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Subject: Prelim minutes from 1/4 teleconf


Prelim minutes are attached.

Please provide corrections before Monday morning to the entire list.

Tom

-- 
----------------------------------------------------
Tom Rutt	email: tom@coastin.com; trutt@us.fujitsu.com
Tel: +1 732 801 5744          Fax: +1 732 774 5133



Title: Minutes of OASIS WS-RX Teleconference 1/4/2007

Prelim Minutes of OASIS WS-RX Teleconference

Jan 4, 2007

 

Start Time:4:00 PM Eastern Daylight Time

 

Paul F acted as chair.

 

Textual Conventions

 

Ø  Action Item

Motion

§    Resolution

 

1         Roll Call

From Kavi:

 

meeting    quorate

 

Tom Rutt agreed to take minutes.

2         Agenda Approval

Agenda

1) Roll Call

 

2) Review and approval of the agenda

 

3) Approval of the Dec 14, 2006 meeting minutes

(preliminary: http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/ws-rx/email/archives/200612/msg00058.html)

 

4) Sponsorship for future calls

 

5) AI Review

http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/ws-rx/members/action_items.php

 

6) Editors' update

 

7) Issue progress review

 

8) W3C WS Policy last call review

 

9) Discussion of PR Issues

 

a> PR035 Delivery Assurance

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i035

 

b> PR009 "Duplicate Elimination" and "Message Ordering"

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i009

 

c> PR020 Message ordering and duplication

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i020

 

d> PR021 Piggy-backing problematic

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i021

 

e> PR018 Piggyback message combinations

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i018

 

f> PR022 RMD cannot detect some incomplete Sequences

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i022

 

g> PR007 RM Destination lacks a mechanism for cleanly terminating inbound sequences

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i007

 

10) Any other business

 

 

Marc G suggested that the issues be reordered 18 before 21.  Also the DA issues can be delayed to the end.

 

Paul F I have a proposal for 27, which we can add to the end.

New order 18 21 2 07 35 9 20 27

1         Approval of the 12/14 Minutes;

http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/ws-rx/download.php/21674/MinutesWSRX-121406.htm

 

Tom moved to approve 12/14 minutes, Charlie seconded.

 

§    No objections, minutes of 12/14 approved.

 

2         Sponsorship for future calls

Looking for sponsors for calls beyond 1/11/2007.

 

Bob F: Hitachi can do two calls.

 

Gil: Bea can do two calls.

 

Marc G: Microsoft can do one call.

3         AI Review

http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/ws-rx/members/action_items.php

 

Report created 04 January 2007 03:57pm EST

 

#0113: Sanjay to follow up with Paul to create a review plan Note that there is a new ignorable attribute

Owner: Sanjay Patil

Status: Done by Ashok

Assigned: 2006-12-07

Due: ---

 

 

#0115: Stefan to put together concrete objections to Gil's strawman on PR007

Owner: Stefan Batres

Status: Closed

Assigned: 2006-12-14

Due: ---

 

 

#0117: Marc G will sort out with Chairs and editors on apportioning existing issue against the core spec and the new Make Connection spec

Owner: Marc Goodner

Status: Still Open

Assigned: 2007-01-03

Due: ---

 

 

#0118: Jacques and Chris F will work toward a proposal to resolve PR 35 and 9 for Jan 4 call

Owner: Jacques Durand

Status: Done

Assigned: 2007-01-03

Due: ---

 

4         Editors' update

Dug: all the issues resolved have been incorporated in the spec.  Also Make connection has been separated into its own spec.

5         Issue progress review

Paul went thru the issues list to determine if all issues have owners prescribed.

 

Paul: could Marc use minutes from 1/7 to attach the owner names.

 

Marc G: I can do that.

 

Paul: issue 12 and 18.

 

Marc G: 12 is against make connection.

 

Sanjay: 18 was closed on Dec 7.

 

Marc G: the list you have is correct list of open issues

 

28 – 31 are part of make connection.  We should deal with these after we close the others.

 

Paul F: we have concrete proposals for all non-make connection issues.

6         W3C WS Policy last call review

Ashok: mail:

Sanjay asked for volunteers to review the WS-Policy Last Call documents.

I interpreted this to mean "does WS-RX Policy work in the context of WS-Policy as embodied in the Last Call documents".

If this was not the intention, my apologies, and we can try again.

 

So, I reread the WS-RX Policy Documents.  Here is what I learned.

 

The WS-RX Policy document defines 3 assertions. 

