OASIS Mailing List ArchivesView the OASIS mailing list archive below
or browse/search using MarkMail.

 


Help: OASIS Mailing Lists Help | MarkMail Help

kmip message

[Date Prev] | [Thread Prev] | [Thread Next] | [Date Next] -- [Date Index] | [Thread Index] | [List Home]


Subject: Re: [kmip] Broader View of Conformance



I tend to disagree.  I think that's because we have different views of how KMIP might be provided in products.

I think the conformance requirement might want to specify the minimum set of things we thing all KMIP servers should support, and not the maximum set.  

Consider this scenario, which I think is very different from what you have in mind.  Instead of a general-purpose server with software implementing KMIP, let's say my company wants to support KMIP for a specific application, and I want to provide that support in a special-purpose piece of secure hardware.  A good example is the use of KMIP to support key management for a banking application, where I would implement the necessary KMIP features in a secure HSM instead of doing it in software in a general-purpose server.  Doing KMIP in a special-purpose hardware device like this is "hard", and implementing and testing the full set if KMIP functionality would be very expensive.  If I know that the clients that will be using my device to serve keys are very limited in their requirements, I can afford to do this development - but if the KMIP standard makes it mandatory that I also implement and test all the many, many other KMIP functions that I know my clients will never use, it will probably make the job too expensive and I'll probably decide not to implement KMIP at all.  I don't think that is what we want - I think we want to define KMIP so that it will be as attractive as possible to the maximum number of people.  We want to write this so that everyone will be excited and will see how it can be used in their environment, whether that environment is general-purpose or special-purpose.  In view of that, the minimum set of required features might be those things that are necessary for a client to figure out if KMIP suits their needs or not.

In your example scenario, you suggest that there could be a proliferation of different KMIP servers with different capabilities.  I'm not sure I agree, unless there are real reasons to have those separate implementations.  I think what might be more likely is that people would switch from a limited-function KMIP server to a broader-function KMIP server that is a superset of what they had when they only needed simpler functions.  I think vendors who develop KMIP servers might go one of two ways - they might just do the whole thing, which would let people start off with something that would meet most of their needs now and in the future, or they might offer a basic KMIP server for one price and then offer enhanced versions at extra cost (maybe even "plug-ins" to add KMIP functionality).  

Just my views...

-------------------------------------------------------------------
Todd W. Arnold, STSM
IBM Cryptographic Technology Development
(704) 594-8253   FAX 594-8336
-------------------------------------------------------------------
email:  arnoldt@us.ibm.com



From: "Jay.Jacobs" <Jay.Jacobs@target.com>
To: "kmip@lists.oasis-open.org" <kmip@lists.oasis-open.org>
Date: 08/21/2009 10:23 AM
Subject: [kmip] Broader View of Conformance





I wanted to re-iterate what I talked about on the last conference call in looking at conformance at a higher level.  I have a concern that multiple server profiles will fragment adoption and increase the complexity and/or frailty of interoperability.  
 
Here’s the scenario I’d like to avoid.  Say I purchase a KMIP conforming server for tape devices, then later purchase/upgrade some client product that also claims “KMIP Conformance” but the new client needs a different profile from the server, so I get a second key management server.  After a few iterations I may end up with several KMIP implementations across the enterprise (compounded by any added features from vendor extensions).  The end result is that my key management now looks like the picture of what KMIP is trying to solve: isolated key management instances that can only support a fraction of the clients in my network.
 
Here’s what I would propose, a single KMIP profile for servers, that should support whatever client gets thrown at it.  This makes the server interchangeable in the network.  It will be more work to create a KMIP Server, but there shouldn’t be many of them in an enterprise anyway.  The clients are compliant only in the requests they choose to make.  If a client won’t ever request asymmetric keys, they wouldn’t have a need to support it and it would still be conforming to the standard.
 
Thanks,
Jay Jacobs




[Date Prev] | [Thread Prev] | [Thread Next] | [Date Next] -- [Date Index] | [Thread Index] | [List Home]