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Subject: [wss] Web Services Security Issues List - Rev 9
The attached issues list includes issues from the mailing list through Nov 11 (for the interop draft) and from our last phone call on Dec 17. Also, I plan to start adding post-interop issues to the list soon. Chris/Kelvin: when you have a moment would you update the link from our TC page. Thanks. In the event there are issues that were missed or need correction please let me know as soon as possible. Regards, -JohnTitle: WSS Issues List
Version 9, Modified on January 12, 2003 10:43:44 PM -0500
This table include issues from the mailing list up to Nov 11 and updates from the December 17 meeting minutes at http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200301/msg00000.html.
The previous version of the issues list can be found at http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00097.html. An archive of the discussion list can be found here: http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/.
If you identify items that are missing or need correction please contact John Shewchuk at email@example.com.
|1||Technical||Closed||Can we have alternative mechanisms of signature and encryption other than XML DSIG and XML Encryption?||Closed on 10/8/02 - http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200210/msg00085.html Conformant implementations must support XML sig/enc and MAY support additional mechanisms.||Closed|
|2||Procedural||Closed||Clarify the IP status and licensing terms for the submissions to the working group||Closed on 9/24/02 - http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200210/msg00011.html. References Prateek Mishra's posting. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200208/msg00011.html.||Closed|
|3||Technical||Closed||Proposal to Label Tokens to Indicate Their Semantics||
F2F Topic - Ronald Monzillo and Anthony Nadalin will send out a proposed set of changes.
|4||Technical||Closed||Why is the token in the header, and not a child of KeyInfo?||Chris talked with PHB. Chris will write up a proposal. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||Closed|
|5||Technical||Closed||Within the KeyInfo, why not use a ds:RetrievalMethod?||Chris talked with PHB. Depends on 4 and conversation with PHB. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||Closed|
|6||Investigation||Pending||Will the authors of the roadmap submit it?||Action to find fixed URL. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html||Chair|
|7||Technical||Closed||Does WS-Security assume SOAP 1.1?||Per Sept 4 minutes – it will support all versions of SOAP||Closed|
|8||Investigation||Closed||Determine interest in a Use case document||Formed a sub-committee, led by Erik Herring. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200210/msg00127.html||Closed|
|9||Investigation||Post Interop Draft||Approach authors to submit the App Note to the TC||Action to find fixed URL. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html||Erick Herring|
|10||Investigation||Postponed||Investigate interop fest at some later time||Postponed pending more feedback on documents. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200210/msg00085.html||Chair|
|11||Investigation||Postponed||Pick date for OASIS submission date after initial drafts available||Covered by issue 10. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200210/msg00085.html||Chair|
|12||Procedural||Closed||Remove all references to ws-routing and such||References were removed.||Closed|
|13||Technical||Closed||Element ordering in the Security tag.||Editors instructed to clarify. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200210/msg00085.html||Closed|
|14||Technical||Closed||State that the recipient SHOULD authenticate the assertion issuer and ensure that the assertion has not been modified||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||Closed|
|15||Technical||Closed||Core: Spec should indicate that it is based on the SOAP messaging model.||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||Closed|
|16||Technical||Closed||Core: The spec should indicate that nonce and / or timestamp elements should be used to prevent replay.||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200210/msg00085.html||Closed|
|17||Technical||Closed||Core: Should SOAP nodes acting in a particular role create or update the appropriate timestamp element.||Editors instructed to clarify. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200209/msg00094.html||Closed|
|18||Technical||Closed||Core: No attribute or reference to the senders time.||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200210/msg00085.html||Closed|
|19||Technical||Pending||Core: Why is it necessary to special case a Username/Password POP token?||Phil owes us a draft.||Ronald Monzillo
|20||Technical||Closed||Core: Define security token propagation.||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||
|21||Technical||Closed||Core: Update definition of a security token to reflect role in defining key or broaden definition.||Was related to 2 and 22. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200210/msg00127.html||
|22||Technical||Closed||Core: Should the spec preclude security tokens whose purpose is other than to convey or bind a key to an identity or entity?||Editors to clarify by added "entity" instead of "client". http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||
|23||Technical||Closed||Core: Make Proof-of-Possession a fundamental type or relationship within [sic] within the ws-security model?||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||Closed|
|24||Technical||Closed||Core: Why is it necessary to treat XML Signature elements as other than security tokens?||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||Closed|
Post Interop Draft
|Core: How can a Signature element occurring outside of the header be referenced?||Postponed for this draft.||Ronald Monzillo|
|26||Technical||Closed||Core: What does it mean to process a BinarySecurityToken?||Closed|
|27||Technical||Closed||Core: Reference element should have an @any to allow for attribute extensibility||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html||Closed|
|28||Technical||Pending||SAML Binding: Include the use of the URI attribute (on SecurityTokenReference) from the SS TC submission||
Ron sent revised doc. We have resolved other derived issues related to this - could close this, but need to point to others - Frederick pointed out that Ron's submission has extensive changes, which needs review.
