Hi Tony-
Thanks for your notes.
During tomorrow’s call I intend to discuss proposals for
four of these items. These are all identified with “Proposed change:”
Some responses:
line 253 - any additional security
requirements for attachments (mime) to secure the attachment(s) ?
Attachments are a good point, but I don’t think any more restrictions
are necessary. The only model we have to attachments is to append them as
separate MIME sections to the current HTTP request. Since the HTTP request is
encapsulated inside a TLS channel, the attachments will always be encapsulated,
too.
line 738 - should we use a ws-securitypolicy to indicate a security (security
profile) and not just the uri ?
We looked at that briefly during the F2F but it’s rarely
used in WS-Discovery now, and including policy to a WS-Discovery message that
uses Compact Signature will push us close to (or beyond) MTU in most cases.
line 1105 - seem there will be an
interop issue if we let folks decide on what mechanisms to use for
authentication, seems that we should just state what is acceptable in the
security profile that is required to be supported
I believe you’re talking about R4046 here, which deals
with HTTP Basic Authentication. Antoine raised objections to removing HTTP
Authentication.
line 1131 - I think that R4035 should be removed as we don't yet have a profile
that has multiple credentials, we need make sure we have a set of requirements
that cover the profile
line 1146 - I think that we should
state the "credentials of the client or device" or make sure that the
profile we have for SSL/TLS covers multiple credentials
This is left unchanged from the prior version of the spec. We
can address the issue of multiple credentials on the next call.
line 1151 - should add SSL also
I assume the goal here is to allow participants to negotiate
down to SSL v3.0.
Proposed change: modify instances of “TLS”
in the document to “TLS/SSL,” but do not add any restrictions.
line 1155 - we should be specific here as this could be basic authn or some
form of SSL/TLS mutual authn
Proposed change: add a restriction that
clearly states that a CLIENT authenticates a DEVICE via x.509 certs exchanged during
TLS setup.
line 1159 - should the the same session that was used to negotiate a secure
session be used ?
I believe the intent is that TLS is the Secure Channel, and that
it should be reused for multiple messages if possible. It’s not clear.
Proposed change: modify restriction so it
clearly indicates the TLS session is to be reused, and not imply that a TLS
session is used to set up another TLS session.
line 1174 - R4046 for interop we should just stick with TLS certificate authn,
this goes back to having a profile and a set of requirements for that profile,
some of these requirements are too framework like and don't get us to an interop
point
Another instance of HTTP Authentication (see note for line 1105,
above).
line 1212 - I think that we should limit this to SSL/TLS as I could use a
proprietary secure channel and we would not get interop
I agree; this can be fixed with a restriction that clearly binds
the Secure Channel to TLS/SSL.
Proposed change: add a restriction that clearly
requires the use of TLS/SSL, and update R5014 to accommodate the SSL-named
Ciphersuites.
line 1126 - I think we should just
have a requirement that lists the unsupported cipher suites for SSL/TLS
Per our last conversation, I copied the rules directly from WS-I
Basic Security Profile v1.0.
Thanks
--D
From: Anthony Nadalin
[mailto:drsecure@us.ibm.com]
Sent: Monday, January 19, 2009 12:44 PM
To: Dan Driscoll
Cc: antoine.mensch@odonata.fr; ws-dd@lists.oasis-open.org
Subject: RE: [ws-dd] DPWS Security changes
Here are my additional comments:
line 253 - any additional security requirements for attachments (mime) to
secure the attachment(s) ?
line 738 - should we use a ws-securitypolicy to indicate a security (security
profile) and not just the uri ?
line 1105 - seem there will be an interop issue if we let folks decide on what
mechanisms to use for authentication, seems that we should just state what is
acceptable in the security profile that is required to be supported
line 1131 - I think that R4035 should be removed as we don't yet have a profile
that has multiple credentials, we need make sure we have a set of requirements
that cover the profile
line 1146 - I think that we should state the "credentials of the client or
device" or make sure that the profile we have for SSL/TLS covers multiple
credentials
line 1151 - should add SSL also
line 1155 - we should be specific here as this could be basic authn or some
form of SSL/TLS mutual authn
line 1159 - should the the same session that was used to negotiate a secure
session be used ?
