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Subject: RE: [egov] Secure Workflow. Was: [egov] "Dry" and "Wet" signatures - A definition


Anders-
 
I strikes me that part of your step two, the phrase "possible future references", could raise some privacy concerns.  Perhaps it should be more explicit about reusing a hash of the signature, not the signature itself?
 
Chris
 


From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren@telia.com]
Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2005 6:55 AM
To: Duane Nickull
Cc: eGov OASIS
Subject: [egov] Secure Workflow. Was: [egov] "Dry" and "Wet" signatures - A definition

Duane,
I may have been unclear but my intention was not alluding that there any major security issues hidden here. 
 
For a universal signature/document system like Adobe's, these terms may indeed be flawed (or not apply) as you say.  A web-only signature scheme may though be differently architected and in such schemes the terms Dry and Wet terms are not entirely wrong.

My personal preference is that a possible standards effort should only target Dry signatures as these (in a web environment NB), are more flexible due to the separation of "user views" (static documents in arbitrary formats), signatures, and possible associated transaction data.

Secure Workflow
 
A further complexity is that few organizations including the US federal agencies have yet begun to look on how secure messaging is to be accomplished on a wider scale except by using e-mail.
 
However, e-mail has huge limitations for sophisticated (automated and interactive) workflow compared to web based systems where the "transaction" and the "view", are typically not using a common representation.  The latter of course has a major impact on how signatures can be utilized.
 
I have personally "toyed" with a number of use cases in order to clear the picture for myself (to begin with...).  One simple but still pretty universal such use-case is the e-purchasing process where one or more employees are running an internal workflow system where a purchase request is, after proper authorization, converted into a purchase order and sent to a supplier. 
 
My own take on the aforementioned e-purchasing process and using the web is as follows:
 
1. The user is (when he considers him as ready), presented a completed requisition proposal in for example HTML or PDF, which he is requested to sign and submit.   In the background the actual data is usually held by the web server session in a "computer-friendly" format.
 
2. After signature validation etc by the workflow system. the requisition is archived together with the user's signature for possible future references
 
3. Assuming the user is the final authorizer, a purchase order is now created in a B2B-network specific format (like UBL or EDI), based on the requisition data (kept in the web session).
 
4.  The completed purchase order is then archived in a table linked to the signed requisition for possible future references.
 
5.  Finally, the purchase order is secured[*] and sent away for fulfillment in a B2B-network defined way
 
Steps 2-5 are automatically performed by the workflow system (server).  Except for user signatures, the scheme above is the de-facto standard way of performing B2B operations.
 
regards
Anders Rundgren
Working for a major US computer security company but here acting as an individual
 
*]  This part is unfortunately a major problem for many people working with PKI as it is really the workflow system that creates, secures, and sends purchase orders to external suppliers.  Due to this, existing [and widely used] B2B schemes are almost exclusively non-secured or are using shared secrets as such schemes (in spite of being completely inferior) seem to pass without major consideration, while "signing PKI-servers", immediately brings in the legal department ("a machine has no will or legal power"), the security experts ("this is violating end-to-end security"), and forces most such efforts into a dead halt.  A maybe vane hope, is that these very interesting issues will be properly "aired" when/if a web signature standards process is launched.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Duane Nickull" <
dnickull@adobe.com>
Cc: "eGov OASIS" <
egov@lists.oasis-open.org>
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2005 19:41
Subject: Re: [egov] "Dry" and "Wet" signatures - A definition


Anders et al:

I will suggest you may want to think about this differently.  Many
signature mechanisms work in a way that mitigate the problem you are
hinting at without having to make this distinction.  Attempting to make
two classes of signature for mutable vs. immutable content is flawed IMO
since you would have to fully understand every possible way a document
or content *might* be modified.  This is simply beyond the grasp of any
group of people since there are so many variables (metadata changes,
versions, file names etc.) plus you are relying on third party vendor
statements to be 100% accurate.

A better methodology is to stipulate that at the time of signing, a hash
is made of the exact content using state of the art algorithms and if
the content later changes, the signature block is flagged to indicate
that there have been changes since it was signed and let the actor
decide how they want to proceed.  Adobe Acrobat's signature method works
this way.  If for any reason, any of it changes, the signature
presentation is flagged to indicate such.  This method was perfected by
Adobe, RSA, Entrust, VeriSign, GeoTrust, and ActivCard.  There is a lot
of information available on this from our website:
http://www.adobe.com/security/digsig.html

The attached file was signed, then changed to demonstrate this.  If you
go to the signature field, you can click on the triangle symbol by the
green check mark.  It will open a dialog window that tells you the
document is still the same, but the values themselves have been altered
since (this is important to distinguish between).  If you select
"signature properties", you get even more information.

Under the summary, the window will note any changes.  If you select the
"document" tab, a modification details window appears.  There is a
button that allows you to generate a change log to compute modifications
subsequent to signing the document.  You can also select 'View Signed
Version' to see the version that was signed and compare the two documents.

I agree that mutability detection algorithms are complex.  Our mechanism
was the result of numerous companies collaborating with customers to
ensure all legal and technical problems were solved.  This was a
somewhat lengthly process.

Best wishes.

Duane

Anders Rundgren wrote:

> Dear list,
> In a previous posting where I referred to some discussions concerning
> a possible Web Sign standards effort within OASIS, "Dry" and "Wet"
> signatures were mentioned.  Several off-list messages indicate that
> these terms need a proper explanation.
>
> This comes to no big surprise as these terms have actually been coined
> by myself in the absence of an established terminology in this
> actually rather virgin field.
>
> *"Wet" web-signatures
> *An editable document, be it an MS Word document or an HTML form with
> edit fields, radio buttons etc. is filled-in and signed by the user
> and then sent to the service provider.
>
> *"Dry" web-signatures*
> The user is (after an arbitrary interactive process with a service
> provider), presented, a static (read-only) document and is requested
> to sign it in order to indicate "acceptance".  Since the document
> actually comes from the service provider, the result sent to the
> service provider is typically only a detached signature of the shown
> document.

> *Further comments*
> These schemes represent two different schools, one which tries to
> mimic the existing paper form world, while the other scheme is more
> aligned with how the web is currently used.

> *Implications*
> Superficially these schemes may appear similar, but that is indeed not
> the case; there is probably a 10-to-1 difference in complexity unless
> you restrict "Wet" signatures to only support a single document
> format.  The reason for this increase in complexity is that each
> document format has its own native signature format (or has no defined
> signature format at all), as well as its own input data validation
> scheme.  Using "Dry" detached signatures, you can achieve the same
> thing as S/MIME does, namely document format independence with respect
> to the signature process (except for some trivial canonicalizations). 
> Possible input data validation is assumed to have been carried out in
> earlier phases of a web session, using standard web methodology. 
> There are numerous other implications as well concerning the use of
> "Wet" and "Dry" signatures, but these are far outside the range of an
> e-mail posting.

> Anders Rundgren
> Working for a major US computer security company but here acting as an
> individual




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