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Subject: Re: [xri] GCS Spoofing
I agree with Nat that it will definitely involve subjective judgment. Not only that, newer versions of Unicode may include more characters that resemble existing syntax characters, and we have to clarify how the specifications relate to the version of Unicode. After collecting all the characters that may resemble the syntax characters, it appears that most of the really obvious ones are already taken care of by NFKC. For example, U+FE61 (SMALL ASTERISK) is mapped to the regular U+002A (ASTERISK). The attached HTML highlights the NFKC-equivalent characters in red. Firefox handles much more glyphs than Internet Explorer. If someone tries to spoof an XRI authority by using one of these look-alike characters in an email link, for example, shouldn't the user agent convert the XRI reference to XRI-normal form (which contains the NFKC step), thereby mitigating the attack? I've been very loose when collecting these characters (I used a name-based search, which may not be extensive enough). Many of the characters listed are not a problem, but some do raise concerns. As Nat said, do we want to go down the slippery slope of banning the characters at spec-level rather than leaving as a recommendation to the client implementations? wil. Sakimura, Nat wrote: > Well, I agree to the point, but I am not quite sure if we can > effectively list all look-alikes. If we start doing that, people will > trust the "look-alikeness" and this means that we have to really careful > that we exclude all the look-alikes. There will be some subjective > judgement involved as well. This is not a trivial task. Is there a good > way of doing it? > > Nat > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Drummond Reed [mailto:drummond.reed@cordance.net] >> Sent: Monday, September 19, 2005 2:41 PM >> To: Sakimura, Nat; 'Chetan Sabnis' >> Cc: xri@lists.oasis-open.org >> Subject: RE: [xri] GCS Spoofing >> >> Nat, this is an extremely good point. I agree with you, >> that's the full-scale solution. >> >> However, I think that Wil's suggestion that we could actaully >> block the direct look-alike characters that would result in >> an "IDN-like" semantic attack on the GCS characters and other >> XRI delimiter characters (focusing particularly on @, =, +, >> !, *, and /) is still one we should look at closely. >> >> Even if these would be blocked/converted by NFKC, a semantic >> attacker would ignore that rule. So Wil's suggestion is that >> we disallow all Unicode homographs for the XRI delimiters >> from the IRI iunreserved set might make it easier for others >> in the XRI resolution chain (such as resolvers and >> browsers) to block such an attack. >> >> Wil (and everyone), on Friday's TC call it was agreed to add >> this issue as Issue #8 (IRI Authority Spoofing) Syntax change >> management page >> (http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/11852/xri-s >> yntax-v2.0-cd- >> 01.pdf). The proposal page is at: >> >> >> http://wiki.oasis-open.org/xri/Xri2Cd02/SynTax/I8IriAuthoritySpoofing >> >> Wil, the TC members wanted to know how many Unicode >> characters would be involved (i.e., what's the scope of >> eliminating these homographs at the XRI spec level?) And how >> long do you estimate it would take for you to create a list >> of these characters that could be excluded from the >> iunreserved production? >> >> Thanks - this was indeed a good catch. >> >> =Drummond >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Sakimura, Nat [mailto:n-sakimura@nri.co.jp] >> Sent: Sunday, September 18, 2005 9:48 AM >> To: Chetan Sabnis >> Cc: xri@lists.oasis-open.org >> Subject: RE: [xri] GCS Spoofing >> >> Actually, when it comes to internationalized characters, >> there are whole bunch of possibility on Visual-Look-Alike >> base spoofing. Forcing NFKC normalization would ease the >> problem a bit, but far from completely. >> IMHO, it has to be dealt with trust and reputation mechanism >> being coupled with client side support for the user so that >> user can view the trust level easily. >> >> Nat >> >> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Chetan Sabnis [mailto:chetan.sabnis@epok.net] >>> Sent: Friday, September 16, 2005 11:30 PM >>> Cc: xri@lists.oasis-open.org >>> Subject: Re: [xri] GCS Spoofing >>> >>> >>> Great find. I think the TC needs to address this in order >>> >> for XRIs to >> >>> be used as links in an email, as URIs would be used in an >>> >> email today. >> >>> The authority accessed by the resource needs to be be >>> >> well-understood >> >>> based on looking at the XRI if XRIs are indeed intended for human >>> viewing. I think this is not a GCS-only issue. It certainly seems >>> like the potential is there to spoof authorities in private >>> cross-reference domains as well. >>> >>> Forgive my ignorance, but does the IRI spec address this? It seems >>> like there might be some guidance there. >>> >>> Chetan >>> >>> William Tan wrote: >>> >>> >>>> The ABNF for XRI accommodates two types of authority: XRI >>>> >> authority >> >>>> and IRI authority. >>>> An XRI authority must begin with a GCS character: "!", "=", >>>> >>> "@", "+" >>> >>>> or "$". However, if the XRI reference begins with a >>>> >>> character that is >>> >>>> visually indistinguishable from one of the GCS >>>> >> characters, and the >> >>>> code point is allowed in the the "iunreserved" production, >>>> >>> a machine >>> >>>> processor would treat it as an IRI authority. This may be a >>>> >>> cause for >>> >>>> concern since it opens the door for spoofing. For example, >>>> >>> an actual >>> >>>> XRI may be: xri://@paypal*services/send-money >>>> >>>> and it could be spoofed (although not exactly) by using: >>>> >>>> xri://@paypal*services/send-money/sub.bad-domain.com/trustme.html >>>> >>>> And the "@" sign above is U+FE6B (small commercial at), "*" >>>> >>> is U+FE61 >>> >>>> (small asterisk), and the 4th and 5th "/" are U+2215 >>>> >>> (division slash). >>> >>>> In effect, the XRI would be interpreted as having an IRI >>>> >>> authority (an >>> >>>> IDN) of: >>>> >> "@paypal*services/send-money/sub.bad-domain.com". This is >> >>>> possible largely because IDNA allows the slash-like >>>> >> character in an >> >>>> IDN label, giving rise to the possibility of syntax spoofing. And >>>> because sub domains appear to right of their parent domains, the >>>> malicious domain can be created as a third (or higher) level sub >>>> domain so that it is outside of the registry's control. >>>> >>>> This is merely a subclass of syntax spoofing homograph >>>> >>> attacks on IDN >>> >>>> which applies to XRIs. >>>> >>>> I'm not sure where is the best place to address it, or if >>>> >> it would >> >>>> even be deemed a problem that the XRI TC would want to >>>> >> solve. If we >> >>>> do, there are at least ways to go about fixing it, at the >>>> >>> syntax level >>> >>>> (i.e. by mapping or limiting the use of GCS characters) or as a >>>> recommendation for XRI clients to disallow or warn the user of >>>> GCS-like characters appearing at the beginning of an XRI >>>> >> reference. >> >>>> wil. >>>> >>>> >>>> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >>>> To unsubscribe from this mail list, you must leave the >>>> >>> OASIS TC that >>> >>>> generates this mail. You may a link to this group and all >>>> >>> your TCs in >>> >>>> OASIS >>>> at: >>>> >>>> >> https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/portal/my_workgroups.php >> >>> >>> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >>> To unsubscribe from this mail list, you must leave the >>> >> OASIS TC that >> >>> generates this mail. You may a link to this group and all >>> >> your TCs in >> >>> OASIS >>> at: >>> https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/portal/my_workgr >>> oups.php >>> >>> >>> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >> To unsubscribe from this mail list, you must leave the OASIS >> TC that generates this mail. You may a link to this group >> and all your TCs in OASIS >> at: >> https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/portal/my_workgr >> oups.php >> >> >> >> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > To unsubscribe from this mail list, you must leave the OASIS TC that > generates this mail. You may a link to this group and all your TCs in OASIS > at: > https://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/portal/my_workgroups.php > > >Title: IRI Authority Spoofing
U+0040 @ COMMERCIAL AT U+FE6B ﹫ SMALL COMMERCIAL AT U+FF20 ＠ FULLWIDTH COMMERCIAL AT U+24D0 ⓐ CIRCLED LATIN SMALL LETTER A # mapped to U+0061 (LATIN SMALL LETTER A) BY NFKC
U+003D = EQUALS SIGN U+207C ⁼ SUPERSCRIPT EQUALS SIGN U+208C ₌ SUBSCRIPT EQUALS SIGN U+034C ͌ COMBINING ALMOST EQUAL TO ABOVE U+0347 ͇ COMBINING EQUALS SIGN BELOW U+2243 ≃ ASYMPTOTICALLY EQUAL TO U+2244 ≄ NOT ASYMPTOTICALLY EQUAL TO U+2245 ≅ APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO U+2246 ≆ APPROXIMATELY BUT NOT ACTUALLY EQUAL TO U+2247 ≇ NEITHER APPROXIMATELY NOR ACTUALLY EQUAL TO U+2248 ≈ ALMOST EQUAL TO U+2249 ≉ NOT ALMOST EQUAL TO U+224A ≊ ALMOST EQUAL OR EQUAL TO U+224C ≌ ALL EQUAL TO U+2251 ≑ GEOMETRICALLY EQUAL TO U+2252 ≒ APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO OR THE IMAGE OF U+2253 ≓ IMAGE OF OR APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO U+2254 ≔ COLON EQUALS U+2255 ≕ EQUALS COLON U+2256 ≖ RING IN EQUAL TO U+2257 ≗ RING EQUAL TO U+225B ≛ STAR EQUALS U+225C ≜ DELTA EQUAL TO U+225D ≝ EQUAL TO BY DEFINITION U+225F ≟ QUESTIONED EQUAL TO U+2260 ≠ NOT EQUAL TO U+2261 ≡ IDENTICAL TO U+2264 ≤ LESS-THAN OR EQUAL TO U+2265 ≥ GREATER-THAN OR EQUAL TO U+2266 ≦ LESS-THAN OVER EQUAL TO U+2267 ≧ GREATER-THAN OVER EQUAL TO U+2268 ≨ LESS-THAN BUT NOT EQUAL TO U+2269 ≩ GREATER-THAN BUT NOT EQUAL TO U+2270 ≰ NEITHER LESS-THAN NOR EQUAL TO U+2271 ≱ NEITHER GREATER-THAN NOR EQUAL TO U+227C ≼ PRECEDES OR EQUAL TO U+227D ≽ SUCCEEDS OR EQUAL TO U+227E ≾ PRECEDES OR EQUIVALENT TO U+227F ≿ SUCCEEDS OR EQUIVALENT TO U+2286 ⊆ SUBSET OF OR EQUAL TO U+2287 ⊇ SUPERSET OF OR EQUAL TO U+2288 ⊈ NEITHER A SUBSET OR NOR EQUAL TO U+2289 ⊉ NEITHER A SUPERSET OF NOR EQUAL TO U+228A ⊊ SUBSET OF WITH NOT EQUAL TO U+228B ⊋ SUPERSET OF WITH NOT EQUAL TO U+2291 ⊑ SQUARE IMAGE OF OR EQUAL TO U+2292 ⊒ SQUARE ORIGINAL OF OR EQUAL TO U+229C ⊜ CIRCLED EQUALS U+22B4 ⊴ NORMAL SUBGROUP OF OR EQUAL TO U+22B5 ⊵ CONTAINS AS NORMAL SUBGROUP OR EQUAL TO U+22CD ⋍ REVERSE TILDE EQUALS U+22D5 ⋕ EQUAL AND PARALLEL TO U+22DA ⋚ LESS-THAN EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN U+22DB ⋛ GREATER-THAN EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN U+22DC ⋜ EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN U+22DD ⋝ EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN U+22DE ⋞ EQUAL TO OR PRECEDES U+22DF ⋟ EQUAL TO OR SUCCEEDS U+22E0 ⋠ DOES NOT PRECEDE OR EQUAL U+22E1 ⋡ DOES NOT SUCCEED OR EQUAL U+22E2 ⋢ NOT SQUARE IMAGE OF OR EQUAL TO U+22E3 ⋣ NOT SQUARE ORIGINAL OF OR EQUAL TO U+22E4 ⋤ SQUARE IMAGE OF OR NOT EQUAL TO U+22E5 ⋥ SQUARE ORIGINAL OF OR NOT EQUAL TO U+22EC ⋬ NOT NORMAL SUBGROUP OF OR EQUAL TO U+22ED ⋭ DOES NOT CONTAIN AS NORMAL SUBGROUP OR EQUAL U+2338 ⌸ APL FUNCTIONAL SYMBOL QUAD EQUAL U+236F ⍯ APL FUNCTIONAL SYMBOL QUAD NOT EQUAL U+2971 ⥱ EQUALS SIGN ABOVE RIGHTWARDS ARROW U+2975 ⥵ RIGHTWARDS ARROW ABOVE ALMOST EQUAL TO U+29E3 ⧣ EQUALS SIGN AND SLANTED PARALLEL U+29E4 ⧤ EQUALS SIGN AND SLANTED PARALLEL WITH TILDE ABOVE U+2A66 ⩦ EQUALS SIGN WITH DOT BELOW U+2A6E ⩮ EQUALS WITH ASTERISK U+2A6F ⩯ ALMOST EQUAL TO WITH CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT U+2A70 ⩰ APPROXIMATELY EQUAL OR EQUAL TO U+2A71 ⩱ EQUALS SIGN ABOVE PLUS SIGN U+2A72 ⩲ PLUS SIGN ABOVE EQUALS SIGN U+2A73 ⩳ EQUALS SIGN ABOVE TILDE OPERATOR U+2A74 ⩴ DOUBLE COLON EQUAL U+2A75 ⩵ TWO CONSECUTIVE EQUALS SIGNS U+2A76 ⩶ THREE CONSECUTIVE EQUALS SIGNS U+2A77 ⩷ EQUALS SIGN WITH TWO DOTS ABOVE AND TWO DOTS BELOW U+2A7D ⩽ LESS-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO U+2A7E ⩾ GREATER-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO U+2A7F ⩿ LESS-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT INSIDE U+2A80 ⪀ GREATER-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT INSIDE U+2A81 ⪁ LESS-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE U+2A82 ⪂ GREATER-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE U+2A83 ⪃ LESS-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE RIGHT U+2A84 ⪄ GREATER-THAN OR SLANTED EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE LEFT U+2A87 ⪇ LESS-THAN AND SINGLE-LINE NOT EQUAL TO U+2A88 ⪈ GREATER-THAN AND SINGLE-LINE NOT EQUAL TO U+2A8B ⪋ LESS-THAN ABOVE DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL ABOVE GREATER-THAN U+2A8C ⪌ GREATER-THAN ABOVE DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL ABOVE LESS-THAN U+2A8D ⪍ LESS-THAN ABOVE SIMILAR OR EQUAL U+2A8E ⪎ GREATER-THAN ABOVE SIMILAR OR EQUAL U+2A91 ⪑ LESS-THAN ABOVE GREATER-THAN ABOVE DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL U+2A92 ⪒ GREATER-THAN ABOVE LESS-THAN ABOVE DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL U+2A93 ⪓ LESS-THAN ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL ABOVE GREATER-THAN ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL U+2A94 ⪔ GREATER-THAN ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL ABOVE LESS-THAN ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL U+2A95 ⪕ SLANTED EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN U+2A96 ⪖ SLANTED EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN U+2A97 ⪗ SLANTED EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN WITH DOT INSIDE U+2A98 ⪘ SLANTED EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN WITH DOT INSIDE U+2A99 ⪙ DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN U+2A9A ⪚ DOUBLE-LINE EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN U+2A9B ⪛ DOUBLE-LINE SLANTED EQUAL TO OR LESS-THAN U+2A9C ⪜ DOUBLE-LINE SLANTED EQUAL TO OR GREATER-THAN U+2A9F ⪟ SIMILAR ABOVE LESS-THAN ABOVE EQUALS SIGN U+2AA0 ⪠ SIMILAR ABOVE GREATER-THAN ABOVE EQUALS SIGN U+2AA8 ⪨ LESS-THAN CLOSED BY CURVE ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL U+2AA9 ⪩ GREATER-THAN CLOSED BY CURVE ABOVE SLANTED EQUAL U+2AAC ⪬ SMALLER THAN OR EQUAL TO U+2AAD ⪭ LARGER THAN OR EQUAL TO U+2AAE ⪮ EQUALS SIGN WITH BUMPY ABOVE U+2AAF ⪯ PRECEDES ABOVE SINGLE-LINE EQUALS SIGN U+2AB0 ⪰ SUCCEEDS ABOVE SINGLE-LINE EQUALS SIGN U+2AB1 ⪱ PRECEDES ABOVE SINGLE-LINE NOT EQUAL TO U+2AB2 ⪲ SUCCEEDS ABOVE SINGLE-LINE NOT EQUAL TO U+2AB3 ⪳ PRECEDES ABOVE EQUALS SIGN U+2AB4 ⪴ SUCCEEDS ABOVE EQUALS SIGN U+2AB5 ⪵ PRECEDES ABOVE NOT EQUAL TO U+2AB6 ⪶ SUCCEEDS ABOVE NOT EQUAL TO U+2AB7 ⪷ PRECEDES ABOVE ALMOST EQUAL TO U+2AB8 ⪸ SUCCEEDS ABOVE ALMOST EQUAL TO U+2AB9 ⪹ PRECEDES ABOVE NOT ALMOST EQUAL TO U+2ABA ⪺ SUCCEEDS ABOVE NOT ALMOST EQUAL TO U+2AC3 ⫃ SUBSET OF OR EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE U+2AC4 ⫄ SUPERSET OF OR EQUAL TO WITH DOT ABOVE U+2AC5 ⫅ SUBSET OF ABOVE EQUALS SIGN U+2AC6 ⫆ SUPERSET OF ABOVE EQUALS SIGN U+2AC9 ⫉ SUBSET OF ABOVE ALMOST EQUAL TO U+2ACA ⫊ SUPERSET OF ABOVE ALMOST EQUAL TO U+2ACB ⫋ SUBSET OF ABOVE NOT EQUAL TO U+2ACC ⫌ SUPERSET OF ABOVE NOT EQUAL TO U+2AD1 ⫑ CLOSED SUBSET OR EQUAL TO U+2AD2 ⫒ CLOSED SUPERSET OR EQUAL TO U+2AF9 ⫹ DOUBLE-LINE SLANTED LESS-THAN OR EQUAL TO U+2AFA ⫺ DOUBLE-LINE SLANTED GREATER-THAN OR EQUAL TO U+FE66 ﹦ SMALL EQUALS SIGN U+FF1D ＝ FULLWIDTH EQUALS SIGN