 

The first assertion is whether Reliable Messaging is used or not.

<wsrmp:RMAssertion [wsp:Optional="true"]? ... >

 

Somewhat to my surprise, this assertion says nothing about delivery assurances.

In my view, applications may want to specify whether they want duplicates removed from a sequence or they

want the messages ordered.  So this assertion seems underspecified.

 

The second and third assertions are about security considerations. 

 

The second assertion is

<wsrmp:SequenceSTR [wsp:Optional="true"]? ... />

 

This says that an RM Sequence MUST be bound to an explicit token that is referenced from a

wsse:SecurityTokenReference in the CreateSequence message.

 

This assertion is, in fact dependent on the RM assertion and cannot be used unless the RM assertion is present.

 

The third assertion is

<wsrmp:SequenceTransportSecurity [wsp:Optional="true"]? ... />

This assertion defines the requirement that an RM Sequence MUST be bound to the session(s) of the underlying transport-level security protocol (e.g. SSL/TLS) used to carry the CreateSequence and CreateSequenceResponse messages.

Further, this assertion must occur in conjunction with the RMAssertion and a sp:TransportBinding assertion that requires the use of some transport-level security mechanism (e.g. sp:HttpsToken).

 

Thus, this assertion is dependent on two other assertions.

 

WS-Policy says in section 3.1 "A policy assertion represents an individual requirement, capability, or other property of a behavior".

But, as we have seen, two of the assertions cannot stand independently. 

 

Consider the situation where a policy contains the first and second assertion, both marked 'optional'.

When such a policy is normalized, we get four policy alternatives.  One of these alternatives will contain the second assertion and not the first.

This is clearly an error.

 

Thus, I think some change to the WS-Policy wording may be desirable.

 

We should also think about whether we can fix this problem on our own.

Clearly, the second assertion can be limited to appear only as a nested assertion for the first assertion.

This would solve the situation wrt the second assertion.

 

But what about the third assertion?  This requires the first assertion as well as the sp:TransportBinding assertion.  So should we make both

the first and third assertions nested assertions of sp:TransportBinding?  But that's not something we can do.  We don't own that domain.

 

All the best, Ashok

 

Paul F: can we fix these problems ourselves.

 

Ashok: nesting the security token assertion inside rm assertion could fix that.  However the other is not in our control.

 

Marc G: I could agree to investigate the nesting of the security token.  We can also try to find ways to fix the transport security assertion.

 

Chris: when you have two assertionts both marked optional which are interoperating, there are problems.  Nesting may be an effective solution.  The problem with the sp security transport dependency is not unique for us, so I do not think we have to do anything about it.

 

Asir: what it the problem

 

Ashok:  with an expression that has both assertions as optional, the security association token cannot appear without the rm assertion..  There is a solution here to next the security token association nested with rm assertion.  For Transport Security, it is more difficult to deal with.

 

Anish: this seems like feedback to policy group to clarify the independence of assertions.  With this security example, we might get an answer to the problem.

 

Action: Ashok to prepare draft feedback to policy working group, on need to be careful to avoid dependency related problems.

 

Action: Ashok to raise new issue about nesting policy assertions for RM.

 

7         9) Discussion of PR Issues

7.1      e> PR018 Piggyback message combinations

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i018

 

Gil: Dug had the last proposal for that one, on Dec 17.

http://www.oasis-open.org/archives/ws-rx/200612/msg00026.html

I think the resolution of this issue and that of PR021 should be combined. In general I like this proposal, but I still have a problem with the language about reference parameters; I don't know what it means to "consider" a reference parameter.

 

- gp

 


From: Doug Davis [mailto:dug@us.ibm.com]
Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2006 7:05 AM
To: ws-rx@lists.oasis-open.org
Subject: [ws-rx] PR18 - A proposal


I think PR18 is saying that the text in 3.2 is a bit too vague w.r.t. which RM header may be piggy-backed and into which messages they may be added.  To that end, I propose we do a bit of wordsmithing.  Currently section 3.2 says:
3.2 Considerations on the Use of "Piggy-Backing"
Some RM header blocks may be added to messages that happen to be targeted to the same Endpoint to
which those headers are to be sent (a concept often referred to as "piggy-backing"), thus saving the
overhead of an additional message exchange. Reference parameters MUST be considered when
determining whether two EPRs are targeted to the same Endpoint.

