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Subject: Re: [xri] Thoughts on XRD-to-resource cardinality
I guess I was considering the case where some consumer does a "discovery" request on the URL http://www.theboot.com/stories/today/top5.html. By default, as I understand it, in a one-to-one mapping of XRD to resource, that URL would have no XRD and discovery would fail. Isn't this the use case that Brian was referring to on the conf call yesterday? not wanting to have to generate an XRD for every single URL in a large site? I probably confused things by referencing multiple classes of use cases in the example. I see the following as important... 1. Site delegation to OpenID RP SaaS provider 2. Identity in the browser support 3. OAuth endpoints (or instance in order to access a protected [e.g. user's play list] resource) All of the above should be discoverable from any URL at the site. If discovery flow implies to walk up the path until you find an XRD, then this wouldn't really be necessary. But if that's the case, then I don't understand the use case Brian mentioned on the phone. I assumed that the one XRD to many resources issue was about describing the meta-data for all those resources. For example, all the photo related URL on this site are protected by one XRD that defines the link to the OAuth endpoints where authorization is required before access is granted. Thanks, George John Bradley wrote: > George, > > On your example I don't quite get why theboot.org needs to do anything > special to delegate its RP functionality. > Yes it needs to have the correct return to URI in the site XRD as it > needs to now in its XRDS. > > I don't see any requirement to add link headers to all the pages > unless we are talking about some sort of identity in the browser > application. > > Are you talking about theboot.org providing OP services to its users > via there home pages and delegating that to a third party? > > I see that as being the use case for delegating the XRD while still > wanting to maintain https://theboot.com/user as the openID claimed ID. > > =jbradley > > On 28-Jan-09, at 1:09 PM, George Fletcher wrote: > >> I too am trying to work through the trust issues with HTTP >> resolution. I'm interested in how the DNS trust profile can help. >> Here is a concrete (though hypothetical) use case... >> >> -------- >> A web site (theboot.com; country music content site) supports OpenID >> authentication via a delegated service implementing the OpenID >> Relying Party support. The web site also supports OAuth access to a >> user's comments and favorite music lists created as part of the site. >> >> To Brian's point on the conf call, theboot.com doesn't want to >> generate XRD's for every resource on the site so uses the Link header >> mechanism to specify a "uncommitted" XRD for the entire site. In this >> "uncommitted" XRD there is neither a CanonicalID or EquivID element >> because neither make sense. (Note that this may be better solved with >> /site-meta. Maybe the Link header could point directly to the >> site-meta with a different rel= value?). >> >> The XRD references related resources for OpenID authentication, OAuth >> endpoints and maybe the IdentityInTheBrowser endpoints. >> --------- >> >> As an invoker of services at this web site, I'd like to know with >> some assurance that the XRD pointed at by the Link header is >> "authoritative" for the URI used to discover it. Even if the XRD is >> signed, the Consumer doesn't have any way to determine if that signer >> is authoritative for the initial URI. >> >> Would it make sense to allow for an optional <TrustURIMap> element in >> the XRD that establishes some level of trust by requiring that both >> the initial resource URI and the signing Subject/SubjectAltName match >> the <TrustURIMap>? >> >> If "trust" is not required or supported by the site, then the >> <TrustURIMap> would not be present and the Consumer would need to >> determine what to do. Determining whether the <TrustURIMap> is >> "specific" enough to provide a reasonable level of trust is out of >> scope for the spec and must be determined by the Consumer. >> >> Thanks, >> George >> >> >> Peter Davis wrote: >>> >>> this approach makes sense to me. On the trust profile topic, >>> however, it's not clear to me how, in HTTP resolution mode, we can >>> establish any bonding between the resource identifier and the XRD >>> signing key. >>> >>> Having said that, I am preparing to publish my DNS trust profile, >>> which might ease this situation. I'll drop a note on the list when >>> I've got it written up on the wiki. >>> >>> =peterd >>> >>> On Jan 28, 2009, at 1:21 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: >>> >>> > This is an interesting idea but I am not sure we need to go this > >>> far. Brian, Breno, Dirk, and I had an interesting conversation about >>> > this today. >>> > >>> > Ignoring the theoretical ideas and focusing on actual use cases, >>> we > have some clear requirements: >>> > >>> > 1. Allow multiple resources to point (link) to a single XRD (with >>> a > single URI). >>> > 2. Allow an XRD to clearly state its subject. >>> > 3. Allow an XRD to establish its authority (via trust) to make > >>> claims about its subject. >>> > 4. Allow an XRD to declare how a set of URIs relate to each other >>> > (equiv, canonical, etc). >>> > >>> > There is no clear use case for an XRD to: >>> > >>> > 5. Allow an XRD to state multiple subjects, unrelated to one another. >>> > 6. Allow multiple entities (certificates) to sing a single XRD. >>> > >>> > --- >>> > >>> > Here is how each can be addressed. Define the following XRD-level >>> > elements (straw man names): >>> > >>> > CanonicalURI - the canonical