Re: [PATCH v7 net-next 4/4] netvsc: refactor notifier/event handling code to use the failover framework

[Siwei Liu <loseweigh@gmail.com>]

On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 7:28 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 03:57:57PM -0700, Siwei Liu wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 3:22 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
>> > On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 02:38:57PM -0700, Siwei Liu wrote:
>> >> On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 1:06 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
>> >> > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 12:44:39PM -0700, Siwei Liu wrote:
>> >> >> On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 10:56 AM, Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
>> >> >> > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 10:44:40AM -0700, Stephen Hemminger wrote:
>> >> >> >> On Mon, 23 Apr 2018 20:24:56 +0300
>> >> >> >> "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> > On Mon, Apr 23, 2018 at 10:04:06AM -0700, Stephen Hemminger wrote:
>> >> >> >> > > > >
>> >> >> >> > > > >I will NAK patches to change to common code for netvsc especially the
>> >> >> >> > > > >three device model.  MS worked hard with distro vendors to support transparent
>> >> >> >> > > > >mode, ans we really can't have a new model; or do backport.
>> >> >> >> > > > >
>> >> >> >> > > > >Plus, DPDK is now dependent on existing model.
>> >> >> >> > > >
>> >> >> >> > > > Sorry, but nobody here cares about dpdk or other similar oddities.
>> >> >> >> > >
>> >> >> >> > > The network device model is a userspace API, and DPDK is a userspace application.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > It is userspace but are you sure dpdk is actually poking at netdevs?
>> >> >> >> > AFAIK it's normally banging device registers directly.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > > You can't go breaking userspace even if you don't like the application.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > Could you please explain how is the proposed patchset breaking
>> >> >> >> > userspace? Ignoring DPDK for now, I don't think it changes the userspace
>> >> >> >> > API at all.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> The DPDK has a device driver vdev_netvsc which scans the Linux network devices
>> >> >> >> to look for Linux netvsc device and the paired VF device and setup the
>> >> >> >> DPDK environment.  This setup creates a DPDK failsafe (bondingish) instance
>> >> >> >> and sets up TAP support over the Linux netvsc device as well as the Mellanox
>> >> >> >> VF device.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> So it depends on existing 2 device model. You can't go to a 3 device model
>> >> >> >> or start hiding devices from userspace.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Okay so how does the existing patch break that? IIUC does not go to
>> >> >> > a 3 device model since netvsc calls failover_register directly.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> Also, I am working on associating netvsc and VF device based on serial number
>> >> >> >> rather than MAC address. The serial number is how Windows works now, and it makes
>> >> >> >> sense for Linux and Windows to use the same mechanism if possible.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Maybe we should support same for virtio ...
>> >> >> > Which serial do you mean? From vpd?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > I guess you will want to keep supporting MAC for old hypervisors?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > It all seems like a reasonable thing to support in the generic core.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> That's the reason why I chose explicit identifier rather than rely on
>> >> >> MAC address to bind/pair a device. MAC address can change. Even if it
>> >> >> can't, malicious guest user can fake MAC address to skip binding.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> -Siwei
>> >> >
>> >> > Address should be sampled at device creation to prevent this
>> >> > kind of hack. Not that it buys the malicious user much:
>> >> > if you can poke at MAC addresses you probably already can
>> >> > break networking.
>> >>
>> >> I don't understand why poking at MAC address may potentially break
>> >> networking.
>> >
>> > Set a MAC address to match another device on the same LAN,
>> > packets will stop reaching that MAC.
>>
>> What I meant was guest users may create a virtual link, say veth that
>> has exactly the same MAC address as that for the VF, which can easily
>> get around of the binding procedure.
>
> This patchset limits binding to PCI devices so it won't be affected
> by any hacks around virtual devices.

Wait, I vaguely recall you seemed to like to generalize this feature
to non-PCI device. But now you're saying it should stick to PCI. It's
not that I'm reluctant with sticking to PCI. The fact is that I don't
think we can go with implementation until the semantics of the
so-called _F_STANDBY feature can be clearly defined into the spec.
Previously the boundary of using MAC address as the identifier for
bonding was quite confusing to me. And now PCI adds to the matrix.
However it still does not gurantee uniqueness I think. It's almost
incorrect of choosing MAC address as the ID in the beginning since
that has the implication of breaking existing configs. I don't think
libvirt or QEMU today retricts the MAC address to be unique per VM
instance. Neither the virtio spec mentions that.

