[Date Prev] | [Thread Prev] | [Thread Next] | [Date Next] -- [Date Index] | [Thread Index] | [List Home]
Subject: Kerberos & front-channel bindings (was Metadata IOP & the front-channel bindings)
On 5 Oct 2009, at 22:22, Scott Cantor wrote: > Josh Howlett wrote on 2009-10-05: >> I'm curious how the IOP addresses the confidentiality and integrity >> requirement of the front-channel bindings (c.f. "Security and Privacy >> Considerations") from the 'metadata alone'. > > I believe that the front-channel bindings take some care to > distinguish the > bindings' requirements for confidentiality/integrity, and the front > channel > itself. Specifically, Redirect and POST say: > > "The presence of the user agent intermediary means that the > requester and > responder cannot rely on the transport layer for end-end > authentication, > integrity and confidentiality." > > The artifact binding text is a bit more muddled, I admit. > > Anyway, this was the justification for speaking broadly in the spec > without > intending to pull in the browser-facing stuff. So, if I understand you correctly, front-channel security is considered entirely orthogonal to SAML message security and the IOP is intended for the latter? The reason I ask is because I have recently been trying to understand the feasibility of using the Kerberos protocol within a SAML system (as opposed to the more typical use of X.509 credentials or public key crypto in general). The use-case is a large organisation with a small number of IdPs and many SPs within an organisational CoT. The organisation already has a mature Kerberos infrastructure that provides authentication for users and applications. The SAML entities in question are probably already principals within the organisation's Kerberos realm and therefore the organisation would prefer to use the same Kerberos infrastructure for trust establishment within the CoT to avoid the overheads imposed by the use of PKI or PK credentials in general. I have tentatively arrived at the conclusion that there is nothing in SAML2Core that would prevent the use of Kerberos in those places where XML-SIG and XML-ENC are invoked, assuming the presence of: (1) a mechanism that allows the Requesting, Responding or Asserting parties to provide a Kerberos service ticket in the <KeyInfo> elements (which contains the session key used in the crypto operations) (2) a mechanism that allows these parties to determine if a Kerberos principal is associated with a particular SAML entity. At present, I'm inclined to address (1) by defining a new Kerberos type for <KeyInfo> (see the Kerberos XSD already defined for the proposed "Kerberos Subject Confirmation Method" and "Kerberos Attribute Profile") and (2) by naming the authorised Kerberos principal in the <RoleDescriptor> metadata (again, using the same Kerberos XSD). The main difficulty that I have encountered is satisfying the confidentiality and integrity requirements of the front-channel bindings using Kerberos and TLS alone. Most browsers only provide these properties, using TLS, in concert with cipher suites using authenticated X.509 server credentials (there are browser implementations supporting the use of TLS and Kerberos-based ciphers, but these implementations are not widely used). I was initially of the opinion that a 'mixed economy' of Kerberos (for SAML message security) and X.509 (for front-channel security) would be a cop-out. But, on reflection, this approach would still yield benefits assuming that the key management imposed by front-channel bindings is equivalent to that which would be required anyway for protecting /general/ (ie. non-SAML specific) HTTP access to the entities in question. This at least still avoids the requirement to establish a parallel trust system (special purpose CA, inline keys in metadata, etc), even if is still necessary obtain certificates from a CA recognised by the browser. I would be very interested in any opinions on this analysis and approach. josh.