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Subject: Re: [ekmi] Some updates


I would suggest the spec include two things:  status code and a status 
message.  Error code standardization is a bigger effort (may be suitable 
for future versions of the spec).

Tomas Gustavsson wrote:
>
> I wholeheartedly agree that we need to give some starting errors for 
> the vendors. Otherwise interoperability will be impossible, or very 
> bad. Future revisions of the standard can standardize more error codes 
> that are found out to be important.
>
> Regards,
> Tomas
>
> Allen wrote:
>> Arshad,
>>
>> I think the schema you propose for error codes, my only concern is 
>> that there might not be enough space for future development. Perhaps 
>> an extra 0 and expand the numbers to 3 digits might solve this 
>> potential problem. The risks of running out of numbers is primarily 
>> with the vendor block.
>>
>> Also the vendor block, as you point out, might have a problem if two 
>> different vendors use the same number for different purposes, 
>> creating potential confusion. We might want to assign blocks within 
>> this space by request from the vendors. With the extra digit I doubt 
>> we'd run out of space all that soon. With only 4 digits we can only 
>> have 9 vendor specific groups. With 5 digits this would allow 99, 
>> more than we'll likely need.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Allen
>>
>> Arshad Noor wrote:
>>> I like that view of Permissions.  I never thought of it from that
>>> perspective, and it makes sense.  Any other thoughts from others?
>>>
>>> WRT the error-codes, it is to define some with standard OASIS-
>>> specified error messages and leave a block of numbers open for
>>> vendor-specific error messages, such as something like the
>>> following (it doesn't have to look like this, but its one option):
>>>
>>> SKSML-ERR-0001 to SKSML-ERR-0099: Authentication errors
>>> SKSML-ERR-0100 to SKSML-ERR-0199: Authorization errors
>>> SKSML-ERR-0200 to SKSML-ERR-0299: Policy errors
>>> SKSML-ERR-0300 to SKSML-ERR-0399: Cache errors
>>> SKSML-ERR-0400 to SKSML-ERR-0499: Miscellaneous errors
>>> SKSML-ERR-1000 to SKSML-ERR-1999: Vendor-block
>>>
>>> SKSML-MSG-0001 to SKSML-MSG-0099: Authentication messages (not errors)
>>> ....
>>> ...
>>> SKSML-MSG-1000 to SKSML-MSG-1999: Vendor-block
>>>
>>> If we wanted to get fancy, we could even have vendor implementations
>>> "register" with the TC and get a unique block so it looks like the
>>> following:
>>>
>>> SKSML-ERR-1000 and SKSML-MSG-1000 ....: Vendor A block
>>> SKSML-ERR-2000 and SKSML-MSG-2000 ....: Vendor B block
>>> SKSML-ERR-3000 and SKSML-MSG-3000 ....: Vendor C block
>>>
>>> and so on, so that there are no collisions of messages if a company
>>> is using server implementations from two (or more) different vendors
>>> (as is likely to happen as with DBMS and LDAP implementations).  I'm
>>> sure SysAdmins and SecurityAdmins will love that in the standard.
>>>
>>> Arshad
>>>
>>> Davi Ottenheimer wrote:
>>>> permitted means whitelist, whereas restricted means blacklist to 
>>>> me. permitted makes more sense if it is a whitelist of what can be 
>>>> done with the key.
>>>>
>>>> 15 minutes seems like a slow search and replace function. :)
>>>>
>>>> not sure about the second question. the option is to do some error 
>>>> codes and leave it open to development or leave all open? i would 
>>>> choose the former over latter.
>>>>
>>>> davi
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----- Original Message ----
>>>> From: Arshad Noor <arshad.noor@strongauth.com>
>>>> To: ekmi@lists.oasis-open.org
>>>> Sent: Friday, September 26, 2008 2:23:36 PM
>>>> Subject: [ekmi] Some updates
>>>>
>>>> Hello everyone,
>>>>
>>>> Some quick updates on events in the last week:
>>>>
>>>> 1) The IEEE held the first Key Management Summit in Baltimore
>>>>     this week.  It was a good event, considering it was being
>>>>     held for the first time.  About 75-80 people attended.
>>>>
>>>>     While most attendees were storage vendors (members of the
>>>>     IEEE 1619.3 Working Group), there were some end-users from
>>>>     the financial industry and government.
>>>>
>>>>     A concern was voiced that the industry must coalesce around
>>>>     a single standard - and soon.  The trouble is that OASIS is
>>>>     focused more at the application layer and only does XML-based
>>>>     protocols, while the IEEE WG is divided over whether it needs
