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Subject: Re: [election-services] Further musings on the need for VVPAT...
Ahhh Perception is king, I am afraid. OK lets look at the "I really have no way too of knowing - just because I got that email - that my vote was really recorded that way electronically into the system". true, But nor do you if you post it. Has the post lost it??? I have a camera at this moment somewhere in USPS vans lost now for 5 weeks. Our post office here loses Millions of letters a year. Has the little man or lady really verified it or have they just got bored and thrown it away. At some point a person has to start believing in something, or at least a combination of 2 things which is why I like the dual approach. However I do not see that postal on its own is viable, (UK experience). But I do see it as being a very good method of verification for e-Voting methods. Which can be made secure and easy to use. Bring the 2 together and maybe perception will change. Just as it has with online purchasing. Cheers Simon <quote who="David Webber \(XML\)"> > Simon, > > OK - neato method - certainly an option to give > people voting remotely. Personally I'd still > feel edgy about typing in my email address...as > I have no guarantee what the client software is > really doing with it. > > However - I really have no way too of knowing - just > because I got that email - that my vote was really > recorded that way electronically into the system. > That of course is the point of having the paper > record in my hand and submitting it as verification. > > Cheers, DW > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Simon Bain" <sibain@tendotzero.com> > To: "David Webber (XML)" <david@drrw.info> > Cc: <election-services@lists.oasis-open.org> > Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 9:35 AM > Subject: Re: [election-services] Further musings on the need for VVPAT... > > >> David hi. >> >> On point 1 you are only partially correct. Yes some part of the process >> must have details of where to send a confirmation. However not all of >> the >> process needs this. In fact it is far better if only one part does. >> >> User logs in by a PC passing their login credentials. >> Server verifies them and sets up a session on a remote database which is >> encrypted by a hash set at the time the process was started at login. >> This >> has with it a SessionId which is internal to the process. >> >> This SessionId is passed with seperate undisclosed and unknown (Created >> at >> this time) details to the voting server which registers the vote and >> passes back the SessionId to the verification server. It matches the 2 >> and >> responds with a "great thanks very much" or an "O I have screwed up" >> email. >> >> The Voting server has no idea who the user is and does not need to know. >> The SessionId dies before the confirmation email is sent as does the >> session on the database, which itself holds no identifying details. >> >> Yes somebody could hack in at this point. But to decrypt thi slot would >> take one hell of a rack of servers, a while and details of at least 3 >> seperate IP addressess and login details. >> >> Cheers >> Simon >> >> >> <quote who="David Webber \(XML\)"> >> > More from the Vote Here discussions today. >> > >> > Here's what I compiled to support the need for paper >> > in an all digital process involving DREs only! >> > >> > DW >> > >> > 1) You cannot have an anonymous trusted verifiable computer >> > process. eBanking works because it is not anonymous. >> > Every eProcess out there gets to know your email >> > address or account ID to send a confirmation >> > somewhere in the process. If it does not send a >> > confirmation - then you have no verification - the >> > DRE is thus reduced to an entertaining arcade >> > gaming machine - for which you have no >> > guarantees to actually what reality is. >> > That theoretical stumbling block is key to >> > understanding the need for a verifiable paper record >> > in anonymous voting systems. >> > >> > 2) Voters need trust (and US Gov HAVA demands it). >> > Paper is the most trusted mechanism everywhere. >> > >> > 3) The banks have a trusted process that handles >> > billions of paper cheques annually. Their error rates >> > are infintesimally small. These technologies are >> > simple, proven and secure. We need to base a >> > trusted voting process around such crosschecking >> > and accounting methods. There will always be >> > enticing exotic proprietary and uncertified and >> > potentially compromisable technologies offered >> > up - but a trusted process needs to be simple >> > and obvious. >> > >> > 4) We need to develop open public specifications >> > so that there is an open marketplace for solution >> > providers. This is the lesson of railways, telephones, >> > automobiles and electricity. The software industry is >> > no different. >> > >> > >> > >> > To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the roster >> of >> > the OASIS TC), go to >> > > http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/election-services/members/leave_workgroup.php. >> > >> >> >> -- >> Simon Bain >> TENdotZERO >> 0845 056 3377 >> 44 1234 359090 >> 44 (0) 7793 769 846 >> >> To unsubscribe from this mailing list (and be removed from the roster of > the OASIS TC), go to > http://www.oasis-open.org/apps/org/workgroup/election-services/members/leave_workgroup.php. >> >> >> > > -- Simon Bain TENdotZERO 0845 056 3377 44 1234 359090 44 (0) 7793 769 846
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