RE: [ebxml-cppa] **VOTE** BPSS/CPPA issue - #21 (old)

[Dale Moberg <dmoberg@cyclonecommerce.com>]

I think this terminology adjustment makes the BPSS
options align better with the security policy
distinctions in Ralph B's Appendix in ebMS. Also
the distinctions seem to be ones that reflect
typical business concerns with security, and leave
the mechanisms whereby these business policies 
are obtained open to implementation agreement,
working within the capabilities of the systems
that will interoperate. 

I still think we have a ways to go before
we have a fully adequate way to 
represent security policy components,
and ordering of their strengths, that
would permit automated reasoning about
security policy acceptability. Maybe 2.0.

In practice, those capabilities may force a
downgrade in what is actually agreed to-- for
example, maybe data confidentiality can only
be interorperably realized on the transient
SSL basis. Nevertheless, since these values
are to indicate what is strongly recommended
for a BP, the Ferris semantic of saying
"at least as strong as" seems reasonable to me.

Whether the spec mentions it or not, people will still
implement the best they can do, even if
it falls short of the mandated policy. And
this may even be reasonable, based on their
threat and potential harm assessments.


-----Original Message-----
From: Martin W Sachs [mailto:mwsachs@us.ibm.com]
Sent: Thursday, December 13, 2001 8:53 PM
To: David Smiley
Cc: ebTWG-BPS; ebXML-CPPA
Subject: Re: [ebxml-cppa] **VOTE** BPSS/CPPA issue - #21 (old)



I abstain on this proposal.

Reason for abstention: I would prefer a proposal that allows the pair of
partners to downgrade or turn off security as well as to update the
level
of security.

Regards,
Marty

************************************************************************
*************

Martin W. Sachs
IBM T. J. Watson Research Center
P. O. B. 704
Yorktown Hts, NY 10598
914-784-7287;  IBM tie line 863-7287
Notes address:  Martin W Sachs/Watson/IBM
Internet address:  mwsachs @ us.ibm.com
************************************************************************
*************



David Smiley <dsmiley@mercator.com> on 12/13/2001 10:26:04 AM

To:    ebTWG-BPS <ebtwg-bps@lists.ebtwg.org>, ebXML-CPPA
       <ebxml-cppa@lists.oasis-open.org>
cc:
Subject:    [ebxml-cppa] **VOTE** BPSS/CPPA issue - #21 (old)



No substantive responses have been received that require
modifying the proposed change to the specification.

Your vote is needed.

**Do you agree with the proposed change?**

FYI,
Once approved, the resolution goes into the
BPSS Issues Log (Pallavi). Then, an editor will be assigned
to make the changes to the spec prescribed by the resolution.

*************************************************************Old/New
issue:
Old
Re-numbered for V1.1: 21
Number: 57
Date: 4/4
Originator: Christopher Ferris
Line: Lines 1081-1100

Issue:

I am still quite uncomfortable with this scheme. It does not
permit a degree of flexibility that allows for a combination
of persistent and transient security mechanisms. For instance,
use of a persistent digital signature over the contents of
the message (or on selected parts) to provide for authentication
as well as integrity combined with a transient encryption of
the message on the wire. Having "isSecureTransport" qualify the
security characteristics of the Document Flow is IMHO, a poor
design. I would much prefer that isConfidential, isAuthenticated
and isTamperProof have the enumeration of "persistent",
"transient" and "none" (default) such that valid combinations
of security mechanisms might be applied.

Suggestion for Change to BPSS Spec:

For isConfidential, isAuthenticated and isTamperProof, change
the type from boolean to enumerated value.

Make the list of possible values be "persistent", "transient",
"persistent-and-transient", "none" with the default being "none".

The value of the attribute, if other than "none" could be
interpreted as "at least <value>".  Thus, if the value were
"transient" it would be interpreted as "at least transient"
which could mean that the parties might choose to adopt a
persistent form of the appropriate countermeasure if they were
more paranoid than the authors of the process. A value of
"persistent" would be interpreted as "at least persistent" which
could be augmented with transient countermeasures (e.g. a digitally
signed message carried over a bilaterally authenticated SSL connection).

Issue Comments:

Background material:
Some comments were posted against V0.99
http://www.ebxml.org/project_teams/jdt/ts/SpecificationSchemaV0.99.pdf.
The current draft being revised is V1.01
http://www.ebxml.org/specs/ebBPSS.pdf or
http://www.ebxml.org/specs/ebBPSS.doc.

David Smiley
Director of Standards
Mercator Software
540.338.3355



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