|29||Technical||Closed||SAML Binding: Should there be a reference form that carries what amounts to a SAML assertion Query such that the sender does not need to have acquired the assertion (to be able to apply it to a request)?||Closed|
Post Interop Draft
|How should XML be explained.||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||Editors|
|31||Technical||Post Interop Draft||Should use OASIS Namespace||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||Chair|
|32||Technical||Closed||A couple of parameter values are prescribed (e.g. SHA-1 in the case of the password digest and “five minutes” in the case of message freshness). The specification should be flexible in these respects.||Closed in Draft 4 of Core specs. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html||Closed|
|33||Technical||Closed||The specification should prescribe clear behaviour for all parties in regard to freshness safeguards. And it should require that time values be enclosed in integrity mechanisms.||Closed in Draft 4 of Core specs. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html||Closed|
|34||Technical||Closed||<wsu:Created> appears to be just a convenient way for the originator to create a nonce. Therefore, it seems unnecessary to require processing different from that required for the <wsu:Nonce> element.||Closed in Draft 4 of Core specs. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html||Closed|
|35||Technical||Closed||Is it necessary to support the HexBinary encoding of tokens?||Closed in Draft 4 of Core specs. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html||Closed|
|36||Technical||Closed||In section 10.2.2, why not just specify that the <Created> element type be xsd:dateTime?||Closed|
|37||Technical||Closed||lines 193-195: Where does the threat of replay attacks belong to? To the first or the second group?||Closed in Draft 4 of Core specs. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html||Closed|
|38||Technical||Closed||line 238: Since this is a normative text, how "inappropriate claims" is defined here?||Pending owner’s examination of changes in Draft 4. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html||Closed|
|39||Technical||Closed||Lines 251-255: Since the UrenameToken element does not have password digest, what is the purpose of the Nonce and Created elements here?||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||Closed|
|40||Technical||Closed||Paragraphs in lines 535-537 and 538-540 repeat each other and one of them needs to be eliminated.||Closed. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00044.htm||Closed|
|41||Technical||Closed||Line 1016: what specification's section 4.5.3 does it refer to? The above text implies XML Encryption. It should be explicit.||Closed. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00044.htm||Closed|
|42||Technical||Closed||Line 1155: the meaning of "materially" is unclear.||Pending Konstantine’s review of current text. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html||Closed|
|43||Technical||Closed||Lines 1430, 1431: The clause "these elements be included in the signature" is unclear. What does "included in the signature" mean? Should they be signed?||Closed. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00044.htm||Closed|
|45||Technical||Closed||WS_Security Core, Draft 3 uses "Multiple trust domains" on Lines 114 and 141 but never defines this term. "End-to-end message level security" on line 141 is also not defined.||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200212/msg00037.html||Closed|
Postponed Pending QoP discussion
|WSDL definitions - It seems to me that a stand-alone specification should just define the semantics of its elements. If an application wants those semantics, then the application WSDL should specify the header as being required.||
Pending referral to ListServer discussion. http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00184.html
|47||Technical||Pending||Add example. Working Draft 3. Page 21, Section 7.1, lines 644-648, recommends that <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element should be used as direct children of <ds:KeyInfo> elements to retrieve signing and encryption certificate when using XML Signature and XML Encryption. Although in section 8.4, there is a XML Signature example for using <wsse:SecurityTokenReferences> element within the <ds:signature>'s <ds:KeyInfo> element, there is no examples provided to using SecurityTokenReference element for XML Encryption in section 9. E.g., Section 9.2 does have a <wsse:KeyIdentifier> contained within the <xenc:EncryptedKey> element. However, it does not have the <wsse:securityTokenReference> element encapsulating the <wsse:KeyIdentifier> as specified in section 7.3.||
Kelvin to send mail.
