[OASIS Issue Tracker] (OSLCCORE-40) Potential click jacking issue for delegated dialogs

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    [ https://issues.oasis-open.org/browse/OSLCCORE-40?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=61055#comment-61055 ] 

James Amsden commented on OSLCCORE-40:
--------------------------------------

What are the implications for OSLC delegated dialogs? 

The OSLC specification explicitly requires the client application to open the dialog in another browser window or use an HTML iframe to embed the dialog in an existing browser window. This ensures the contents of the dialog provided by another application are isolated from the displaying applications.

Interaction between the client application and the delegated dialog is restricted to the Window.postMessage function. The client should ignore all messages that are not understood and should only respond to events from known sources, and those that start with oslc-response:. 

The actual content of the dialog provided by the server, other than the posting of the required resize, creation or selection messages is not specified by OSLC.

Is there anything else we should add? Are there particular recommendations, possibly including the use of whitelists what OSLC core should recommend?

Are there any implications for existing OSLC v2 delegated dialog implementations that should be addressed?


> Potential  click jacking issue for delegated dialogs
> ----------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: OSLCCORE-40
>                 URL: https://issues.oasis-open.org/browse/OSLCCORE-40
>             Project: OASIS OSLC Lifecycle Integration Core (OSLC Core) TC
>          Issue Type: Bug
>            Reporter: James Amsden
>            Assignee: James Amsden
>            Priority: Minor
>
> What
> We have found that MOST of Rational CLM is vulnerable to click jacking attacks, specifically the debug pages are vulnerable so we will use these as an example POC. By inducing victim users to perform actions such as mouse clicks and keystrokes, the attacker can cause them to unwittingly carry out actions within the application that is being targeted. This technique allows the attacker to circumvent defenses against cross-site request forgery, and may result in unauthorized actions.  
> Attack Use Case:
> - An attacker can create an attack page called jts_delete.html
> - Deploy the page to a server
> - Send a link to the Admin
> - When the Admin clicks the link they will be presented with a benign page. Maybe Something Like
>           "Authenticated with BSO"
>                  Click Continue
>                 
> From the screen shot the Attacker has over layed this message on top of the debug console. As a result, the Attacker could align the click with any of the options shown in the screen shot.
> StopAll, RemoveAll, etc... .on other pages there are other 1 click options.
> the point, the screen shot demonstrates that the DEBUG pages (and most pages in CLM) are click jacking vulnerable.
> Remediation
>              
> The Team(s) should review the application functions that are accessible from within the response, and determine whether they can be used by application users to perform any sensitive actions within the application. If so, then a framing attack targeting this response may result in unauthorized actions.
> To effectively prevent framing attacks, the application should return a response header with the name X-Frame-Options and the value DENY to prevent framing altogether, or the value SAMEORIGIN to allow framing only by pages on the same origin as the response itself.  
> The Core TC may want to provide guidance on how to protect from this sort of attack, and implement the prevention mechanism mentioned above. 



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