 CURRENCY units, is rejected. We need to make sure that we do not create confusion between these two definitions.</p>		OPEN
Should the delegation stuff be in the Privacy section in addition to the PartyID section?	Toby Considine	None	The language of a Delegate and thereby of a Delegate's ID is introduced in WD14 as being a Party other than the ultimate buyer or the ultimate seller whose ID MAY be used instead of the PartyID in tenders, quotes, and transactions. Should a discussion of the DelegateID be added to the privacy section?	ENERGYINTEROP-739			OPEN
Include market characteristics for trading strategy development	William Cox	FACET MARKET	William Cox	ENERGYINTEROP-740	<p>Certain market characteristics dictate aspects of trading strategy. For example, if the clearing use Double Auction approaches versus Order Book, the meaning and effect of low or negative bid differs. The set of Market Characteristics should be extended to enable realistic trading behavior and strategies.</p>		OPEN