>>>>     XML at all or XML + a compact, binary protocol.
>>>>
>>>>     If they only choose to do a binary protocol, then it makes it
>>>>     possible to have one standard that supports SKSML + IEEE-binary,
>>>>     set a flag to indicate which one the payload is carrying.
>>>>     Vendors may be required to implement both, but users will be
>>>>     the winners.
>>>>
>>>>     If they decide they want to work on an XML version too, and
>>>>     they vote to NOT use SKSML, then it has potential for lots of
>>>>     confusion in the market.  However, I think there was sufficient
>>>>     emphasis in KMS that there should be one standard.
>>>>
>>>>     I have promised to have a follow-up conversation with the Chair
>>>>     of the 1619.3 WG to see how we might come closer to an solution.
>>>>     I'll keep the TC updated on this after the conversation.
>>>>
>>>> 2) A ballot is currently out, seeking to decide which design
>>>>     firm to use for creating the EKMI flash demo.  While 100%
>>>>     of voting members have cast their ballot, until the vote
>>>>     closes on 9/27, the vote is not final.  But, we hope to
>>>>     have a decision by next week so that OASIS Administration
>>>>     can start the contract paper-work.
>>>>
>>>> 3) We have completed our Public Review of SKSML, as required
>>>>     by OASIS rules and as one can see, we did not receive any
>>>>     comments:  http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/ekmi-comment/.
>>>>
>>>>     While this might sound discouraging, I do not view it as
>>>>     such.  Based on my experience in presenting EKMI/SKSML to
>>>>     various groups around the world over the last 2 years, I
>>>>     have not heard one person say that we have designed an
>>>>     insecure protocol, or one that does not meet business needs.
>>>>     I believe we have hit this ball out of the park this time.
>>>>
>>>>     Given this, we can technically move towards voting on a
>>>>     Committee Specification (CS) and also move towards asking
>>>>     for an OASIS Standards vote.
>>>>
>>>>     However, there are two items I wanted to bring up to the
>>>>     TC on the specification, and I would like to get feedback
>>>>     from the TC before I setup the ballot for the CS:
>>>>
>>>>     a) The protocol has a <Permissions> element that tells
>>>>        conformant symmetric-key client libraries (SKCL) what
>>>>        the library is permitted to do with the key.  Since
>>>>        the permissions are a form of restrictions, does it
>>>>        make sense to change the name of this element from
>>>>        <Permissions> to <Restrictions> and each of the
>>>>        <Permitted.....> element to <Restricted.....>?  This
>>>>        would change, for example, <PermittedDates> to
>>>>        <RestrictedDates>, <PermittedTimes> to <RestrictedTimes>,
>>>>        etc.  Does this make the protocol any clearer?  Remember
>>>>        that NO end-user will ever see this.  No application
>>>>        developer will ever see the protocol; but developers
>>>>        who're implementing SKSML and building a library and/or
>>>>        product to use it, will definitely see it.  This is a
>>>>        very, very small number of developers.  While they will
>>>>        definitely get the meaning regardless of whether we call
>>>>        it <Permitted...> or <Restricted...>, I thought I'd ask
>>>>        the TC for its opinion on this.
>>>>
>>>>        The impact of this change is minimal; a find-and-replace
>>>>        will fix the document within 15 minutes.
>>>>
>>>>     b) Any application making a call to an SKS server may get
>>>>        error messages that must be processed by SKCLs.  Should
>>>>        we specify standard error-codes and messages that MUST
>>>>        be implemented and still leave room for vendor-specific
>>>>        codes/numbers?  Or should we leave all error-codes and
>>>>        messages open to vendors, completely?
>>>>
>>>>        The impact of this is that we, as a group, must identify
>>>>        and determine all potential error-codes and messages and
>>>>        specify them.  This could take a few weeks or a month, at
>>>>        a minimum.
>>>>
>>>> Let me know what you all think.  If I don't hear back by Frdiay
>>>> (Oct 3rd), I'll setup the ballot for the CS vote next week.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks and have a great weekend everyone.
>>>>
>>>> Arshad Noor
>>>> StrongAuth, Inc.
>>>>



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