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Subject: Comment requested on removing DTD definitions from XML Signature 1.1 and on elliptic curve
(1) The W3C XML Security working group is considering removing DTD
definitions from XML Signature 1.1 and XML Encryption 1.1 and only
providing XML Schema definitions in these specifications [1].
If this is a concern please indicate the concerns and rationale on the
XML Security WG comment list at public-xmlsec-comments @ w3.org. This
list is publicly archived at http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-xmlsec-comments/s/
(2) The XML Security WG would also like to refine the question about
the suitability of elliptic curve as a mandatory to implement
algorithm for XML Signature 1.1 by highlighting that the scope of
elliptic curve is greatly limited in what is proposed to be mandatory
in XML Signature 1.1. The specific curve being used in an instance
of ECDSA is important and there are a few sets of well-known
("named") curves that have been standardized. The P-256, P-384 and
P-521 curves are three of the five NIST-defined prime curves.
Since the publication of the First Public Working Draft of XML
Signature 1.1, the following clarifying text was added by the XML
Security WG to the end of section 6.4.3 of XML Signature 1.1 [2]:
"This specification REQUIRES implementations to support the
ECDSAwithSHA256 signature algorithm, which is ECDSA over the P-256
prime curve specified in Section D.2.3 of FIPS 186-3 [FIPS186-3] (and
using the SHA-256 hash algorithm). It is further RECOMMENDED that
implementations also support ECDSA over the P-384 and P-521 prime
curves; these curves are defined in Sections D.2.4 and D.2.5 of FIPS
186-3, respectively."
It is important to realize that by reducing the scope of the
requirement to a specific curve that this should simplify evaluation
of whether it is desirable to make this mandatory to implement.
The XML Security WG would also like to note the importance of this
algorithm to US Government customers, as evidenced by their adoption
of Suite B [3]. This is reflected in the XML Security WG Use Cases
and Requirements document in section 3.5.2.3 [4].
If you have feedback on the suitability of the mandatory to implement
requirement for ECDSAwithSHA256 algorithm, please indicate on the
public comment list. (1) The W3C XML Security working group is
considering removing DTD definitions from XML Signature 1.1 and XML
Encryption 1.1 and only providing XML Schema definitions in these
specifications [1].
If this is a concern please indicate the concerns and rationale on the
XML Security WG comment list at public-xmlsec-comments @ w3.org. This
list is publicly archived at http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-xmlsec-comments/
(2) The XML Security WG would also like to refine the question about
the suitability of elliptic curve as a mandatory to implement
algorithm for XML Signature 1.1 by highlighting that the scope of
elliptic curve is greatly limited in what is proposed to be mandatory
in XML Signature 1.1. The specific curve being used in an instance
of ECDSA is important and there are a few sets of well-known
("named") curves that have been standardized. The P-256, P-384 and
P-521 curves are three of the five NIST-defined prime curves.
Since the publication of the First Public Working Draft of XML
Signature 1.1, the following clarifying text was added by the XML
Security WG to the end of section 6.4.3 of XML Signature 1.1 [2]:
"This specification REQUIRES implementations to support the
ECDSAwithSHA256 signature algorithm, which is ECDSA over the P-256
prime curve specified in Section D.2.3 of FIPS 186-3 [FIPS186-3] (and
using the SHA-256 hash algorithm). It is further RECOMMENDED that
implementations also support ECDSA over the P-384 and P-521 prime
curves; these curves are defined in Sections D.2.4 and D.2.5 of FIPS
186-3, respectively."
It is important to realize that by reducing the scope of the
requirement to a specific curve that this should simplify evaluation
of whether it is desirable to make this mandatory to implement.
The XML Security WG would also like to note the importance of this
algorithm to US Government customers, as evidenced by their adoption
of Suite B [3]. This is reflected in the XML Security WG Use Cases
and Requirements document in section 3.5.2.3 [4].
If you have feedback on the suitability of the mandatory to implement
requirement for ECDSAwithSHA256 algorithm, please indicate on the
public comment list. A similar question applies to ECDH-ES mandatory
for XML Encryption 1.1.
(3) if you have any comment on any of the documents recently published
by the XML Security WG [1] we would appreciate feedback on the public
comments list.
Thank you
regards, Frederick
Frederick Hirsch, Nokia
Chair XML Security WG
(3) if you have any comment on any of the documents recently published
by the XML Security WG [1] we would appreciate feedback on the public
comments list.
Thank you
regards, Frederick
Frederick Hirsch, Nokia
Chair XML Security WG
[1] http://www.w3.org/2008/xmlsec/wiki/RoadmapandPublicationStatus
[2] http://www.w3.org/2008/xmlsec/Drafts/xmldsig-core-11/Overview.htm
[3] Fact Sheet NSA Suite B Cryptography, http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml
[4] http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/WD-xmlsec-reqs-20090226/#algorithm-suiteb
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