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Subject: Seciton 5 resolution (Sec Concerns)

Incomplete, but gives the jist...

Section 5:

Significant portions of this specification deal directly with security
properties, and shall not be summarized again here.  Rather, general
properties of security practices and know risks in resolution protocols are
well documented in many other specifications.  

DNS Spoofing
As this system is dependant on the DNS, one can not be sure that the 
one get back from DNS, and subsequently, the XRI resolution response, is no 
secure than original DNS query. To solve that, the use of DNSSEC [DNSSEC] for 
and verifying zones is to be recommended, and the use of trusted resolution as
defined in this specification or server authenticated HTTPS should be 
considered, when unambiguous and
authoritative responses are paramount. [aren't they always]

HTTP Security
Much of the security considerations set forth in HTTP/1.1 [RFC2616] apply to 
XRI Resolution protocols defined here.  Special consideration should be given 
proxy and caching behaviours to ensure accurate and reliable responses from 
resolution requests.  In particular, network topologies increasingly have 
transparent proxies, for various reasons, some of which may insert VIA and 
other headers as a consequence, or may even cache content without reguard to 
poper caching policies set for by the HTTP authority for a resource.

Caching Authorities
In addition to traditional HTTP chacing proxies, XRI resolution authority 
proxies may exist in the resolution topology.  these entities are especially 
instructed to take precautions against cache poisoning (as decribed in 
[RFC....]), as these caching entities may represent trust decision points 
within a deployments resolution architecture.

LookAhead and Proxy Resolution
- special trust considerations for in-network resolvers

Well-Know locations
- secure distribution of community root keys and authority URI's (perhaps
  trusted XRID?)
SAML Considerations

[DNSSEC] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC 2535, 
March 1999.

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