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Subject: Re: [security-services] Re: Proposed Agenda for SSTC Conference Call(Tue 21 Sept 2010)


  On 09/21/2010 12:42 PM, Nate Klingenstein wrote:
>
>> 2. Need a volunteer to take minutes.
>
Voting Members:
John Bradley      Individual
Scott Cantor     Internet2
Nathan Klingenstein     Internet2
Bob Morgan     Internet2
Thomas Hardjono     M.I.T.
Anthony Nadalin     Microsoft Corporation
Frederick Hirsch     Nokia Corporation
Thinh Nguyenphu     Nokia Siemens Networks GmbH & Co. KG
Paul Madsen     NTT Corporation
Hal Lockhart     Oracle Corporation
Emily Xu     Oracle Corporation
Anil Saldhana     Red Hat
David Staggs     Veterans Health Administration

Members:
Federico Rossini     Telecom Italia S.p.a.
Duane DeCouteau     Veterans Health Administration
Phil Hunt     Oracle Corporation

Quorum: 13 of 17 (76%) Achieved:
Status Changes:  FedericoR  gains voting rights.  Rob Philpott and 
George Fletcher lose voting rights.


> Nate volunteered.  Quorum was achieved.
>
>> 3. Approval of minutes from last meetings:
>>
>> Minutes from SSTC Call on 7 Sept 2010:
>>
>> http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/security/email/archives/201009/msg00016.html 
>>
>
> Anil moved to approve the minutes and Scott seconded.  The minutes 
> were approved.
>
>>    (c) SAML V2.0 Holder-of-Key Web Browser SSO Profile Version 1.0 as 
>> a CS
>>        - Status: CS created and publsihed.
>>
>>    (d) SAML V2.0 Holder-of-Key Assertion Profile Version 1.0
>>        - Status: CS created and publsihed.
>
> These have both been created and published.  Nate has not updated the 
> Wiki yet, but will do so.
>
>>    (e) Kerberos related items. [Josh/Thomas]
>>        - Kerberos Attribute Profile:
>>        - AI: Josh/Thomas will suggest additions to Attribute Profile.
>
> The profile is still being retooled alongside the team from CMU who 
> provided the additional use case discussed in prior minutes.  The 
> revision is probably almost done and an updated version should land in 
> the SSTC within the next several weeks.
>
>>    (f) SAML V2.0 Identity Assurance Profiles, Version 1.0
>>        - Status: 15-day review closed on 10 Sept.
>>        - Any comments received?
>
> Bob and Scott were not aware of any further comments received on the 
> Profiles.
>
> Paul attested to the fact that no further comments were received, that 
> CD-02 was reaffirmed and unchanged; Scott seconded it.  No objections 
> or concerns were raised.  Nate then moved to create a CS ballot for 
> CD-02 of the Identity Assurance Profiles.  Paul seconded Nate's 
> motion.  Thomas will submit a request to Mary for the ballot.
>
>>    (g) SAML V2.0 Metadata Profile for Algorithm Support Version 1.0:
>>        - Status: now in 60-day public review. (Closes 13 October)
>>        - Any updates?
>
> Scott had observed that the examples were broken in this profile, and 
> he'll update a new working draft shortly.
>
>>    (h) Service Provider Request Initiation Protocol and Profile 
>> Version 1.0
>>        - Status: now in 60-day public review. (Closes 13 October)
>>        - Any updates?
>
> No updates.
>
>>    (i) NSN Attribute Management proposal (Thinh/Phil) - any updates?
>
> Draft 2 was sent to the list on Monday.
>
> The terminology has been cleaned up so that notify issuer and notify 
> target are more explicit.  The references have been updated.  The core 
> protocol is largely the same; the major change is that instead of 
> using a SAML subject, a SAML NameID/EncryptedID is referenced in the 
> schema instead.
>
> Front-channel and back-channel have been renamed to asynchronous and 
> synchronous.  The terminology here is meant to match the rest of 
> SAML's terminology.  Scott said this was never deeply discussed, and 
> the goal was to create profiles that were not specifically tied to 
> bindings.  The goal was to keep bindings separate from profiles, and 
> Scott came up with arbitrary categories for those bindings.
>
> Scott suggested the examples be moved to the core protocol section.
>
> In retrospect, he's comfortable with the categories, but not so much 
> the way it was laid out in this document.  He just wants to see a core 
> protocol that is binding-agnostic, and a profile that defines use and 
> bindings of the protocol; Thinh agreed with the approach.  Either 
> terminology is comfortable for him, and placing both into the same 
> document is fine.  A conformance section, which is a requirement to 
> conform to OASIS rules, most sensically matches a profile, since 