I propose to make the following edits:

3.2 Considerations on the Use of "Piggy-Backing"
Some RM header blocks may be added to messages that happen to be are targeted to the same Endpoint to
which those headers are to be sent (a concept often referred to as "piggy-backing"), thus saving the
overhead of an additional message exchange. Reference parameters MUST be considered when
determining whether two EPRs are targeted to the same Endpoint.  See the sections that define each
RM header block to know which ones may be considered for piggy-backing.

thanks,
-Doug

 

Doug D moved to accept Doug’s proposal to resolve issue 18, Matt seconded.

 

Jacques: one comment on recent mail from Doug on list regarding definition of piggybacking.  Some combination of rm headers should not be considered piggybacking.  It would be good to make this more explicit.

 

Gil: This leads into issue 21, on defining what piggybacking is.  Optionality of piggybacking is in eyes of sender.  Ack request headers may be piggygacked.

 

Paul F: how do we deal with that with the motion we have. Could PR 21 cover this.

 

Gil: once we agree on text for 21, I could provide text for needed changes to resolution to 18.

 

No objection, Issue 18 resolved by accepting proposal from Doug D.

 

7.2      d> PR021 Piggy-backing problematic

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i021

Gill Email: http://www.oasis-open.org/archives/ws-rx/200612/msg00060.html

I've been reviewing the message that accompanied this issue and I'd like to update/revise my position on the points I made:

 

1.) Complicates SOAP processing: I think the proposal on the table for PR018 basically eliminates this concern.

 

2.) Agreement on use of piggy-backing: I'm still somewhat concerned about this aspect. I think the spec should make it clear that the "MAY" in piggy-backing applies to the piggy-backer; it's sender-optional. RMS and RMD implementations MUST be prepared to handle piggy-backed SequenceAcknowledgement and AckRequested (respectively) headers.

 

3.) EPR comparison: I still think this is a real concern. We are talking about comparing EPRs, something the WS-Addr group decided was too hairy to get into. Waving our hands and saying that reference parameters must be "considered" doesn't cut it. We should profile a small subset of the options for EPR comparison and say "this is how you compare EPRs for the purposes of selecting a SOAP message on which to piggy-back". We can afford to be a little conservative because a false negative comparison (thinking two EPRs are "different" when they are really "the same") isn't all that harmful.

 

- gp

 

Gil: we allow this but it is sender optional.  We need to clarify Pr 18 text to clarify that it is sender optional, and the receiver has to be prepared to have piggygacking present on not present.

 

Gil: A more difficult problem is how to determine piggybacking address, which requires some kind of epr comparison by the implementation.  We have not done an adequate job on determining how this epr comparison will happen.  We should have at least one epr comparison algorithm.

 

Tom: prescribing an algorighm that will work everywhere might not be necessary.  The sender knows when it will work (e.g. anonymous) and when it knows somehow, it can try to piggyback.  An error can result if it is not correct.

 

Doug D: I would like to focus on point 2.  This is true for messages which are not piggybacked.  The use of Must understand attribute must be considered.

 

Gil: acks lost due to non agreement on how piggybacking is to be sent is a special case.

 

Paul F: we need a concrete proposal for Issue 21.

 

Gil: would there be support for epr comparison?

 

Marc G: I am not sure there is a proposal needed for this problem 3.  I do not think we need to do anything for 2.  We could close the entire issue without change.  I do not think it is a good idea to go back to discussion of epr comparison.  We have text about significance of ref parms already.

 

Action: Gill will provide concrete language around item 2 in his proposal for issue 21.

 

Stefan: the spec does not have to have an explicit algorithm

 

Dave O: the epr comparison has not been discussed specifically with piggybacking.  You cannot have interoperability of piggybacking out of the box without addressing the concern in 3).  The right people are gathered here to solve this problem.   The solution, if scoped to piggybaking, might be acceptable.  I support doing it.

 

Coleen: choosing one algorithm is not required.  I agree with Tom’s point.

 

Gil: lets take discussion of item 3 to mailing list.

 

7.3      f> PR022 RMD cannot detect some incomplete Sequences

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i022

 

http://www.oasis-open.org/archives/ws-rx/200612/msg00032.html

Title: PR022: strawman proposal

 

From previous discussions on this issue it is evident that the TC doesn't think that the motivating requirement is pressing enough to justify any large changes to the spec (i.e. making TerminateSequence or CloseSequence required). With that in mind I propose that we resolve this issue by doing the following:

 

1.) Adding the mandatory LastMsgNumber element to CloseSequence. As previously discussed, the description of LastMsgNumber should be something along the lines of:

 

The LastMsgNumber element specifies the highest assigned message number of all the Sequence Traffic Messages for the Sequence being closed. The RM Destination can use this information, for example, to implement the behavior indicated by wsrm:CreateSequenceResponse/wsrm:IncompleteSequenceBehavior.