identifier of the XRD subject >>> resource > (0 or 1). >>> > EquivURI - an alias of the subject resource, a different URI to >>> the > same resource (0 or more). >>> > >>> > 1. While resources can share any XRD, even with a stated subject, >>> it > will probably fail trust verification in most applications if >>> the > URI being discovered is not listed in one of the two URI >>> elements > above. I think we should name the kind of XRD that has no >>> URI > subject declared internally, and has its subject derived from >>> the > URI being discovered pointing to it. A sort of "uncommitted" XRD. >>> > >>> > 2. The XRD can use any combination of the URI elements to declare >>> > its subject. Usually if it contains a single URI, it will use the >>> > CanonicalURI, and if more than one, it can have one canonical and >>> > many equiv, or just many equiv without clearly choosing a canonical. >>> > >>> > 3. To make trust simple enough, there has to be a connection >>> between > the XRD subject and the subject of the certificate used to >>> sign it. > In theory, any one of the URIs can be signed, including >>> an non- >>> > canonical one. But usually the canonical URI will be the one signed. >>> > >>> > 4. The clear meaning of the two URI elements allow declaring how > >>> multiple URI relate to one another, while the XRD describes a single >>> > resource. >>> > >>> > --- >>> > >>> > This approach simply adds to what we have today the explicit >>> ability > to not state the subject of an XRD, and allow such >>> uncommitted > descriptor to be used by multiple resources. >>> > >>> > We should discuss the elements names (I am not against the current >>> > ___ID elements, but they don't translate well to the non-identity >>> > use cases, even if the ID maps to the I in URI...), as well as >>> more > such URI relationships at the XRD level. >>> > >>> > EHL >>> > >>> > >>> >> -----Original Message----- >>> >> From: Drummond Reed [mailto:drummond.reed@cordance.net] >>> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2009 10:00 PM >>> >> To: 'XRI TC' >>> >> Subject: [xri] Thoughts on XRD-to-resource cardinality >>> >> >>> >> I will be offline Thursday and Friday travelling to a memorial, so I >>> >> want to >>> >> contribute here on the list to advance today's discussion about >>> >> XRD-to-resource mapping >>> >> (http://wiki.oasis-open.org/xri/SelfServeAgenda#head- >>> >> a4044b7035eb441c2674549 >>> >> d07ccaf27daed8970). >>> >> >>> >> As I said on the call, the concept of a one-to-many mapping >>> between >> an >>> >> XRD >>> >> and the resources it describes is a mind-expander for those of us who >>> >> have >>> >> been living a one-XRD-to-one-resource worldview for a few years now. >>> >> But the >>> >> use case -- being able to get and cache one XRD to describe >> >>> potentially >>> >> a >>> >> very large number of resources (such as an entire site) is >> >>> compelling. >>> >> >>> >> Under a one-to-many mapping, I believe Eran's right that the >> >>> concept of >>> >> asserting a synonym (not just CanonicalID but any synonym) pretty >>> >> much >>> >> goes >>> >> away. The only synonym assertion I could see providing is some >>> form >> of >>> >> aliasing template that would apply to the URIs of all the described >>> >> resources (e.g., every that maps to the http://foo.example.com/* >>> >> template >>> >> can all be mapped to the http://bar.example.com/* template). >>> >> >>> >> But that appears to be of limited use, and probably not >>> appropriate >> for >>> >> assigning CanonicalIDs (which is usually a mapping from a >> >>> reassignable >>> >> to a >>> >> persistent identifier). >>> >> >>> >> But the rest of the XRD metadata and Link metadata still seems >>> >> appropriate, >>> >> i.e., it applies as much to an individual resource (one-to-one >> >>> mapping) >>> >> as >>> >> it does to a group of resources (one-to-many mapping). >>> >> >>> >> So what I'm wondering is if maybe there should be a clear way of >>> >> indicating >>> >> the cardinality of the XRD. In other words, a child element of >>> the >> root >>> >> XRD >>> >> element that indicates whether it is it an individual XRD (one-to-one >>> >> mapping) or a group XRD (one-to-many mapping). >>> >> >>> >> If there was a choice between two mutually exclusive options for that >>> >> child >>> >> element, then all the other elements that are appropriate only >>> for >> one >>> >> or >>> >> the other (CanonicalID, EquivID, URIMap, etc.) could follow as >> >>> children >>> >> of >>> >> that element. >>> >> >>> >> Here's a simple example using the element names <Resource> and >>> >> <ResourceGroup>: >>> >> >>> >> INDIVIDUAL XRD: >>> >> >>> >> <XRD> >>> >> <Expires>2009-01-01T08:30:00Z</Expires> >>> >> <Resource> >>> >> <CanonicalID>http://example.com/resource/1</CanonicalID> >>> >> <EquivID>http://example.net/resource/1</EquivID> >>> >> </Resource> >>> >> <Type>http://example.com/type/profile_photo</Type> >>> >> >>> >> <Link> >>> >> <URI>http://example.com/resource/2</URI> >>> >> <Rel>http://example.com/rel/profile</Rel> >>> >> </Link> >>> >> </XRD> >>> >> >>> >> GROUP XRD: >>> >> >>> >> <XRD> >>> >> <Expires>2009-01-01T08:30:00Z</Expires> >>> >> <ResourceGroup> >>> >> <URIMap>http://example.com/resource/*</URIMap> >>> >> </ResourceGroup> >>> >> <Type>http://example.com/type/photos</Type> >>> >> >>> >> <Link> >>> >> <URI>http://example.com/service/1</URI> >>> >> <Rel>http://example.com/rel/some-group-service</Rel> >>> >> </Link> >>> >> </XRD> >>> >> >>> >> Thoughts? >>> >> >>> >> =Drummond >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >> To unsubscribe from this mail list, you must leave the OASIS TC that >>> >> generates this mail. 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