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Subject: RE: The Hal/David model


I have a few comments on this.

The model shows an Authentication Authority having a relationship
with Authentication Assertions. By symmetry, I would have expected
to see an Attribute Authority having a similar relationship to Attribute
Assertions - instead I see Authorization Attributes. This seems
a little strange to me.

I am not sure that it is worth trying to separate Authorization Attributes
and Authorization Assertions. The definitions try to distinguish the two
by making the latter a policy (such as user "noddles" is granted "execute" 
on "/usr/bin/guitar") and equating the former to an attribute (circular?)
such
as role, title... To me "execute on /usr/bin/guitar" is another attribute
of noddles. 

There have been examples of both kinds of assertions on the core-assertion 
mailing list and Phill Hallam-Baker has pointed out the distinction is
blurred 
- it would be hard to design a framework that could do one, but not the
other.
Therefore to me, it is not worth trying to make a distinction.

A comment is also made about equating authorization assertion with
authorization
decision. To me, this is up to the interpreter of the assertion. I could get
this and
treat it as an access control decision. Equally, it could be processed by a
PDP
to produce a "yes/no" answer. Therefore, I would say that not all assertions
of this 
class would necessarily be authorization decisions.

Finally I have a comment on the definition of Principal. (This is with
apologies, since
I was on the conference call.) On reflection, I think it is worth capturing
the idea of
authentication in the definition. If we are going to be making assertions
about principles,
it doesn't really make sense if those principles cannot be authenticated to
gain the 
privileges implied by the assertion. Also the term "instantiation" for me
does not
capture the idea that a system entity may have more than one principle
identity. I propose
the following:
"An authenticable identity of a system entity within the security domain."

Nigel.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Orchard, David [mailto:dorchard@jamcracker.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2001 10:32 PM
> To: security-services@lists.oasis-open.org
> Subject: RE: The Hal/David model
> 
> 
> I have updated the use case team's domain model as a result 
> of today's use
> case telecon.  Excellent progress all!
> 
> Cheers,
> Dave
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Orchard, David [mailto:dorchard@jamcracker.com]
> > Sent: Monday, March 12, 2001 8:32 PM
> > To: security-services@lists.oasis-open.org
> > Subject: RE: The Hal/David model
> > 
> > 
> > I have updated the domain model as best I can with the 
> various emails,
> > glossary, pdfs, etc. that are available.  I don't yet have a 
> > usable copy of
> > Visio, so the diagram will come from togetherJ for the near future.
> > 
> > This is an imperfect job as I was a bit overwhelmed by the 
> > glossary and all
> > the discussions on terminology differences.  I started 
> bottom-up (what
> > glossary terms are required) rather than try to fit all the 
> > glossary terms
> > in the diagram.  
> > 
> > I have liberally and flagrantly infringed copyrights by copying some
> > material from the mailing list(s) and the glossary.  I also 
> > copied from the
> > glossary rather than refering to it, so that reviewers could 
> > combine all
> > their comments together.   I also added issues where 
> > definitions seemed
> > vague/confusing/etc.
> > 
> > This is complete in that every item and major relationship 
> > listed in the
> > class diagram has a glossary entry.   
> > 
> > Process going forward: I expect that once we come to 
> > agreement on what we
> > mean by terms, we can then push them back to the glossary.  
> > Please provide
> > plenty of feedback to the group on this.
> > 
> > Suggestion for the use case chair and subcommittee: Very soon 
> > we start only
> > allowing conversations about terms that are in the 
> > glossary/domain model.  I
> > have been scanning various e-mails and notice many different 
> > synonyms, which
> > I (and I'm sure other readers) would find confusing.  I 
> > suggest that the set
> > of requirements we are now balloting is a candidate for this. 
> >  Terms like
> > subject, policy-based disclosure, subject security 
> > attributes, parties,
> > disclosure,  run-time, sharing, etc. are not currently in the 
> > domain model,
> > nor in the glossary.  One person's run-time is another 
> > persons compile-time,
> > etc.  Let's define these terms or not use them at all.
> > 
> > Dave Orchard
> > XML Architect
> > Jamcracker Inc.,    19000 Homestead Dr., Cupertino, CA 95014
> > p: 408.864.5118     m: 604.908.8425    f: 408.725.4310
> > 
> > www.jamcracker.com - Sounds like a job for Jamcracker.
> > 
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Eve L. Maler [mailto:eve.maler@east.sun.com]
> > > Sent: Friday, March 09, 2001 9:04 AM
> > > To: security-services@lists.oasis-open.org
> > > Subject: The Hal/David model
> > > 
> > > 
> > > People who attended F2F #1 will recall the diagram that Hal 
> > > Lockhart drew 
> > > up on the whiteboard.  It was something he and David Orchard 
> > > came up with 
> > > to help the use-case group settle on terminology and a rough 
> > > model of the 
> > > "things" we're discussing.  Fred Moses worked from his notes 
> > > to create the 
> > > following electronic version, which reflects a bit more of 
> > > the discussion 
> > > we had that day:
> > > 
> > >    http://oasis-open.org/committees/security/docs/sstcach1.gif
> > > 
> > > I'm sure we need more revisions to this diagram, but I would 
> > > like to work 
> > > towards consensus on the names for things and the 
> > > relationships between 
> > > them.  Please use this thread to discuss it, and we will take 
> > > it up as a 
> > > topic at the 20 March telecon.
> > > 
> > > For starters:
> > > 
> > > - On Tuesday, we discussed separating each box so that 
> > > there's no hint of 
> > > chronology.  This could mean, e.g., duplicating the "1" 
> > > callout so that 
> > > it's shown separately as the output of a credential collector 
> > > and the input 
> > > to an authentication authority.
> > > 
> > > - I think the policy balloons should largely be in the "Not 
> > > SAML" layer 
> > > above.  Or is the XACML discussion precisely about whether 
> > > some of these 
> > > balloons should be in scope?  Can we give distinct names to 
> > > the different 
> > > types of policies?
> > > 
> > > - What exactly do the input/output letters above refer to?
> > > 
> > > - I think we *may* have consensus that the "SAML" box should 
> > > cover more 
> > > stuff to the left, e.g., it should cover the authentication 
> > > authority.  Comments?
> > > 
> > > - Do we have consensus that SAML should cover the PEP box?
> > > 
> > > Thanks to Fred for making this version; I think Hal and David 
> > > should now 
> > > take up any revisions we ask for.
> > > 
> > > 	Eve
> > > --
> > > Eve Maler                                             +1 
> > 781 442 3190
> > > Sun Microsystems XML Technology Development  eve.maler @ 
> > east.sun.com
> > > 
> > > 
> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > To unsubscribe from this elist send a message with the single word
> > > "unsubscribe" in the body to: 
> > > security-services-request@lists.oasis-open.org
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> 


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