line 1174 - R4046 for interop we should just stick with TLS certificate authn,
this goes back to having a profile and a set of requirements for that profile,
some of these requirements are too framework like and don't get us to an interop
point
line 1212 - I think that we should limit this to SSL/TLS as I could use a
proprietary secure channel and we would not get interop
line 1126 - I think we should just have a requirement that lists the
unsupported cipher suites for SSL/TLS
Basically I think we need to have a section for a mandatory (if you want
security)secure profile and then have the requirements that cover that secure
profile as this is still trying to cover a framework for security
Anthony Nadalin | Work 512.838.0085 | Cell 512.289.4122
Dan Driscoll ---01/07/2009 11:18:51 PM---Thanks for the
feedback, Antoine!
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Thanks for the feedback, Antoine!
I incorporated all changes except a few
minor notes:
* One comment you had said that we should distinguish "DEVICE" by
saying "DEVICEs that conform to this security profile." If we
did, I think we would have to change most (all?) instances in this section--I
think it is far more effective to allow the composition text at the beginning
make it clear: all of Section 7 is optional and must be applied in entirety.
* The case of an unsecure DEVICE and a secure HOSTED SERVICE is an unusual
one, and in cases where it's used, I think we should classify that as a
separate security profile entirely, instead of trying to accommodate it in this
profile.
Everyone, please see the updated text.
You may reply with the original text, or this one--if you haven't yet
started reviewing, please use the latest version.
Issues addressed in this draft:
032: Describe security composability
051: Generalize security
112: Remove WS-Security reference
113: Cleanup Network Model
114: Remove security negotiation
115: Replace R4070 with switches on HTTPS ID/xAddrs
138: Create introduction and concrete description of security profile
139: Remove protocol negotiation
140: Clean up HTTP Authentication
Thanks
--D
-----Original Message-----
From: Antoine Mensch [mailto:antoine.mensch@odonata.fr]
Sent: Monday, January 05, 2009 4:27 AM
To: ws-dd@lists.oasis-open.org
Subject: Re: [ws-dd] DPWS Security changes
Hi Dan and all,
Please find enclosed a version of the
document annotated with comments.
As the comments author is lost when saving the doc, I have prefixed all my
comments with AM. Besides minor editorial issues, I have two major concerns
with the current version:
1) it does not really clarify the security model for HOSTED SERVICEs:
most requirements still refer to DEVICEs, although the spec mentions that
control and eventing messages (that normally apply to HOSTED
SERVICEs) should use the Secure Channel established for the DEVICE. I think
the intent is that HOSTED SERVICEs delegate the establishment the security
association to the DEVICE and then use the secure channel established between
DEVICE and CLIENT, but it should be made clearer in the spec.
2) The removal of requirements R4028 and R4069 adds uncertainty to the
spec: it becomes more difficult to understand with feature is optional and
which one is mandatory. I think we should explicitly say that TLS with both
server and client certificates is the preferred approach, but that HTTP Basic
Authentication can be used as a mandatory minimal fallback mechanism when
client certificates are not practically feasible.
Cheers
Antoine
Dan Driscoll a écrit :
>
> Hi all-
>
> Please see my proposed changes for the DPWS Security issues. The
> following issues are addressed in this proposal:
>
> * 032: Describe security composability
> * 112: Remove WS-Security reference
> * 113: Cleanup Network Model
> * 114: Remove security negotiation
> * 115: Replace R4070 with switches on HTTPS ID/xAddrs
> * 138: Create introduction and concrete description of
security
> profile
> * 139: Remove protocol negotiation
> * 140: Clean up HTTP Authentication
>
>
>
> Note that although change tracking is enabled, the document is much
> easier to read with tracking disabled.
>
>
>
> Thanks
>
> --D
>
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