|48||Technical||Pending||Make URI attribute required. Working Draft 3. Page 22, Section 7.2, lines 662, indicates that SecurityTokenReference/Reference/@URI is an optional attribute. However, the corresponding XML Schema for WS-Security core specification does not explicitly specify the the attribute "URI" of the ReferenceType complex type as an optional attribute by use of "use=optional". I suggest that the URI attribute be required rather than be optional as stated on line 662.||
Kelvin to send mail.
|49||Technical||Pending||Working Draft 3. Page 26, Section 8.4, lines 852-856, indicates a specifialized type of <ds:KeyInfo> element that although is compatible with Section 7.1, I am concerned that the core specification is silent on the subject of acceptability of processing a signature element that uses an in-line X.509 data (representing, e.g., a signing certificate). What processing behaiour is expected from WS-Security compliant system that may receive a SOAP message that contains a signature element in its SOAP security header, i.e., <wsse:security>, that has a <ds:KeyInfo> element that does not contain <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element rather contains an in-line X509 data pertaining to the signing cert? I think the specification needs to clearl state that all <ds:KeyInfo> instances that contain in-line cert data are also acceptable in addition to <SecurityTokenReference> element option if indeed we are allowing such in-line X509 cert data type of KeyInfo element be part of signature elements. The motivation of using SecurityTokenReference is mostly in the use case where the same signing certificate, for example, may be used to generate multiple signature elements (i.e., when same signing cert is used for signing multiple SOAP message parts) within a <wsse:Security> header. Having specific wordings of minimum requirements of what a SOAP/WS-Security sending and receiving application must support w.r.t. KeyInfo elements will help in security interoperability tests.||
Kelvin to send mail.
|50||Technical||Pending||Sections 7.1 (beginning at line 617 of Draft 3 of the core) through 7.3 define the Security Token Reference Element, Direct References and Key Identifiers. I find the use of these varying forms of references confusing. Perhaps Direct References and Key Identifiers are the 2 forms of STRs, but it looks like there is also a n elemental form of STR that is neither a direct reference or a key identifier.||
Ron to review and provide feedback by next call
|51||Technical||Closed||The example beginning at line 637, seems to contain a "direct reference" (in the section on STRs), which makes thedistinction between STR's and direct references difficult (for me) to understand.||http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/wss/200211/msg00057.html||Closed|
|52||Technical||Pending||The example in section 3.4 (line 278) seems to have been set up to do a reference bywsu:id attribute value, although the reference is done by URI where the value of theURI is the attribute value. Is this the prefered use model? or would we expect a simpleSTR with a wsu:id value as apposed to a Direct reference/URI to be used? The description of key identifiers seems to imply that Direct references are theprefered form of reference, and where they cannot be used a key identifier isrecommended.||
Ron & Chris to clean up any text.
|53||Technical||Pending||Section 6.1 Usernames and Passwords, beginning at line 422, defines the
use of the <wsse:UsernameToken> element "as a way of providing a username
and optional password information". The definition of this tokenmakes no
mention of its potential value in defining the key to supportthe signing or
encryption of the attached SOAP message. I realize that the
core document is intended to serve as a framework, but it seems less thanobvious from the description that these tokens could be used to identifya signing (or encryption key); which perhaps is the most significant usecase that features such tokens.
The example in section 3.4 beginning at line 248, seems to depict the useof such tokens (as revealed by lines 299-300), as a means to carrya password derived signing key. However, the importance of this example,warrants further discussion in section 6.1.
Ron to work with Chris, Tony & PhilG on issue 53, and report by next week
|54||Technical||Closed||i) Lines 180 to 184: It is not clear to me whether this definition is meant to
describe a case of delegation where the client and sender are two different
entities or whether the sender is the channel acting on behalf or a
client. From the definition on lines 217 to 223 it appears that
delegation is not intended. Either way I believe this paragraph should be
ii) Line 294: Should read Lines (005) to (009) .
iii) Line 461: I believe that this line should read - "This required element specifies the username of the authenticated party or the party to be authenticated" NOT "of the authenticating party." A clarifying question - am I correct in believing that this specification does not intend to prohibit the receiving party from using the username and password to authenticate the client?
iv) Lines 534 & 535: I believe that these lines should read " ... binary or XML tokens ..", not just "binary tokens"
v) Lines 575 to 588: Are these lines needed since we RECOMMEND that Exclusive Canonicalization be used?
vi) Section 6.3.2: We say in the WSS-SAML specification to use the assertion id to reference SAML tokens, not to use the wsu:Id and license id for XrML? This section should state this and shouldn't unequivocally use "SHOULD" for the wsu:id attribute.
vii) Section 7.1 & 7.2: These sections also don't mention assertion id's for SAML and license id's for XrML.
viii) Section 7.4: This section only discusses BinarySecurityTokens. SAML also has a KeyInfo token.
i) to be corrected in drafts - pending.
ii) corrected in draft 4 of core specs - pending.
iii) need to correct draft - pending
|55||Technical||Closed||Is it really appropriate to endorse a claim via encryption? Perhaps line 209 in
should be changed to read: "that is digitally signed by the authority."
