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Subject: RE: Artifacts : a slightly different (Shibboleth) perspective


Anders,

Your statement

>>The SAML solution (BTW, there seems to be two!)
>>introduces unnecessary interoperability problems by variant
>>structures and dual-party interpretation.  

is an error both in fact and interpretation. Kindly take the time
to read Section 3.1 of bindings 0.4. As it stands your claims
are a fact-free opinion.

- prateek


>>An artitfact should IMO be
>>opaque for all "outsiders" while the proper user can typically decode
>>a time-stamp and an instance-ID, besides verifying its signature.
>>
>>3. Artifacts can usually be replaced by the mechanism featured in
>>VISA's 3D Secure payment system:
>><HTML>
>><BODY Onload="javascript:document.forms[0].submit ()">
>><FORM METHOD="POST" ACTION="Destination_Server_URL">
>><INPUT TYPE="HIDDEN"
>>     NAME="SAMLAssertion"
>>     VALUE="Base64-encoded SAML Assertion">
>></FORM>
>></BODY>
>></HTML>
>>Going for the "real stuff" has several advantages over artifacts,
>>such as room for full XML objects and not only public keys,
>>but entire cert-paths.  Reduced requirements on Server-state is also
>>a factor to consider.
>>.
>>/Anders
>>
>>----- Original Message ----- 
>>From: "Marlena Erdos" <marlena@us.ibm.com>
>>To: <security-services@lists.oasis-open.org>
>>Sent: Wednesday, July 18, 2001 04:15
>>Subject: Artifacts : a slightly different (Shibboleth) perspective
>>
>>
>>Dear SAMLers,
>>
>>  I've been reading the bindings work on
>>"artifacts" with interest.
>>
>>  Shibboleth also has an artifact -- but
>>its semantics are slightly different.
>>And while Shibboleth covers a much narrower space
>>than SAML needs to, I think the
>>Shibboleth model may have some use
>>in furthering the bindings works.
>>
>>  Here is a discussion of Shibb and the
>>Shibb artifact -- what it means and
>>how it is used. Along the way
>>I'll point out some differences from
>>the current bindings model.
>>  A much fuller discussion of Shibboleth's use
>>of artifacts can be found in the Shibboleth architecture
>>document (draft!).  The URL for that doc is:
>>
>>http://middleware.internet2.edu/shibboleth/docs/draft-erdos-sh
>>ibboleth-architecture-01.pdf
>>
>>
>>  Firstly, Shibboleth only has a "web browser profile" -- and no
>>other.  Our model is of a user accessing
>>a web resource over http(s).  The user logs into
>>their "home organization". The home organization
>>hosts an attribute authority which issues
>>attribute assertions in response to attribute
>>queries.   Shibboleth doesn't include
>>an authentication authority or authentication
>>assertions -- more about this
>>shortly.
>>  Since Shibboleth has a large emphasis on
>>user privacy, we had a conundrum: How can
>>a relying party (RP) "securely" associate an attribute assertion with
>>a user who is not identified to the RP?
>>  Our solution was for the home organization
>>to send an "attribute query handle" in a secured package
>>to the RP via a redirect through the user's browser.
>>(We have two "paths" to get to this redirect. I don't
>>want to make this note even longer, so please see the Shibb Arch
>>doc for details.)
>>  The RP then uses the attribute query handle (which
>>I'll just call a "handle" henceforth) to
>>make request for an attribute assertion at the home
>>organization's AA.   That is, the handle serves
>>as the "subject" of the request.
>>  Of particular note, is that the handle
>>can *not* be said to refer to an existing assertion.
>>  Since Shibboleth allows a user to choose
>>what attributes get released to each RP (including
>>"name"), the AA will create different attribute assertions
>>about a given user depending on the RP that
>>is making the request.
>>  In Shibboleth, the handle refers to the user
>>(albeit in an opaque way).
>>
>>  The "secure package" for the handle,
>>is akin to the SAML "artifact".  We however
>>have a specific format rather than an
>>artifact framework.  Also, the contents
>>of our artifact are specifically aimed
>>at foiling impersonation rather than
>>eliminating replay per se.
>>  I'll send along an example of the
>>handle package in a separate note.  I'll
>>also include an explanation of the
>>impersonation attacks we try to defeat.
>>
>>
>>  To wrap up this note ...
>>
>>  About authentication assertions: we
>>don't have them in Shibboleth.  The
>>RP by virtue of receiving a valid
>>handle package can infer that the user authenticated
>>to their home organization.  But that is it.
>>It is possible for "login method" to be included
>>as an attribute in the attribute assertion,
>>though thus far we've been
>>thinking about longer-lived attributes.
>>
>>  About the "artifact": Thus far the
>>documentation of the artifact says
>>that the "assertion id" is used to
>>get an authentication assertion. Is there
>>any reason that the "id" couldn't
>>be used to retrieve an attribute assertion?
>>
>>  About anonymity: We achieve anonymity
>>by using the opaque handle as the subject
>>for the attribute query.  SAML doesn't
>>yet allow this (though Phill seemed amenable
>>when I talked with him late last week).
>>The returned assertion may or may not
>>contain the user's identity. It depends
>>on what the user has allowed the attribute
>>authority to release.
>>
>>
>>Comments? Questions?  You can
>>send them to me but I'll unfortunately
>>be away from July 19 until Aug 5.
>>(You might wish to
>>refer Shibboleth-specific
>>questions to Bob Morgan as he too is a
>>Shibb designer.)
>>
>>
>>Regards.
>>Marlena
>>
>>
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