 

2.) The use of CloseSequence remains optional. Any agreement between the RMS and the RMD about the use of CloseSequence to allow the RMD to determine if it has succesfully received all the messages sent by the RMS is out of scope.

 

3.) An RMS that sends a CloseSequence but does not receive a CloseSequenceResponse is free to retry the CloseSequence message or not depending upon local policy etc.

 

- gp

 

There were questions on the details of the proposal.

 

Jacques: the wording uses SHOULD.  There is a corner case when is should be a MUST.  When it was agreed that the csr will send it and it does not, there should be an error sent.  

 

Gil: should we define another fault for this case.

 

Jacques: we need to make RMS aware, of this situation.  There has to be an error message about the expectation of a last message number, otherwise the entire sequence will be lost.

 

Doug D: What about when RMS does not know about last sequence number.  This is a special case.

 

Jacques: it is when discard all is in use.  Either the spec should say that when discard all is in use the last message must be sent, or an error will be sent.

 

Paul: I think that SHOULD is a good enough word.  People need good enough reasons to not obey a should requirement.

 

Gil: I am sympathetic to Jacques concern in the area.  If you make it MUST for the corner case, it could be MUST for all.

 

Tom: we have to worry about the loss of state edge case for an RMS..

 

Stefan: whats wrong with: if RMS knows the last message number then it MUST include it in CS/TS ?

 

Paul F: take Stefan’s wording, and have it apply to both close sequence and terminate sequence.

 

Action: Gill will make new proposal for Issue 22.

 

7.4      g> PR007 RM Destination lacks a mechanism for cleanly terminating inbound sequences

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i007

 

Gil: both close sequence and termininate sequence should include a last number element.  If agreed, I could write a concrete proposal

 

Paul: discussion requires a concrete proposal.

 

Action: Gil to provide a concrete proposal to resolve issue 007 to include a finalAck in the closeSequence and TerminateSequence message.

 

7.5      a> PR035 Delivery Assurance

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i035

 

Jacques reviewed his original proposal for 35:

  • Core spec should define  DAs, even if does not require support of DAs
  • Define Policy assertions for DAs

 

Jacques: I believe an entirely new section is needed.

http://www.oasis-open.org/archives/ws-rx/200701/msg00013.html

Proposal for these, concerning the wsrm core specification (complementary proposal from Chris is about additions in WS RM Policy)

 

Add a new 2.2 section (moving down former 2.2 -> 2.3, etc)

 

2.2 Delivery Assurances

 

The delivery assurances (DAs) alluded to at the beginning of section 2, and enabled by the reliable messaging protocol are defined below as AtLeastOnceDelivery, AtMostOnceDelivery, ExactlyOnceDelivery and InOrderDelivery. Their enforcement is communicated or advertised between parties in the form of policy assertions that are defined in WS-RM Policy specification. This specification does not require that these DAs be signaled between RM Source and RM Destination over the protocol described here. Users may choose to communicate these DAs via the protocol, e.g. using extensibility points.

 

AtLeastOnceDelivery: When sending a message under this delivery assurance (DA), one of the two following outcomes shall occur: either (1) the RMD has received the message and successfully delivered it to the AD, or (2) either the AS or the AD is made aware of a delivery failure. Note: it may happen that both (1) and (2) occur for a message. It is also possible that the message is delivered more than once.

 

AtMostOnceDelivery: When sent under this DA, a message shall not be delivered more than once by the RMD to the AD. Message duplicates are identified based on Sequence ID and Sequence number. Note: a message that is not delivered at all is compliant with this DA.

 

ExactlyOnceDelivery: This DA is equivalent to the combination of  AtLeastOnceDelivery and AtMostOnceDelivery DAs.

 

InOrderDelivery:  When sent under this DA, messages from the same sequence shall be delivered by the RMD in the same order they have been sent by the AS, i.e. submitted to the RMS. Note: the protocol provides ways to signal specific delivery behaviors regarding incomplete sequences (see IncompleteSequenceBehavior).

 

-Jacques

 

Marc G: why not use the definitions from the first CD.

 

Jacques: these are inspired by the earlier definitions.  I think these are better than the previous ones.  The wording is more cautious.

 

Tom: if the DAs could be combined, we could define in order as Chris did, and combine it with at least once if required.  This could result in three policy assertions.

