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Subject: Input to use case meeting
Hi Guys! I enrolled the security-service TC as my company is in the process of launching a product called Purple(tm) designed for use case #1 (only). We feel that the input document to the TC describes a system that does not lend itself to massive use due to huge requirements on pre-configuration between partners. The following gives a condensed version on how our scheme achieves advantages by using challenge-response authentication (and more): Purple(tm) in use case #1 Client clicks on a partner URL on Site A where the client is authenticated NEW: Site A challenges Site B at a static URL. Includes a payload as well. NEW: Site B responds with a signed payload including a Site A challenge. REVISED: Site A creates a signed credential including an arbitrary payload adapted for the partner relation/activity. REVISED: Site A pushes the credential if both sites indicated that this was their preference. Otherwise it must be held in storage a (short) while. REVISED: Site A gives the security URL token to the client as a response to the client's request. A redirect takes the client to the proper Site B URL where the token is checked and credential is fetched inside or pulled depending on already (in-process) settled config data. 1. URL/method Config: -------------------------- S2ML v0.8: 2 static URLs + push/pull config. Purple(tm): 1 static URL, ZERO push/pull config. 2. Trust Config for Site B ------------------------------ S2ML v0.8: Recognize 'n' issuers of signed Entitlements and one(?) issuer of NameAssertions/per partner Purple(tm): Recognize ONE issuer of digital credentials/per partner. Credentials *could* though hold S2ML assertions as payload (if required). 3. Encrypted Credentials (option) ----------------------------------------- S2ML v0.8: Will fail every time Site B PKC is renewed. Purple(tm): Always gets fresh PKC as part of C-R Auth. 4. Clock & State Dependencies ---------------------------------------- S2ML v08.a: Not specified. Entitlements have validity but that is not equivalent to authentication time-out. Purple(tm): "Ticket" time-out (auth. state-holding requirement) is governed by receiving party (only) although Site A could in case of credential pulling indicate a max value it will hold a credential in storage. ========================================================================= I suggest that Web-authentication become separate XML objects (and TC task) that *optionally* can include S2ML assertions. ========================================================================= Regards Anders Rundgren CTO X-OBI
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