Editorial comment - the word "unendorse" can be misinterpreted as some sort of revocation.
I'd argue, remove it from line 208 ("A claim can be endorsed by a trusted authority.") and
then begin line 213 with "A claim may be trusted without explicit endorsement if there is ..."
Editorial - line 362 in 4.2, spell out "Post-Schema Validation InfoSet". I guess this last paragraph says that for non-schema aware processors, support for wsu:Id is optional but recommended? Wouldn't it be better to require support regardless of implementation?
|56||Technical||Pending||General issue with the use of the "utility" namespace for defining elements and attributes used in wsse. It has not been explicitly stated anywhere that I am aware of that the WS-Security TC is responsible for defining this namespace and its associated schema. WS-Security cannot just presume the existence of the utility namespace schema. ... If there is an expectation that "utility" is to be a truly general Web Services Utility namespace, then it may need to be defined by another TC with input from other Web Services-oriented bodies. But then, again, WSS won't be able to presume its existence at this time.||
Create new Appendix that provides explanation.
|57||Technical||Closed||[Section 4.2 and elsewhere] I do not see any value in using "wsu:Id" when the base XML schema ID Type is available. This is especially true since "wsu:Id" is simply defined in utility as just being of type "xsd:ID". I believe it can only lead to confusion (and minor additional processing overhead). I recommend removing the use of wsu:Id in vavor of the base xsd:ID.||
Related to 56.
|58||Technical||Closed||Various editorial comments||Closed|
|59||Technical||Open||Various editorial comments on XrML binding||Thomas DeMartini|
|60||Technical||Open||Proposal for processing rules. It seems that for certain bindings of WSS (SAML and XrML in particular) there may be a more straight-forward way of describing processing rules. Currently, the bindings for these have processing rules described under "proof-of-possession" (in other words, you start with the token and then try to figure out if there is proof of possession, without even knowing if you need to do that for the purposes of that message). Recall that SAML and XrML express, among other things, things like "A can do B upon C." A statement such as "A can do B upon C" doesn't have any inherent processing rules that need to be associated to it necessarily. A better way might be to look at the message. For instance, if the message is encrypted, we only need an identification of the key that can decrypt it, not a statement like "A can do B upon C." If the message is signed using a key (say k), we need to validate the signature (say it succeeds), check the semantics of the message (say that it is that Alice is requesting two tickets (to see a movie)), check that the request is fresh (say that it is), check that Alice is authenticated to k (say that she is), check that "Alice can request upon tickets" (say that she can), and, finally, process the request and generate the response. (Also, as Phill pointed out in his recent e-mail, we ought to also indicate where the callers should put -- and the receivers expect to find -- the tokens for each of these steps in order to avoid the cost of figuring out the chains on the server side.) In this way, it is clear what the intent and processing rules of the token are, once we establish that there is first some processing to determine what it is we are trying to prove with the tokens based on the message coming in. I think this is clearer rather than just looking at the tokens and explaining some of the things we can prove with them.||
Guillermo Lao to review with Thomas.
Proposed change in wording to address lines - in merged draft 8, 12 Dec 2002.
"An XML signature may also be used to prove that the claims in a token apply to the signer. Proving possession of a key associated with a token key claim supports applying the other token claims with the signer. The relying party acceptance of the claims may depend on confidence in the token integrity, such as validation of an authority signature on the token. Multiple tokens may have a key claim for a signature and may be referenced from the signature using a SecurityTokenReference. A key claim can be an X.509 Certificate token, or a Kerberos service ticket token to give two examples."
|63||Technical||Open||XML Token Wrapper||TC|
|65||Technical||Open||Adding support for biometric authentication to the UserName security token.||Is this pre-interop draft? Phil proposes adding an optional XCBFSecurityToken parameter to the current login and optional password parameters of the UserName security token.||TC
There are currently no additional notes on issues. In most cases the history of an issue can be easily determined by examining the linked meeting minutes or discussion message and/or previous versions of the issues list.
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