


PKCS #11 AEAD functions

Wan-Teh Chang <wtc@google.com>

Outline


- Use case
- Problems
- Proposed solutions
- Review comments needed

Use case: encrypting TLS records



RC4 stream cipher and CBC block ciphers,
even with per-record explicit IV

Use case: encrypting TLS records



Need a **C_EncryptInit** call for each record to specify the **IV** and **AAD**, even though the **key stays the same**.

AEAD ciphers such as AES-GCM


Problem 1: C_EncryptInit overhead

- Minimize number of PKCS #11 calls to encrypt each record
- C_EncryptInit performs IV-independent initialization repeatedly
 - AES-GCM derives the GHASH key H from the AES key K: $H = \text{AES}(K, 0^{128})$

Problem 2: IV generation

- For CTR and GCM, IV must not be repeated
 - IV provided by the caller: hard to verify uniqueness
 - IV generated by a crypto module: IV generation can be validated
- Applies to both AEAD and non-AEAD
- Reference: draft-mcgrew-iv-gen-03

Use case: encrypting TLS records



AES GCM and nonce generator

```
#define CKM_AEAD_AES_GCM 0x00000700

typedef struct CK_AEAD_GCM_PARAMS {
    CK_ULONG ulNonceLen;
    CK_ULONG ulTagLen;
} CK_AEAD_GCM_PARAMS;

#define CKM_GCM_NONCE_DETERMINISTIC 0x00000750
#define CKM_GCM_NONCE_RBG_BASED 0x00000751

typedef struct CK_GCM_NONCE_DETERMINISTIC_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE_PTR pFixed; /* the fixed field */
    CK_ULONG ulFixedLen;
} CK_GCM_NONCE_DETERMINISTIC_PARAMS;

typedef struct CK_GCM_NONCE_RBG_BASED_PARAMS {
    CK_BYTE_PTR pFree; /* the free field */
    CK_ULONG ulFreeLen;
} CK_GCM_NONCE_RBG_BASED_PARAMS;
```


Review

- GCM and CTR as target algorithms.
Anything else?
- Other use cases?
- Are repeated calls to C_EncryptInit expensive?