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Subject: RE: [sarif] RE: IANA media type registration
This list is pretty comprehensive but also tends a bit towards being scary. I wonder whether we could try to adjust the language to provide more nuance on security concerns being related to the purpose to which the format is put. Make sense?
JSON obviously provides a natural mechanism for persisting a URI. Now consider making this statement: “For this reason, again, JSON should only be used in an environment that provides sufficient security.” A text file can contain a clear text password. Consider this statement: “For this reason, again, text files should only be used in an environment that provides sufficient security.” Does my point make sense? Any format is a mechanism for transmitting information that may be insecure. It is most helpful in your guidance to clearly articulate particular places where someone may reasonably transmit data that leads to
security problems. The data is the issue, not the format. The security approach depends on the data that you are transmitting, not, strictly, the format.
Can’t resist this: you can say your password aloud and it may be overheard: “For this reason, again, human speech should only be used in an environment that provides sufficient security.” 😊 Final suggestion: there are mechanisms out there for cryptographic signing of JSON and it may be useful to point out that these exist. Last time I looked at the situation (I am not particularly knowledgeable here), there didn’t seem to
be a clearly accepted approach… From: O'Neil, Yekaterina Tsipenyuk <katrina@microfocus.com>
Looks good to me! k From: sarif@lists.oasis-open.org [mailto:sarif@lists.oasis-open.org]
On Behalf Of Larry Golding (Comcast) Hello all, I wrote the “Security Considerations” section for our
IANA media type registration. For your convenience, I reproduce it here. Please comment! Security considerations: Producers and consumers of SARIF files should consider the following security-related issues: 1) SARIF files contain results produced by static analysis tools. These results might describe security vulnerabilities, or other defects that should not be disclosed, in the software being analyzed. Since SARIF is a textual format with no provision for protecting potentially sensitive results, SARIF should only be used in an environment that provides an appropriate level of security. For example, SARIF files might be stored on a file share with limited permissions, or transmitted by means of an encrypted protocol such as HTTPS. 2) SARIF files contain URIs which specify the location of the files that were analyzed. If these URIs are absolute, they might disclose information about the system on which the analysis took place, such as the name of the engineer, for example: "file://C:/Users/MarySmith/src/ui/window.c". For this reason, URIs should be specified as relative references, for example: "ui/window.c". Even relative URIs might disclose sensitive information about the implementation of the software, for example, "encryption/sha1.c". For this reason, again, SARIF should only be used in an environment that provides sufficient security. 3) SARIF provides a property run.originalBaseUriIds whose purpose is explicitly to provide the absolute URI ("file:/Users/MarySmith") with respect to which relative references such as "ui/window.c" are evaluated. This property discloses information, and should only be used in an environment that provides sufficient security. 4) SARIF provides an object named invocation which contains information about how the static analysis tool was invoked. Many of its properties (for example, machine, account, and environmentVariables) disclose information about the machine on which the analysis took place. These properties should only be used in an environment that provides sufficient security. 5) The URIs in a SARIF file might point to insecure resources such as malicious web sites. They might also contain executable code (for example, in a "_javascript_:" URI). SARIF producers should not emit such URIs. SARIF consumers should take care not to follow malicious links. In practice, this means that end users should not open SARIF files unless they trust the producer. 6) User-visible messages in SARIF files can be expressed either in plain text or in a rich text format (by default, GitHub-flavored Markdown). Markdown can contain arbitrary HTML, which poses a security risk. SARIF producers should not emit HTML. SARIF consumers should sanitize the Markdown they receive (for example, by removing embedded HTML). SARIF consumers should process Markdown with a Markdown processor that allows HTML processing to be disabled, and that guards against stack overflows induced by maliciously constructed Markdown. 7) SARIF defines an extensibility mechanism that allows SARIF producers to include arbitrary properties in a SARIF file (information that is not explicitly defined in the SARIF format). If a SARIF producer uses this mechanism to define a property that contains executable code or script, and if SARIF consumer that is aware of this property executes the content, this might permit an attack. SARIF producers should not emit executable content. If they do, a SARIF consumer that is aware of that content should execute it only if it trusts the producer. Thanks, Larry From: Larry Golding (Comcast) <larrygolding@comcast.net>
Hi Luke, IIRC, you are going to handle the IANA media type registration. As I mentioned a few days ago, I’m going to provide the “Security considerations” section. I’m now ready to do that. For convenience in collaborating on this registration, I created a document
IANA media type registration form.txt in our repo’s Documents folder. I filled in a few fields, and will now add the Security section. It’s plain text to make it easier to paste it into IANA’s
Application for a media type web form when we’re ready. Thanks, Larry |
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