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Subject: RE: [xri] Re: The elements formerly known as TargetAuthority and TargetSubject
Nat Sakimura wrote on 2009-07-02: > 1. Root XRD Trust > > The starting XRD, in this case, XRD1 MUST be signed in such a way that > > Case B) : Third Party X.509 Certificate > In this case, XRD/ds:KeyInfo/X509Data/ must somehow related to > XRD/Subject. <<<< This needs to be defined! I totally agree, but would also caution that it seems to me you're all biting off an awful big job here. This amounts to defining a PKI with Naming Constraints, something that has pretty much failed elsewhere, so is that really in scope to do here? Should it be left to subsequent profiling? > 2. Delegation > > For delegation, besides XRD2's integrity is ok as in 1. above, I'm having trouble understanding one piece of this...what is the original/delegating XRD signed with? The same key that signs XRD2? It has to be signed with something (or authenticated some other way) or this isn't useful. If I can attack the original document, I can just point it my XRD. > Case A) If XRD1/Link has Subject, > XRD1/Link/Subject MUST match XRD2/Subject > > Case B) Else > XRD1/Link/ds:KeyInfo == XRD2/ds:KeyInfo > > <<<< OR shall we just say that > pub key in the XRD1/Link/ds:KeyInfo > == pub key in the XRD2/ds:KeyInfo ? I think it's the same as my earlier concern...that's an awfully big piece of work to take on. My only other comment on Drummond's text was that I would suggest against trying to profile ds:KeyName into some XRD-specific meaning. If you want to identify an <xrd:Subject> as a way of identifying a key, just put that element directly into <ds:KeyInfo> (it's extensible). -- Scott
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