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Subject: RE: [pki-tc] Candidates for OASIS PKI TC Chair
I would question statement like "That secure e-mail currently is being redesigned from the ground and up (DKIM)". The goal of DKIM is to identify who sends email mainly from smtp gateway point of view (for supressing spamming). It does have the advantage of ease of key distribution using dns for key lookup and retrieval, but it is only for message origin verification, not for message content security (encrypted like SMIME). It does not have a legal binding at this point. Secondly, depending on how we use PKI, if we mainly use PKI without legal binding as DKIM, PKI will be more popular than it is now. I still think PKI at this point is still the most effective solution in certain industry or region for its original goal(authentication, integrity, non-repudiation etc). -----Original Message----- From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren@telia.com] Sent: Thursday, April 13, 2006 8:37 AM To: PKI TC; Arshad Noor Subject: Re: [pki-tc] Candidates for OASIS PKI TC Chair >Businesses continue to search for the elusive silver bullet to >solve their security problems - but it is my belief that until >they start using PKI in many different aspects of their IT infra- >structure (along with appropriate changes to applications, >business processes and employee training), that silver bullet >will continue to elude their grasp. I think businesses should be cautious embracing a technology that not even the people who claim to know PKI, know how to apply to everyday business processes such a e-purchasing. Until such knowledge becomes common, agreed upon, and published[*], businesses betting on PKI are at risk being stuck in pretty "consultant-intensive" activities. That "secure e-mail" currently is being redesigned from the ground and up (DKIM), is another indication that the previous generation of PKI "theologists" did not actually foresee the Internet revolution. The problem is that S/MIME effectively delegates security policy enforcement down to the [nowadays often rather novice] users. The following is how secure e-mail should have been: "If I send a mail via my company, it is my company that secures it" If any of the TC chair candidates have the guts to address any of these issues, he or she has my full support. Anders Rundgren *] Go to NIST's PKI pages. Nothing Go to PKI-TC AGSC pages. Nothing Go to PKI-*. Nothing --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe from this mail list, you must leave the OASIS TC that generates this mail. You may a link to this group and all your TCs in OASIS at: https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/portal/my_workgroups.php
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