> conformance to a protocol is a less meaningful concept.
>
> The issuer can now state which protocols it is capable of using.  If 
> it suggests a non-SAML protocol such as SPML or OpenID to subsequently 
> pass the data, omitted is how they would handle the use of different 
> types of identifiers.  But Scott observed that SAML does not have a 
> fixed set of identifiers; it has a structure to allow you to use any 
> type of identifier you would like, and that should suffice to handle 
> this aspect of the multi-protocol use case.
>
> Tom Zeller submitted some questions to the list about this tonight 
> regarding clarification of the differences between a ManageNameID 
> request and a RetireSubject in the Notify protocol.
>
> Frederick was a little confused as to why PoCo was included, since 
> there is relatively little protocol included in PoCo.  The idea, put 
> forth by Salesforce.com, was that a notification could be sent using 
> ChangeNotify.  They wanted to use PoCo as the payload for a large bulk 
> transfer, and would "secure the channel and do whatever."  Phil 
> expresses no opinion about how this next step is performed, 
> considering it out of scope for this proposal.  The same is true for 
> LDAPv3, SPML, etc.; the notification is the only part that SAML is 
> responsible for if SAML is not the transfer protocol.  It is a purely 
> informative reference and does not affect the SAML operations, and as 
> such the references are non-normative.
>
> In section 2.5.1, if the Notify Issuer indicates that many protocols 
> are available, a question was outstanding whether there should be a 
> way to indicate preference, e.g. through another attribute or an 
> ordering of the URI's.  The other way to do this would be through the 
> SLA.  Scott suggested text indicating that, in the absence of 
> out-of-band information, the order in the element SHOULD be taken as 
> preference.
>
> It should be clarified that a response will use one protocol, as the 
> alternatives allowing for the use of many protocols to respond to a 
> single ChangeNotify were too complicated to countenance.
>
> Scott will look at the schema for the next call.
>
> The next step for Phil will be to complete the profile section and to 
> move the examples into the profiles to give a cleaner separation.  
> There's a fair number of empty paragraphs left to do.  Detailing how 
> an AuthnRequest works with a ChangeNotify, for example, is a goal.  
> This would differentiate between an ordinary AuthnRequest, and the 
> initiation of identity federation via presentation of an AuthnRequest.
>
> Thinh proposed another scenario where a ChangeNotify would lead to an 
> AuthnRequest that would suggest an identifier that could be used to 
> create a new identity at the recipient of the AuthnRequest, followed 
> by a ChangeNotify Response.  Phil has some concerns about mixing the 
> protocols in such a way.  Given the complaints and problems about 
> getting the user-agent to the providers in the right sequence at the 
> right time, Scott is dubious that such a mix can be performed well, 
> and a consensus was reached that a cleaner separation between the two, 
> rather than an encapsulation, would be a better approach.
>
> Scott suggested a Metadata section needs to be added to the document 
> as well.
>
>>    (j) SOA-TEL Token Correlation Profile  (Federico/TI) - any updates?
>
> Federico had no updates on the document itself.  He analyzed the 
> specification again after Scott's comments regarding the applicability 
> of the delegation work to Federico's use case.
>
> Federico is still not sure whether the token correlation requirements 
> and semantics are sufficiently different from the delegation work.  
> He's also not sure whether the token correlation profile and syntax 
> are complete and correct.
>
> Some of the restrictions have been placed on Federico's company by 
> their vendor, due to limitations of the IdP implementation.  It was 
> more comfortable sending two separate assertions.  It also more simple 
> for them to implement the issuance of SAML assertions that are 
> generally usable at a number of services, rather than issuance of 
> specific assertions for every application, because the IdP requires 
> less knowledge of the business services.  It's also nice to decouple 
> business policies from the actual technical implementation.
>
> He's still concerned about the processing of the expiration time of 
> the first SAML assertion, and whether and how to imbed the link from 
> the second assertion to the first assertion, particularly without 
