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Subject: Re: [kmip] Asymmetric Key Profiles and Associated Proposed Changesto KMIP
This has also got me to thinking about whether the key format types for the RSA private and public keys should be PKCS1 and Raw not Transparent RSA private and Transparent RSA public. My thinking is that in the basic store cases the client generated their own keys and then uploaded them. The format the client is going have is probably PKCS1 (RSAPrivateKey) and then probably either SubjectPublicKeyInfo or RSAPublicKey.* I think that the Transparent RSA public/private keys are probably only going to be support when the KMIP Server makes the keys and then we'd want to give the client the option to pick how they'd want to receive them. I'm proposing that we make the following changes (5 in total) to the proposal: Change 1: 1.1.2 Conformance as a Basic Asymmetric Key Store 2.a: OLD: i. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4) ii. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.5) NEW: i. Raw ii. PKCS1 Change 2: 1.2.2 Conformance as a Basic Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store 2.a: OLD: i. PKCS1 ii. X.509 iii. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4) iv. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.5) NEW: i. Raw ii. PKCS1 iii. X.509 Change 3: 1.3.2 Conformance as a Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server 2.a: OLD: i. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4) ii. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.5) NEW: i. Raw ii. PKCS1 iii. X.509 iv. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4) v. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.5) Change 4: 1.4.2 Conformance as a Basic Certificate Server 2.a OLD: i. PKCS1 ii. X.509 iii. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4) iv. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.5) NEW: i. Raw ii. PKCS1 iii. X.509 Change 5: 1.5.2 Conformance as a Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server OLD: i. PKCS1 ii. X.509 iii. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4) iv. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4) NEW: i. Raw ii. PKCS1 iii. X.509 iv. Transparent RSA private key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4) v. Transparent RSA public key ([KMIP-Spec] 2.1.7.4) spt * OpenSSL spits out SubjectPublicKeyInfo if you extract the public key from the RSAPrivateKey structure. Sean Turner wrote: > Curious what others think about requiring support for PKCS1 instead of > Transparent RSA public/private in the Basic Asymmetric Key Store and the > Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server profiles? Maybe we should > switch because when you generate RSA keys with things like OpenSSL it > automatically spits out the PKCS1 format. It would be less work for an > implementation to be compliant. > > spt > > Furlong_Judith@emc.com wrote: >> At yesterday's OASIS TC call I promised to send out an email to >> summarize the KMIP Asymmetric Key Profiles body of work and remind all >> of you on the committee to review and provide comments on the profiles >> document and the associated modification proposals via this email list. >> >> The "Basic Asymmetric Key Profiles" document was posted on November 5, >> 2009 to the KMIP OASIS TC site. >> Please see >> http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=35010 >> >> The Basic Asymmetric Key Profiles document includes five separate >> profiles namely: >> >> 1. Basic Asymmetric Key Store (section 1.1): Key pairs are generated >> external to the server and are sent to the server for storage (perhaps >> for key escrow reasons or for ease of distribution to other entities). >> This profile only requires support for the Register operation. No >> support for certificates imposed on server. >> >> 2. Basic Asymmetric Key and Certificate Store (section 1.2): Key pairs >> and certificates are generated external to the server and are sent to >> the server for storage (perhaps for key escrow reasons or for ease of >> distribution to other entities). This profile only requires support for >> the Register operation. [May need to make vaulting of dig sig/non-rep >> only keys optional to avoid controversy over whether this type of keys >> should be held away from the owner of the keys.] >> >> 3. Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Server (Section 1.3): 3. Key >> pairs (but not certificates) are generated by the server. This profile >> only requires support for the Create Key Pair and Rekey (which is >> modified supports asymmetric keys) operations. >> >> 4. Basic Certificate Server (Section 1.4): Key pairs are generated >> external to the server (aka locally at the client) but the client would >> contact the server to request a certificate to be generated -- either >> directly by the KM or the KM proxies the request to a CA. This profile >> would support Certify and Re-certify. [Optionally this profile could >> support register for the key pairs.] >> >> 5. Basic Asymmetric Key Foundry and Certificate Server (Section 1.5): >> Key pairs are generated by the server and the server would also handle >> getting the corresponding certificates generated (either using its own >> capabilities or by contacting a CA). This profile would include the >> Create Key Pair, Rekey (which is modified supports asymmetric keys), >> Certify and Re-certify operations. >> >> >> In support of the Basic Asymmetric Key Profiles document two proposals >> for modifying the KMIP Specification and supporting documents (e.g. >> Usage Guide) have been submitted: >> >> 1. Proposal for Supporting Rekey of Asymmetric Key Pairs was >> submitted on December 4, 2009 >> Please see >> http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=35444 >> >> The proposal describes a new KMIP operation for rekeying asymmetric key >> pairs and also >> outlines changes to the KMIP Spec and KMIP Usage Guide in light of the >> addition of this new operation. >> >> 2. Proposal for Making Submission of a Certificate Request in the >> Certify and Re-certify Operations Optional was submitted on December 3, >> 2009 >> Please see >> http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/document.php?document_id=35434 >> >> This proposal makes the inclusion of the Certificate Request attribute >> and the associated Certificate Request Type attribute in the Certify and >> Re-certify operations as non-mandatory. >> >> If anyone has questions please feel free to post to this mailing list or >> contact me directly. >> >> Judy Furlong >> >> |Principal Product Manager|EMC Product Security Office|RSA -The Security >> Division of EMC| >> |t: 508 249 3698|e: Furlong_Judith@emc.com| >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> To unsubscribe from this mail list, you must leave the OASIS TC that >> generates this mail. Follow this link to all your TCs in OASIS at: >> https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/portal/my_workgroups.php >> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > To unsubscribe from this mail list, you must leave the OASIS TC that > generates this mail. Follow this link to all your TCs in OASIS at: > https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/portal/my_workgroups.php >
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