State Department Use Cases Notes--3 examples

I have made these notes as an attempt to collect a series of use-cases we can use or adapt. So some of the notes actually refer to previous notes. Please bear that in mind. That's why I have dated them, and so that we can return to those dates in the archives of the press for material related, if we choose to make use of transcripts or photographs to document these as specific use cases.

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7-2-03--CNN's Jane Arraf today reported that the window during which the return of utility services and security could have built good relations with Iraqis is now past and from here America is viewed almost solely as an "occupying" power. She is reporting from a "man (Iraqi) in the street" perspective based on interviews and reports of general feelings. This, itself, needs to be cited as subjective, if used for a use case.

This report purports to represent a common cultural viewpoint for Iraqis, and as such, is suspect simply because it is an oversimplification. However, it points up a building problem. We are indeed creating a mindset where it may become increasingly implausible for America to be trusted by commonplace Iraqis. If this opportunity is truly beyond redemption, we will have lost the only opportunity we had to salvage something positive from this military conquest and occupation, however it is politically justified or diplomatically explained.

This points to a public perception which is more difficult to change than simply returning the Iraqi infrastructure to a condition of functionally normal public water and power utlities and general security regarding criminal activity such as looting and extortion not directly associated with political purposes. It also warns that American lack of effective planning in providing for the return of these vital services, which the very thinly supported American coalition, destroyed will have deleterious and possibly irreversible effects on that public perception. This could cause generations of ill-will by the majority of Iraqis toward the US and all Americans and which will have severe consequences for decades both in Iraq and throughout the Arab and Non-Arab Islamic world.

This makes the need for reversing this public perception of paramount importance, and requires immediate and long term attention. As of this moment, that understanding on the part of the American leadership does not appear to be possible. Political expediency in America requires more attention than the problem itself, and draws resources away from the problems to the explanation of the problem in political terms which serve the purpose of attempting to mold American Public Perception and Opinion, not Iraqi Public Perception.

The point in regard to making the case for HumanML-based improvements in cultural understanding is that it may indeed become impossible to do this even before it is attempted, at least in this period directly after the "major" combat conflict. There may still be a possibility of improving understanding after an Iraqi civilian administration is established, if US retains enough good will or simple enforcement troops and public service programs in place for there to be adaptations of those programs which can be put to such a use.

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7-13-04 The previous note was composed almost two weeks ago, and edited just now for a bit more clarity. However the main point needs to be made as part of a preamble to any set of State Department-Related Use-Cases we draw up to demonstrate how HumanML can be applied to State Department Uses. That point is the conclusion of the foregoing note:

"To deliver a clear and well-understood message to commonplace Iraqis, we need to focus on Iraqi Public Perception and Public Opinion."

Similarly, "To deliver a clear and well-understood message to the State Department, we need to focus on what the State Departments says it needs.

(We must absolutely stay within the stipulated constraints that have been delivered to Ranjeeth concerning internal State Department diplomatic vocabularies. )

This may sound simplistic, but it is not. We must keep our focus on our audience, the State Department, in the same way that American Policy, if it uses HumanML principles and tools, must focus on its audience, Iraqi Public Perception and Public Opinon.

The important corollary of this premise of focusing on the correct audience for the message to be delivered is:

State Department messages to the Iraqi populace must not be aimed at American Public Perception and Opinon, and our message to the State Department must not be aimed at HumanML audiences, nor at our perception of American Public Perception and Opinion. It is often the case that when we fomulate our arguments, we are really speaking to our own constituencies to either gain their agreement or reinforce their agreement.

We must not make the same error we are trying to address.

So perhaps the wisest approach we can make to developing State Department Use-Cases is to take an approach that is a variation on the "Socratic" method. I am going to suggest asking questions rather than giving answers at this stage.

We can use the slides representing Ranjeeth's Use-Cases which Rob provided. Those images of observers making notes on encounters/events or showing interchanges between observers and participants, will suffice so that we can say that the Observers ask pertinent questions based on their observations.

We can cite and diagram many 'real world' examples from Iraq where we have video footage of squads of soldiers interacting with civilians in recent counter-insurgency "sweeps" attempting to locate perpetrators of isolated attacks on American soliders.This footage shows encounters mostly without apparent interpretors present to represent any attempt to bridge the language gaps. We can ask CNN for permission to borrow their images, or I can make composites from several different images which then avoid copyright inclusion because they are not for profit, do not use exact images and come from public domain sources

We need only say that HumanML-enhanced observers/markup specialists could annotate such footage to show discrete points where body language of civlians, especially women and children, exhibit stress, lack of understanding and fear. I doubt we need to go further into analysis of footage than that to show that the ability to have observers ask, "Could even a very basic attempt to have an interpretor present improve both how the situation evolves and the soldier's effectiveness in eliciting information or understanding, and thus, perhaps, support?"

No one needs to have it explicitly pointed out that fear and intimidation in the presence of ignorance will almost certainly breed resentment.

Then, to anticipate the most obvious defensive position that a responsible military officer would feel compelled to make, we can expect to be answered: "But this is necessary for force protection, and to show that we are not simply going to accept such casualties without an attempt to locate and bring the perpetrators to justice, or to deterr future attacks."

