Re: [election-services] Re: Defining a trusted voting process

["David Webber \(XML\)" <david@drrw.info>]

Simon,

Thanks for the confirmation on the "dual-process" method.

I agree that it appears to hold best promise in tackling a
variety of issues and exposing whenever a concerted
manipulation effort is going on.

Remote access to voting I think is mostly beneficial - since
people have to opt for that - eg - if they fear intimidation
they can go to the public voting centers.

But - the advantages of remote voting for voters is clear -
from busy families to disabled or elderly who might not
otherwise vote.  You are right that confirmation mailings
can be a target for tampering - and vulnerable citizens
do need to be made aware of those issues too.

Clearly ensuring secure mail services and delivery
is always important for society.  One option could be
to use banking services as an alternate secure
confirmation delivery service.

Our goal would be to optimise these benefits that
digital voting can bring - without jeapordizing the
value that traditional paper-based ballots have.

DW

----- Original Message ----- 
From: <sibain@tendotzero.com>
To: <election-services@lists.oasis-open.org>
Sent: Friday, February 18, 2005 2:12 AM
Subject: [election-services] Re: Defining a trusted voting process


> David.
>
> This looks good. I would put in here a few points which in the UK have
been highlighted with postal ballots again this week.
>
> Elected officials from one of our major political parties have been
accused of "Ballot Stuffing". That is going to people and saying "Give us
your ballot and we will post them for you". Hmmm gullible the people maybe.
Trusting yes, scared or just very naive? Whatever the reason it would seem
that it has happened. So I think a method to overcome this would be vital.
This is not an issue with postal ballots as much as ballots being cast in a
non public place. Somewhere that an individual is not open to abuse,
coercion or threats. But that is I am sure for a different group in a
different organisation.
>
> As far as this is concerned In the UK in May 2003 we had the users posted
with 2 separate login credentials, if they had opted to use e-Voting. This
seemed to work well, and meant that any interference was kept to a minimum
as users had no knowledge of these login credentials prior to the ballot
starting. I also think that the postal ballot should not hold any user
identification. But only the actual candidate voted for. This should be in a
bar coded form which is machine readable and not human changeable.
Verification could then be carried out anonymously and any discrepancies
easily brought to light in a given ward or election area.
>
> This would not stop people trying to rig ballots, but it would make it
more difficult, as there would be no way in the postal ballot of an
individual knowing who the voter has voted for.9Stopping any intimidation)
They could still of course offer to post the ballots and not do so. However
by doing this the discrepency would be highlighted by the dual count and
also highlight the wards that have problems with ballot rigging and allow
the authorities to act quickly and rerun any ballots where necessary. One or
2 "non posted" would not show and so these people would lose their ballot
however 1 or 2 thousand would be very noticable, and quickly.
>
> All the best
> Simon