U+002B + PLUS SIGN U+00B1 ± PLUS-MINUS SIGN U+02D6 ˖ MODIFIER LETTER PLUS SIGN U+031F ̟ COMBINING PLUS SIGN BELOW U+1429 ᐩ CANADIAN SYLLABICS FINAL PLUS U+207A ⁺ SUPERSCRIPT PLUS SIGN U+208A ₊ SUBSCRIPT PLUS SIGN U+2213 ∓ MINUS-OR-PLUS SIGN U+2214 ∔ DOT PLUS U+2295 ⊕ CIRCLED PLUS U+229E ⊞ SQUARED PLUS U+27F4 ⟴ RIGHT ARROW WITH CIRCLED PLUS U+293D ⤽ TOP ARC ANTICLOCKWISE ARROW WITH PLUS U+2945 ⥅ RIGHTWARDS ARROW WITH PLUS BELOW U+2946 ⥆ LEFTWARDS ARROW WITH PLUS BELOW U+29FA ⧺ DOUBLE PLUS U+29FB ⧻ TRIPLE PLUS U+2A01 ⨁ N-ARY CIRCLED PLUS OPERATOR U+2A04 ⨄ N-ARY UNION OPERATOR WITH PLUS U+2A22 ⨢ PLUS SIGN WITH SMALL CIRCLE ABOVE U+2A23 ⨣ PLUS SIGN WITH CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT ABOVE U+2A24 ⨤ PLUS SIGN WITH TILDE ABOVE U+2A25 ⨥ PLUS SIGN WITH DOT BELOW U+2A26 ⨦ PLUS SIGN WITH TILDE BELOW U+2A27 ⨧ PLUS SIGN WITH SUBSCRIPT TWO U+2A28 ⨨ PLUS SIGN WITH BLACK TRIANGLE U+2A2D ⨭ PLUS SIGN IN LEFT HALF CIRCLE U+2A2E ⨮ PLUS SIGN IN RIGHT HALF CIRCLE U+2A39 ⨹ PLUS SIGN IN TRIANGLE U+2A71 ⩱ EQUALS SIGN ABOVE PLUS SIGN U+2A72 ⩲ PLUS SIGN ABOVE EQUALS SIGN U+2ABF ⪿ SUBSET WITH PLUS SIGN BELOW U+2AC0 ⫀ SUPERSET WITH PLUS SIGN BELOW U+FB29 ﬩ HEBREW LETTER ALTERNATIVE PLUS SIGN U+FE62 ﹢ SMALL PLUS SIGN U+FF0B ＋ FULLWIDTH PLUS SIGN U+1D144 𝅄 MUSICAL SYMBOL PLUS NOTEHEAD
U+002A * ASTERISK U+0359 ͙ COMBINING ASTERISK BELOW U+204E ⁎ LOW ASTERISK U+2051 ⁑ TWO ASTERISKS ALIGNED VERTICALLY U+2217 ∗ ASTERISK OPERATOR U+229B ⊛ CIRCLED ASTERISK OPERATOR U+2722 ✢ FOUR TEARDROP-SPOKED ASTERISK U+2723 ✣ FOUR BALLOON-SPOKED ASTERISK U+2724 ✤ HEAVY FOUR BALLOON-SPOKED ASTERISK U+2725 ✥ FOUR CLUB-SPOKED ASTERISK U+2731 ✱ HEAVY ASTERISK U+2732 ✲ OPEN CENTRE ASTERISK U+2733 ✳ EIGHT SPOKED ASTERISK U+273A ✺ SIXTEEN POINTED ASTERISK U+273B ✻ TEARDROP-SPOKED ASTERISK U+273C ✼ OPEN CENTRE TEARDROP-SPOKED ASTERISK U+273D ✽ HEAVY TEARDROP-SPOKED ASTERISK U+2743 ❃ HEAVY TEARDROP-SPOKED PINWHEEL ASTERISK U+2749 ❉ BALLOON-SPOKED ASTERISK U+274A ❊ EIGHT TEARDROP-SPOKED PROPELLER ASTERISK U+274B ❋ HEAVY EIGHT TEARDROP-SPOKED PROPELLER ASTERISK U+29C6 ⧆ SQUARED ASTERISK U+2A6E ⩮ EQUALS WITH ASTERISK U+FE61 ﹡ SMALL ASTERISK U+FF0A ＊ FULLWIDTH ASTERISK
U+0024 $ DOLLAR SIGN U+FE69 ﹩ SMALL DOLLAR SIGN U+FF04 ＄ FULLWIDTH DOLLAR SIGN
U+0021 ! EXCLAMATION MARK U+00A1 ¡ INVERTED EXCLAMATION MARK U+01C3 ǃ LATIN LETTER RETROFLEX CLICK U+055C ՜ ARMENIAN EXCLAMATION MARK U+1944 ᥄ LIMBU EXCLAMATION MARK U+203C ‼ DOUBLE EXCLAMATION MARK U+203D ‽ INTERROBANG U+2048 ⁈ QUESTION EXCLAMATION MARK U+2049 ⁉ EXCLAMATION QUESTION MARK U+2762 ❢ HEAVY EXCLAMATION MARK ORNAMENT U+2763 ❣ HEAVY HEART EXCLAMATION MARK ORNAMENT U+FE15 ︕ PRESENTATION FORM FOR VERTICAL EXCLAMATION MARK U+FE57 ﹗ SMALL EXCLAMATION MARK U+FF01 ！ FULLWIDTH EXCLAMATION MARK
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