In addition, it's difficult to fake PCI device on Linux does not mean
the same applies to other OSes that is going to implement this VirtIO
feature. It's a fragile assumption IMHO.

>
>> There's no explicit flag to
>> identify a VF or pass-through device AFAIK. And sometimes this happens
>> maybe due to user misconfiguring the link. This process should be
>> hardened to avoid from any potential configuration errors.
>
> They are still PCI devices though.
>
>> >
>> >> Unlike VF, passthrough PCI endpoint device has its freedom
>> >> to change the MAC address. Even on a VF setup it's not neccessarily
>> >> always safe to assume the VF's MAC address cannot or shouldn't be
>> >> changed. That depends on the specific need whether the host admin
>> >> wants to restrict guest from changing the MAC address, although in
>> >> most cases it's true.
>> >>
>> >> I understand we can use the perm_addr to distinguish. But as said,
>> >> this will pose limitation of flexible configuration where one can
>> >> assign VFs with identical MAC address at all while each VF belongs to
>> >> different PF and/or different subnet for e.g. load balancing.
>> >> And
>> >> furthermore, the QEMU device model never uses MAC address to be
>> >> interpreted as an identifier, which requires to be unique per VM
>> >> instance. Why we're introducing this inconsistency?
>> >>
>> >> -Siwei
>> >
>> > Because it addresses most of the issues and is simple.  That's already
>> > much better than what we have now which is nothing unless guest
>> > configures things manually.
>>
>> Did you see my QEMU patch for using BDF as the grouping identifier?
>
> Yes. And I don't think it can work because bus numbers are
> guest specified.

I know it's not ideal but perhaps its the best one can do in the KVM
world without adding complex config e.g. PCI bridge. Even if bus
number is guest specified, it's readily available in the guest and
recognizable by any OS, while on the QEMU configuration users specify
an id instead of the bus number. Unlike Hyper-V PCI bus, I don't think
there exists a para-virtual PCI bus in QEMU backend to expose VPD
capability to a passthrough device.

>
>> And there can be others like what you suggested, but the point is that
>> it's requried to support explicit grouping mechanism from day one,
>> before the backup property cast into stones.
>
> Let's start with addressing simple configs with just two NICs.
>
> Down the road I can see possible extensions that can work: for example,
> require that devices are on the same pci bridge. Or we could even make
> the virtio device actually include a pci bridge (as part of same
> or a child function), the PT would have to be
> behind it.
>
> As long as we are not breaking anything, adding more flags to fix
> non-working configurations is always fair game.

While it may work, the PCI bridge has NUMA and IOMMU implications that
would restrict the current flexibility to group devices. I'm not sure
if vIOMMU would have to be introduced inadvertently for
isolation/protection of devices under the PCI bridge which may cause
negative performance impact on the VF.

>
>> This is orthogonal to
>> device model being proposed, be it 1-netdev or not. Delaying it would
>> just mean support and compatibility burden, appearing more like a
>> design flaw rather than a feature to add later on.
>
> Well it's mostly myself who gets to support it, and I see the device
> model as much more fundamental as userspace will come to depend
> on it. So I'm not too worried, let's take this one step at a time.
>
>> >
>> > I think ideally the infrastructure should suppport flexible matching of
>> > NICs - netvsc is already reported to be moving to some kind of serial
>> > address.
>> >
>> As Stephen said, Hyper-V supports the serial UUID thing from day-one.
>> It's just the Linux netvsc guest driver itself does not leverage that
>> ID from the very beginging.
>>
>> Regards,
>> -Siwei
>
> We could add something like this, too. For example,
> we could add a virtual VPD capability with a UUID.

I'm not an expert on that and wonder how you could do this (add a
virtual VPD capability with a UUID to passthrough device) with
existing QEMU emulation model and native PCI bus.

>
> Do you know how exactly does hyperv pass the UUID for NICs?

Stephen might know it more and can correct me. But my personal
interpretation is that the SN is a host generated 32 bit sequence
number which is unique per VM instance and gets propogated to guest
via the para-virtual Hyper-V PCI bus.

Regards,
-Siwei

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>> >> >> > --
>> >> >> > MST