 

Chris F: proposed three policy assertions for DAs.

From: Christopher B Ferris [mailto:chrisfer@us.ibm.com]

Sent: Thursday, December 07, 2006 1:35 PM

To: ws-rx@lists.oasis-open.org

Subject: [ws-rx] strawman proposal for delivery assurance in policy for RM

 

 

Previous to the LC draft of the WS-Policy 1.5 - Framework spec, there was no means by which

you could include an assertion that had no client impact and/or on-the-wire manifestation. All assertions

had to be both understood and would manifest themselves in the interactions between the two

parties.

 

However, in the LC draft, the WS-Policy WG introduced a new attribute: wsp:Ignorable, of type boolean,

that could be added to an assertion to indicate that at the policy consumer's discretion, that assertion

could be omitted from consideration in the intersetcion algorithm. Thus, a service provider that

wanted to advertise a QoS capability of the service, sich as a delivery assurance, that in fact placed

no requirements on the part of the client, such that the client could choose to ignore it if it didn't

understand that assertion. Effectively, it is a means for the service prvider to advertise in its policy

"here is an assertion, but you don't need to do anything about it, or even understand it and you can

still interoperate with me".

 

One of the concerns that we had previously with regards to delivery assurances (DA) was that regardless

of what DA was, or was not inforce, the protocol was exactly the same in all cases. Thus, prior to the

changes introduced in the WS-Policy LC draft, there was really no means of defining a policy assertion

that could advertise a DA and also provide a means by which the client could choose whether it

wanted to consider it in the intersection.

 

Given that WS-Policy now has this new feature, and given the concerns that have been raised by

FIX and others, perhaps we might consider addition of policy assertions that reflected the semantics

of the DAs we previously had in the input specification, with a strong recommendation that service

providers leverage the wsp:Ignorable='true' attribute to allow for a client to omit the assertion from

consideration in the intersection algorithm.

 

e.g.

 

<wsrmp:ExactlyOnceDelivery wsrmp:InOrder='true|false' wsp:Ignorable='true'/>

<wsrmp:AtMostOnceDelivery wsrmp:InOrder='true|false' wsp:Ignorable='true'/>

<wsrmp:AtLeastOnceDelivery wsrmp:InOrder='true|false' wsp:Ignorable='true'/>

 

This approach would give the client (RMS) the choice as to whether to engage with the service

as it could use the policy intersection mode of 'strict' to ensure that it only interacted with

a service provider that supported RM and offered the DA it required. Alternatively, a client

that didn't care what the DA was at the service provider could use the lax mode of intersection

to omit the assertion from the intersection algorithm.

 

Considerations:

- only ONE DA could be advertised per service endpoint, as there is nothing in the message

that would indicate which was in play since the protocol operates the same in all cases. There is nothing

in WS-Policy that can enforce such a constraint (that an assertion be exclusive of others in any

alternatives in the policy statement). We would need to have a constraint like:

 

        A Policy statement MUST NOT contain more than one of the DA assertions in its collective

        alternatives. A Policy statement MAY include the same DA assertion in more than one alternative.

 

- Should probably provide guidance on use of the wsp:Ignorable attribute (e.g. SHOULD be used

unless the service is being deployed with knowledge that all consumers of the service will

both understand that assertion and be willing to include it in the policy intersection)

 

Thoughts?

 

Christopher Ferris

 

Anish: I am not in agreement with the “ignorable” part.  The Client may need to know if a DA is in use.

 

Gil: I think it is Ignorable.  It should not effect interop.

 

Marc G: I would not like to depend to the newest changes to the Policy spec.  You do not want to hurt a client that

 

Anish: Our charter is to wait for w3c spec to be at a particular state.

anish: this is what the charter says:

anish: "If an above specification is outside of a standardization process at the time this TC moves to ratify its deliverables, or is not far enough along in the standardization process, any normative references to it in the TC output will be expressed in an abstract manner, and the incarnation will be left at that time as an exercise in interoperability."

 

 

Tom: there are both lax and strict forms of intersection algorithm in the new policy spec version.  This should be considered when discussion “ignorable”

7.6      b> PR009 "Duplicate Elimination" and "Message Ordering"

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i009

 

no time

7.7      c> PR020 Message ordering and duplication

http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-rx/issues/pr/Issues.xml#i020

 

no time

 

8         Any other business

 

Doug D: I have separated out the make connection into a new spec.  Can I make a new draft of the main spec without Make connection.

 

Paul: we agreed to go forward with two new editors drafts.



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