RE: AuthenticatorLocale Definition

[Hal Lockhart <hal.lockhart@entegrity.com>]

There was strong sentiment for the inclusion of this element at F2F#3. (And
a few people strongly opposed.) The issues document DS-7-04 & DS-7-05
discusses some of the pros and cons. Core warns that the values can easily
be spoofed. 

Given that ease of spoofing is the major reason for opposing the inclusion,
I would personally be opposed to using these values in a way that suggested
they had some security properties, e.g. in SubjectConfirmation.

The fact of the matter is that these values are used today for AuthZ
decisions and Audit Trail whether we like it or not.

Hal

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Irving Reid [mailto:Irving.Reid@baltimore.com]
> Sent: Friday, August 24, 2001 11:01 AM
> To: 'Hal Lockhart'; 'security-services@lists.oasis-open.org'
> Subject: RE: AuthenticatorLocale Definition
> 
> 
> Does the AuthenticatorLocale trace back to any specific requirements?
> Core-0.15 says that it's optional, since the information can 
> be spoofed;
> given that, I think we need more rationale for why it's in 
> the spec at all.
> 
> If we want a way to record the source IP address from which an
> authentication originated (for example, to protect against 
> interception of
> authentication assertions), the SubjectConfirmation field seems more
> appropriate. Then the logic would be: the way you confirm 
> that the presenter
> of this assertion is the subject is that the message came from the
> corresponding IP address.
> 
>  - irving - 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Hal Lockhart [mailto:hal.lockhart@entegrity.com]
> > Sent: Friday, August 24, 2001 10:53 AM
> > To: 'security-services@lists.oasis-open.org'
> > Subject: AuthenticatorLocale Definition
> > 
> > 
> > The current core describes AuthenticatorLocale thus:
> > 
> > The <AuthenticationLocale> element specifies the DNS domain 
> > name and IP
> > address for the system entity that performed the authentication.
> > 
> > IMO this might reasonably be interpreted as the IP and DNS of the
> > Authentication Authority, or associated server that validated the
> > credentials. Is that what was wanted? My understanding was 
> > that we wanted
> > the IP and DNS or the client being authenticated.
> 
> 
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