> invalidating the signature on the assertion.  Requiring that both 
> assertions be valid makes the profile a little simpler.
>
> Federico also thought it might be interesting to place the correlation 
> element out of the assertions themselves, and use it as an entirely 
> standalone token.
>
> Federico understands if this profile is not considered the best 
> approach within the SSTC on the basis that existing SAML 
> specifications could achieve his goals.
>
> Scott sees a subjective question and an objective issue.
>
> Subjectively, he thinks it's inappropriate to create a profile that 
> allows an RP to ignore the validity of one of the assertions.  Nate 
> agreed.
>
> The objective issue with regards to this profile is there is no way to 
> use the condition that he's trying to create outside of the signed 
> content and keep it in the assertion.  If the correlation condition is 
> not expressed in the assertion, then it's not in SAML, and needs to be 
> done somewhere else, such as WS-Security, where there are already ways 
> to chain multiple tokens to a single message, which may be a more 
> appropriate foundation.  If you want to recycle elements of SAML in 
> another protocol or context, that's fine, but it's still not a SAML 
> issue.
>
> Federico explained that the WS-Security working group is on 
> maintenance status, so it's a difficult place to do further work.  As 
> such, Nate suggested that Federico try this series of actions:
>
> 1)  Analyze the delegation profile to see whether its semantics and 
> technical requirements can solve his use case.
> 2)  If not, make sure that token correlation can be expressed at the 
> assertion level, rather than at a message level, or outside the 
> assertion.  The SSTC is not the right place for definition of message 
> level constructs.
> 3)  If token correlation can be expressed as a <Condition> in an 
> <Assertion>, and the requirement that both <Assertion>s be valid is 
> okay, then continuation of work on the Token Correlation Profile in 
> the SSTC is appropriate.
>
>>    (k) Channel binding proposal -- Scott.
>
> Scott has been playing around with some strategies for incorporation 
> of the channel binding concept for pairing SAML to GSS or SASL.  He's 
> come up with a way to allow the IdP to be a mediator for channel 
> binding negotiation, a cool little trick that can really improve the 
> phishing story.  One very simple application of the material would be 
> to plug a MITM hole in the existing SOAP binding, where the SOAP 
> binding is often authenticated with the SOAP signature because client 
> TLS is more painful.  From the people who have looked at it, some 
> consensus has arrived that it could be useful.
>
> He plans to move this along independently, but in parallel, will 
> produce a new version of the ECP that uses the channel bindings in 
> this proposal and also adds holder-of-key support.  The presentation 
> of the profile would also be simplified so it would be less 
> confusing.  This has a ways to go, but he wants to move this along 
> fairly quickly, in order to encourage a GSS proposal(at the IETF, 
> likely in KITTEN rather than the SASL working group) to move more 
> rapidly too.  This will likely lead to some natural liaison work with 
> the SSTC.
>
>>    (l)  Metadata extension for Login/Discovery -- Scott.
>>
>
> Scott hopes this document will speak for itself, and it has been 
> alluded to on a number of other calls.  This is a specific proposal 
> from Sampo, he believes, to use the Organization elements in metadata 
> to include descriptions of IdP's and SP's and include logos.  Back 
> then, individuals thought it distasteful to do it, but based on 
> experience and embedded base that have accrued since then, it seems 
> clear that the use case is important and some extensions are necessary 
> to address it.
>
> The extensions are in two subsets; one is for user interface, and the 
> other set of extensions relates to hinting information to allow 
> discovery tools to potentially derive guesses about the IdP to use, 
> particularly from client information, such as network address.  Some 
> strawman implementations are being fiddled with right now, but the 
> standards process doesn't need to be rushed.
>
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-- 
--------------------------------------
Anil Saldhana
Leader, JBoss Security&  Identity Management
Red Hat Inc
URL: http://jboss.org/jbosssecurity
BLOG: http://anil-identity.blogspot.com
---------------------------------------



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