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Subject: RE: [saml-dev] SAML2.0 SSO & identity management

Hi Giuseppe,


It’s a good idea to also check our errata document.  Some questions you have might have been addressed by the TC in that document.  Our plan is to update the specs with these corrections. The SAML 2.0 errata document is at: sstc-saml-errata-2.0-draft-18.pdf. Item PE-6 states:


Description:  When using the nameid-format:encrypted type of name identifier in SAML assertions and protocol messages, it is not possible to communicate the format of the unencrypted identifier as part of the assertion or message.  This concept was derived from Liberty which only used it for persistent identifiers.  Since we also support other formats in SAML 2.0, the agreement on the unencrypted form (prior to encryption/after decryption) must be done out of band.

Options: In [SAMLCore] append to paragraph ending on line 2139:

“It is not possible for the service provider to specifically request that a particular kind of identifier be returned if it asks for encryption. The <md:NameIDFormat> metadata element (see [SAMLMeta]) or other out-of-band means MAY be used to determine what kind of identifier to encrypt and return.”


Disposition: During the conference call of April 12 the TC accepted this option.



Rob Philpott
Senior Consulting Engineer
RSA Security Inc.
Tel: 781-515-7115
Mobile: 617-510-0893
Fax: 781-515-7020
I-name:  =Rob.Philpott

From: Conor P. Cahill [mailto:concahill@aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, October 27, 2005 11:34 AM
To: Giuseppe Sarno
Cc: Philpott, Robert; saml-dev@lists.oasis-open.org
Subject: RE: [saml-dev] SAML2.0 SSO & identity management


Giuseppe Sarno wrote on 10/27/2005, 11:23 AM:

Hi thanks,


The other thing strange (to me anyway) (also looking at 2136)

is that the NameIDPolicy format has persistent/transient/encrypted and etc..

This means I can either have a persistent ID or an encrypted ID in the resulting Assertions, which I think one shouldn't preclude the other.

The thought behind encrypted was that the IdP would choose whether or not the ID is encrypted depending upon the channel through which the assertion was delivered to the consuming party.  This came about because of one of Liberty's web services invocation models where an assertion is delivered to party A to be delivered to party B through a web service invocation and the encrypted ID was used by the IdP to prevent party A from learning the ID for the user at party B.

So encryption wasn't thought to be a decision made or requested by the SP on an authnRequest, but rather a security decsion by the IdP when the assertion is generated (based upon the IdP's security policies).


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