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Subject: RE: [security-services] comments on core-25


I have applied most of the corrections proposed by Prateek, the folowing
appear to be somewhat beyond a typo fix however:

> (2) 
>  
>  
> 996, use of ConfirmationMethod
> 656, use of AuthenticationMethod
>  
> There is some inconsistency here. My understanding
> in earlier versions was that the filter was built around
> AuthenticationMethod (otherwise why should it be
> specific to <AuthenticationQuery>?). My guess is
> that line 996 should read:
> 
> <AuthenticationMethod>[Optional]


I have not problem with this change but it is more than correcting a typo so
I thought I would bounce it to the list.

> 393:
>  
> I am puzzled by the maxOccurs="unbounded" attribute for 
> <ds:Signature>.
> I would have thought this to have cardinality 0 or 1 (no need 
> for maxOccurs
> attribute). A close examination of Section 5.1 (1311)
> does not yield any justification for such a cardinality.

Again, no problem with me but more than a minor editorial change.
  
> add to line 1298:
>  
> The message integrity of assertions must also be guaranteed by use of
> appropriate technology.
>  
> add to line 1304:
>  
> The message integrity of requests and responses must also be 
> guaranteed by
> use of appropriate technology.


I could not get these two comments in registration with my text, please
supply more context.


> (9)  replace line 1348 by:
>  
> SAML processors MUST use enveloped signatures for signing 
> assertions and
> protocols. SAML processors SHOULD use RSA signing for public 
> key signatures.

Here I reworded slightly since SHOULD use is somewhat strong, should support
is closer... isn't verification a MUST though?

SAML assertions and protocols MUST use the enveloped signatures for signing
assertions and protocols. SAML processors should support use of RSA signing
and verification for public key operations.

Phillip Hallam-Baker (E-mail).vcf



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