# Using Risk Management to Improve Privacy in Information Systems



### Potential Problems for Individuals

Loss of Trust

Loss of Self Determination Loss of Autonomy

Exclusion


Loss of Liberty


Physical Harm

Stigmatization Discrimination Power Imbalance

**Economic Loss** 







### The Right Tool for the Job

Many current privacy approaches are some mixture of governance principles, requirements and controls.

### **USG FIPPs**

Transparency
Individual Participation
Purpose Specification
Data Minimization
Use Limitation

Data Quality and Integrity Security Accountability and Auditing

### NIST SP 800-53, Appendix J

Authority and Purpose
Accountability, Audit, and
Risk Management
Data Quality and Integrity
Data Minimization and

Retention

Individual Participation and

Redress Security

Transparency


**Use Limitation** 



## NIST IR 8062

Privacy Risk Management for Federal Information Systems

### NIST Process





## Draft Privacy Engineering Objectives

- Design characteristics or properties of the system
- Support policy
- Support control mapping

**Predictability** is the enabling of reliable assumptions by individuals, owners, and operators about personal information and its processing by an information system.

Manageability is providing the capability for granular administration of personal information including alteration, deletion, and selective disclosure.

**Disassociability** is enabling the processing of personal information or events without association to individuals or devices beyond the operational requirements of the system.



## Security Risk Equation

Security Risk = Vulnerability \* Threat \* Impact



### Privacy Risk Equation


Privacy Risk = Likelihood of a Problematic Data Action \* Impact

Likelihood is determined by contextually-based analysis that a data action is likely to create a problem for representative set of individuals


Impact is determined by an analysis of the adverse affects on an organization of creating the potential for privacy problems

Note: Contextual analysis is the comparison of Data Actions, the personal information on which they act, and contextual considerations

Implementing the Theory








## Privacy Risk Assessment Methodology

### Frame Business Objectives

Frame the business objectives for the system(s), including the organizational needs served.




- Describe the functionality of your system(s).
- Describe the business needs that your system(s) serve.
- Describe how your system will be marketed, with respect to any privacy-preserving functionality.




### Frame Privacy Governance


Frame the organizational privacy governance by identifying privacy-related legal obligations, principles, organizational goals and other commitments.

- Legal Environment: Identify any privacy-related statutory, regulatory, contractual and/or other frameworks within which the pilot must operate.
- Identify any privacy-related principles or other commitments to which the organization adheres (FIPPs, Privacy by Design, etc.).
- Identify any privacy goals that are explicit or implicit in the organization's vision and/or mission.
- Identify any privacy-related policies or statements within the organization, or business unit.



### Assess System Design – Data Actions







## Assess System Design - Context

#### Example:

An individual wishes to use ACME IDP service to augment a social credential with identity proofing and a second authentication factor to create a stronger credential. This stronger credential will be used to access government benefits.

government	benents.						
Data Action	Personal Information	1		Assess Assess System Privacy Risk Species			
Collection from the Social Media Site	- Self-Asserted Full Name - Validated Email -List of Friends -Profile Photograph	One-time action (per user) between social credential and ACME IDP, but establishes an ongoing relationship between user's social media presence and ACME IDP     Social credential linking is visible to user     Linking of social credential simplifies access to government benefits system     User profile may contain information the user considers sensitive     User profile may contain information from other users not participating in the system	- Full social credential profile access (including picture and list of friends) is not necessary for fulfilling operational purpose - Will users understand the eventual high-assurance credential is controlled by ACME and not by their social credential provider? - How will perception of the social media organization's privacy practices impact users' willingness to consent to this data action? - Will the user understand ACME will have	Design			
Site		Example Contextual Factors Organizational					
		System includes both govern Multiple					
		Public perception: high expectation of privacy with	l credential provider				
		Relationships: No pre-existing relationship with ACME IDP, regular is	eractions with social credential provider				
		System  Personal information is not intended to be made public					
		al identity.					
		a taentiy.					
		Four parties sharing personal information: one public institution, three private  ACME will use 3rd party cloud provider					
		Users exhibit various levels of technical sophistication					
		Potential user confusion regarding who "owns" the various segments of each system 20% of users use privacy settings at social provider					
	20% of users use privacy settings at social provider						


Frame Org



## Assess Privacy Risk

**SAMPLE TABLE** 

<u>SAMPLE TABLE</u>				
Data Actions	Summary Issues	Problematic Data Actions	Potential Problems for Individuals	Likelihood
	Full social credential profile access (including picture and list of friends) is not necessary for fulfilling operational purpose.	-Appropriation -Induced disclosure	Stigmatization: Information is revealed about the individual that they would prefer not to disclose.	7
Collection from the Social		-Surveillance -Unanticipated Revelation	Power Imbalance: People must provide extensive information, giving the acquirer an unfair advantage.	2
Media Site	Will users understand the eventual high-assurance credential is controlled by ACME and not by their social credential provider?	-This summary issue will be associated with another data action.		NA





How will percept organization's priva willingness to con	Data Actions	Summary Issues	Problematic Data Actions	Potential Problems for Individuals	Business Impact Factors			Total Business Impact (per Potential Problem)		
					Noncompliance Costs	Direct Business Costs		Internal Culture Costs	Other	
	organization's privacy practices impact	-Appropriation -Induced	Stigmatization	7	6	6	4		23	
		not necessary for fulfilling operational	disclosure -Surveillance -Unanticipated Revelation	Power Imbalance	7	6	8	4		25
		How will perception of the social media organization's privacy practices impact users' willingness to consent to this data action?	disclosure	Loss of Trust	7	6	8	7		28



## Assess Privacy Risk

### **Problem Prioritization Heat Map**







### Resources

NIST Privacy Engineering Website:

http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/privacy\_engineering/index.html

Draft NISTIR 8062:

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsDrafts.html#NIST-IR-8062