To which, we ask, "Yes, we realize that, and our observation is not meant to suggest that you should not respond. We are only asking if there is a way to respond that shows some consideration for civlians who may be innocent or who may be victims themselves? And is it possible to use these responses as ways to give civilians reasons to support us and aid us in their own defense?"

The point is to show how HumanML-based annotations of these encounters can make a beginning on the task of taking the viewpoints of ALL participants into consideration. The purpose of simply pointing out instances of fear and cultural misunderstanding in conjunction with the lack of any language translation should be enough to give the State Department reasons to be involved in the manner in which Foreign Policy is carried out by the Defense Department.

An argument can be made in this Use-Case that HumanML can be applied at the grass roots level to build better understanding from there upwards, and that we can apply the principles of Conflict Resolution in very practical applications in the smallest and apparently least politically impactful situations.

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7-20-03 On the Sunday Morning Political Talk Shows, specifically Meet the Press on NBC and Face the Nation on CBS, Special Presidential Envoy Bremer, the de facto Governor of Iraq, regardless of how we attempt to soften the perception of that position for the American Public, was asked on both programs about the morale of American forces.

Before I discuss that, let me say, as we should say if we choose to use this as an example, that his job is to present as positive an image of American positions as possible. So he is constrained in the kind of responses he is allowed to make within broad bounds.

However, his answer to this crucial question is especially enlightening. First and foremost, he is addressing the American Public and representing the Bush Administration. He said he did not SEE (by which I am assuming he meant that he did not PERCEIVE) a big morale problem. He said he has talked to (his words) "probably thousands" of troops.

He is obviously attempting to give as much credibility to his opinon as he can, but, even in the month-plus he has been there, he has at best been able to exchange the briefest of greetings with perhaps a handful of troops because he simply has had too many considerations in his schedule, so this statement can not be taken literally, nor is it likely he meant it to be taken literally.

I think that giving him the benefit of the doubt, he may actually have been in the presence of hundreds of troops in the time he has been "on station" in Iraq.

Unfortunately, of that number we can pretty much rest assured that none have had the opportunity to speak frankly to Mr. Bremer, nor could they give voice to any negative feelings unless specifically asked to speak "off the record." Military requirements prevent those who have taken oaths of service from ever publicly expressing criticism of superiors or questioning orders. One can, at best and giving Mr. Bremer extreme benefit of the doubt, expect that what he meant was that he has not seen obvious evidence of bad morale in body language or dereliction of duty.

However, for those of us who are members of the public he was addressing, it is actually incumbent upon us to form an opinion of the perceptions of the administrators of policies conducted in our name, on our behalf, and using our taxes. And this is something the State Department is required to acknowledge, whether they express that or act on it. What this expression of Mr. Bremer's opinion tells us is that he is apparently not aware of the actual morale of the average run of troops. We can say this because it is simply not possible on the face of it for him to have had sufficient experience of that morale in the time available for him to do so.

What makes this particularly telling is that saying such a thing while clearly on stage in the task of supporting Amercan Foreign Policy flies in the face of common sense when a day before we have heard reports of extreme disaffection where CNN broadcast the words of an ordinary soldier who said, with clearly unfeigned dissatisfaction and distress, that he knew of fellows who want to return home so much they would be willing to be wounded to accomplish that desire or need. HumanML's ability to provide tools for evaluating the evidence for such emotional expressions can be employed by annotating such material. Thus setting these two reports side by side with annotations by perhaps as many as three differing observers/evaluators woud suffice to illustrate how HumanML could contribute to a State Department awareness of how American efforts in Iraq are being publicly perceived.

Yet in comparing the two reports, which do we give more credence to? They cannot both be true. Our task is not to decide this, except for ourselves as individual members of the American Public. Our task is to show how HumanML can be used by the State Department to understand its options and responsibilities more accurately in order to formulate policy options more accurately and effectively. Monitoring public opinion is one such task which we can contribute to in earnest, and I think we should use this example to simply point out that there is an essential disconnect at work in the expressions of Mr. Bremer.

This disconnection occurs precisely in his verbal and physical expression of his perceptions. One hopes that he is in fact brighter than he appears to be when he says that he does not perceive a morale problem based on his experience of "probably thousands" of troops.

He does not make any allowance in expressing how he formed his opinion for a very simple and basic fact. This fact is that no one in the military except a General even has the option of expressing poor morale. It would have been very simple to say, for instance, "I understand that the troops are constrained by the rules of military justice from expressing criticism of their superiors or their orders, but judging by apparent attitudes under difficult circumstances, the morale of our troops remains good."

Also, making an admittedly subjective judgement based on the pained expression which never fully left his face in the course of either interview, Mr. Bremer's own morale is apparently at odds with his words. However, such an expression could equally well be characterized as showing "appropriate seriousness and concern." One hopes that is how Mr. Bremer himself would have so characterized his performance.

If we have learned nothing from our setbacks as well as our victories in military operations over our relatively recent history, it is that the truth will usually make itself known and the one causalty our State Department can least afford is our credibility. One of the single most damaging elements in such situations are apparent discrepancies in credibility embodied in such previous judgemental errors as pronouncing that one can see "a light at the end of the tunnel."

The clich� goes: "Those who do not learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them." Perhaps we should take a pass on the opportunity to repeat some of our previous lessons.

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