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Subject: Re: [pkcs11] ECDH key derivation function


Hi Dieter

Of course, given that one of these standards is a private standard that costs money to look at, does make this more challenging. But I imagine there are enough people in this group that have access to the standard that we should be able to discuss this.

I ran this by some folks in my team that work on algorithm implementations, and this was the advice that came out of there:

 First, fix the CKD_SHA[224|256|384|512]_KDF description in
2.3.8 EC mechanism parameters, that is, change

" The key derivation function CKD_NULL produces a raw shared secret
value without applying any key derivation function whereas the key
derivation function CKD_SHA1_KDF, which is based on SHA-1, derives
keying data from the shared secret value as defined in ANSI X9.63."

to

" The key derivation function CKD_NULL produces a raw shared secret
value without applying any key derivation function whereas the key
derivation functions CKD_SHA[1|224|256|384|512]_KDF which are based on
SHA-[1|224|256|384|512]derive keying data from the shared secret value
as defined in ANSI X9.63." .

Second, discuss whether introducing the NIST SP800-56A version of the
these functions would be useful and if so, add those, too. E.g. adding
the functions CKD_SHA[1|224|256|384|512]_NIST_KDF.

Would you be able to discuss this further in our next TC meeting? If not, would someone else like to bring this issue up? It seems like something we should address in 2.41.

Valerie


On 6/9/2015 12:41 AM, Dieter Bong wrote:
All,

we encountered the following issue w.r.t key derivation functions for ECDH:

·NIST SP800-56A section 5.8.1.1 specifies the following for derivation of a key:
Compute K(i) = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo)

·ANSI X9.63 in contrast specifies Ki = Hash(Z || Counter || [SharedInfo])

ANSI and NIST thus specify different orders for concatenation of ‘Z’ and
‘counter’. Has this been discussed in the TC before?

The PKCS#11 standard explicitly references ANSI X.63 when using CKD_SHA1_KDF for
derivation of keying data; there is no such explicit reference for
CKD_SHA[224|256|384|512]_KDF. Yet I would assume they are also meant to be
implemented according to ANSI X9.63. Is this assumption correct?

One of our customers wants to implement key derivation according to NIST
SP800-56A using PKCS#11 mechanism CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE. Strictly following the
PKCS#11 standard this would not be possible resp. require implementation of a
Vendor Defined Mechanism?

Any thoughts or suggestion from your side?

Thanks,

Dieter

Viele Grüße / With kind Regards

Dieter Bong

Product Manager HSM

**

Utimaco IS GmbH

Germanusstr. 4

DE-52080 Aachen

Germany

Fon: +49 241 1696 - 233

Mobil: +49 173 9080381

_www.utimaco.com <http://www.utimaco.com/>_


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--
NOTE: Using voice recognition software, forgive typos/grammar mistakes!
Valerie Fenwick, http://bubbva.blogspot.com/ @bubbva
Solaris Cryptographic & Key Management Technologies, Manager
Oracle Corporation: 4180 Network Circle, Santa Clara, CA, 95054.


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