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Subject: RE: Anonymity, Secrecy, Privacy
Hi Kevin, My understanding is that the issues you are refering to are better termed as "secrecy" - specifically, protecting the content of the votes. "Privacy", on the other hand, has to do with a voter's ability to cast a vote without been sneaked upon ( i.e. nobody looking over the voter's shoulder). Consequently (if we agree on these terms), "Secrecy" has implications on the token structure, and "Privacy" doesn't. << And just in case :) - "Voter' Anonymity" is the ability to include some info about the voter's identity into a token, without revealing the identity to an unauthorized party >> > -----Original Message----- > From: Kevin Broadfoot > Sent: Tuesday, 26 June 2001 23:23 > To: Michael Zolotarev > Cc: 'election-services@lists.oasis-open.org' > Subject: RE: Anonymity, Secrecy, Privacy > > > Hi Michael, > > >Privacy: > >Obviously privacy is a critical issue to consider when > talking about election process in general, as Kevin rightly > noted. >But I don't think that privacy issues should have any > implication to the tokens. > > I'm not so sure. In most jurisdictions I'm familiar with > privacy and data protection legislation would kick in as soon > as the voted ballot document was transmitted irrespective of > whether it was encrypted or not. Of course the legislation > could be amended but as it presently stands.... > > Also, in the US, in some jurisdictions I've been looking at > the election administrators keep digital voting history > records, ie. whether a voter turned up at the polling place > or not. In those cases it is possible to say who voted but > not how they voted. > > regards, > > Kevin. > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Thom Wysong [mailto:wysong@technodemocracy.org] > > Sent: Monday, 25 June 2001 23:56 > > To: > > Subject: Anonymity, Secrecy, Privacy > > > > > > > > Kevin, > > > > This is interesting. I don't think I've heard this > > distinction before, so > > let's see if I correctly understand what you are saying > > (http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/election-services/200106 > /msg00042.html). > > (+) For anonymity, there is no link between voter and ballot. > Or, if there > is one at some point in the voting process, it is destroyed > before the > voting process is concluded. > > (+) For secrecy, there may or may not be a voter/ballot link. > If that link > exists, however, it is not revealed - thus the ballot remains secret. > > (+) For privacy, at a polling place, *who* is voting may be > known, but > *how* they vote is kept private. > > You seem to be saying that the important thing is that > ballots be kept > *secret*, regardless of whether or not they are *anonymous*. > > IMO, *secrecy* and *privacy* are more or less synonymous when > it comes to > how they're used with regards to electronic voting (ignoring > what *privacy* > means in a physical polling place, since that's beyond our scope). > > However, as you seem to suggest, *anonymity* is only one way > to implement > secrecy/privacy. > > Any thoughts? > > -Thom > > > > This footnote confirms that this email message has been swept by > MIMEsweeper for the presence of computer viruses. > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > --------------------------------------------------- > The information contained in this message is confidential and > is intended > for the addressee(s) only. If you have received this message > in error or > there are any problems please notify the originator immediately. The > unauthorized use, disclosure, copying or alteration of this > message is > strictly forbidden. Baltimore Technologies plc will not be > liable for direct, > special, indirect or consequential damages arising from > alteration of the > contents of this message by a third party or as a result of > any virus being > passed on. > > In addition, certain Marketing collateral may be added from > time to time to > promote Baltimore Technologies products, services, Global > e-Security or > appearance at trade shows and conferences. > > This footnote confirms that this email message has been swept by > Baltimore MIMEsweeper for Content Security threats, including > computer viruses. >
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